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Introduction 
In recent years, the agricultural sector in the European Union (EU) is facing new challenges. 
The increasing attention to the relationship between agriculture and the environment and the 
rise in price volatility on agricultural markets has led to a new emphasis on agri-
environmental policies as well as to a search for new risk management strategies for the 
farmer. These trends are strengthened by the evolution of the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) towards an higher allocation of the EU budget to the agri-environmental schemes 
(AESs) over the years and towards a liberalisation of agricultural markets in the EU. 
Nowadays, EU farmers are required to combine the provision of environmental benefits with 
the production of agricultural commodities, whose market price is hardly predictable. In 
addition, the proposed reform of the CAP after 2013 focuses the EU agricultural policy on the 
environmental concern by conditioning the decoupled direct payments to the so called 
‘greening’ and towards the search for new farm risk management tools such as the income 
stabilisation tool.  
The research objective of this PhD thesis is in line with this challenging context, since it 
provides an analysis of the EU AESs from two viewpoints. First, an ex-post analysis aims at 
investigating the AESs for their traditional role as measures which encourage sustainable 
farming while compensating the farmer for the income foregone. The effects of farmers’ 
participation in the AESs on their production plan and on the economic performances are 
analysed in five EU Member States. The existing literature does not comprise any study on 
the AESs which is focused on the impact on farm income and which makes a comparative 
analysis among different Member States. This comparison may have significant policy 
implications since it may reveal the countries where the participation in AESs requires a 
deeper change of the farmers’ production plans and where the effects on farm income are 
stronger. The analysis may also identify whether the agri-environmental payment provides a 
fair compensation of farmers’ income losses arising from program’s participation. Finally, 
such comparison may also indicate where the AESs are effective in promoting sustainable 
farming practices and, by this, it may indirectly shed light on the environmental impact of 
such schemes. This study has been performed by applying a semi-parametric technique which 
combines a Difference-in-Differences estimator with a Propensity Score Matching estimator 
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in order to prevent the selection bias both on observed and time-invariant unobserved 
covariates.  
The second study considers the AESs from an innovative viewpoint and it performs an ex-
ante analysis investigating their role as farm income stabilizer. Although the traditional role of 
these schemes consists in the provision of environmental benefits and their payments wish to 
compensate the income forgone because of the adoption, we argue that they may play a new 
role in presence of increasing agricultural price volatility. Indeed, as these contracts guarantee 
the farmer with a fixed payment per hectare irrespectively of the crop price fluctuations, they 
may act as an  income risk management tool available to the farmer. This study has developed 
a new methodological approach, which represents one of the few attempts to integrate the risk 
component in a Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) framework. We think the 
combination of PMP with risk modelling will be one of the new research frontier in the area 
of mathematical programming  as it allows the use of a calibrated model in analysing farm 
behaviour under uncertainty. The proposed method differs from the few earlier attempts as it 
merges the first two phases of the traditional PMP procedure using the dual relationships of a 
farmer’s expected utility maximisation problem. Therefore, it allows the simultaneous 
estimation of the non linear cost function as well as of the farmer’s risk aversion coefficient 
and of the shadow prices. The estimated model has been used to investigate the potential role 
of an AES as a strategy to cope with risk under different scenarios of crop price volatility. 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 1 provides the background for this thesis by 
discussing the evolution of the CAP and the increasing role of both the rural development 
issues and the environmental concern and by focusing on the analysis of agricultural price 
volatility over time. Chapter 2 presents the comparative ex-post analysis on the effects of the 
AESs on farm performances in five EU Member States. Chapter 3 describes the 
methodological proposal for integrating risk in a PMP framework and provides an empirical 
application where this approach is used to investigate the potential role of an AES as farmer’s 
income stabilizer tool under scenarios of rising crop price volatility. 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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CHAPTER 1 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new 
challenges for agriculture in the European Union  
1.1 THE COMMON AGRICULTURAL POLICY AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
ISSUE 
Over the last decades in developed countries there has been an increasing concern about the 
relationship between agriculture and the environment. In the European Union (EU), the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has introduced environmental measures in order to 
discourage negative environmental externalities and to promote positive externalities of 
agricultural activities. Such a concern was not included in the original framework of the CAP. 
When article 33 of the Treaty of Rome stated the objectives of the CAP in 1957 there were 
not any statements about the environment. Productivity increase, food security, support to 
farm income, stable market and reasonable consumer prices were the starting goals of the 
CAP and the instruments adopted consisted mainly of intervention buying, export subsidies 
and variable import levies. Although the CAP objectives were reached quickly, those market 
distorting mechanisms raised negative consequences soon. The price support resulted in large 
commodities surplus which was disposed on the world market and in large budgetary 
expenses for the EU. In addition the European farmers were isolated from the world market 
signals as they received guaranteed prices and the stress on the productivity led to an 
increasing use of chemical fertilizer and pesticides, which affected negatively the 
environment. Throughout the years the European society became aware that new instruments 
were needed to support farm income as well as to guarantee food security and the role of 
farmers as environmental and landscape service providers. Moreover, the negative 
environmental externalities of agriculture became increasingly important.  
In the seventies and eighties the EU introduced some regulations and directives about 
producer groups, support to mountainous and less favoured areas, improvement of processing 
and marketing conditions for agricultural products and setting up for young farmers. All these 
measures started slightly to shift the focus of agriculture from production only to other related 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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activities. The EU agri-environmental schemes (AESs) were introduced in the eighties as an 
option to be applied by Member States and they became compulsory for all Member States 
with the newly name of ‘accompanying measures’ of the CAP with the Council Regulation 
2078/92 of the Mac Sharry reform. The ‘accompanying measures’ of the MacSharry reform 
included also afforestation incentives and early retirement for farmers. Since Regulation 
2078/92 all Member States were obliged to offer AESs to their farmers, who could participate 
on a voluntary basis. These measures were cofinanced  by the Guarantee Section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) of the EU. AESs promoted 
environmentally sustainable farming practices, through payments that compensated farmers 
for the provision of environmental goods that the market did not reward. Besides the 
introduction of the accompanying measures, the MacSharry reform introduced a radical 
change in farm income support tools: price support was reduced significantly and farmers 
were compensated for this cut by a coupled direct income payment per hectare and per unit of 
livestock. The reduction in price support, which started with the 1992 reform and was further 
strengthened by the following CAP reforms, made the EU farmer production decisions more 
respondent to market signals and avoided the negative consequences of supply surplus. Since 
the MacSharry reform, the CAP has developed towards a stronger market orientation and the 
attention on the link between agriculture and environment has increased.  
The following step towards an agricultural policy considering the environmental concerns 
was the CAP Agenda 2000 reform (Council Regulation of the European Community, 1999), 
which brought together the different measures about rural development, including the AESs, 
into a single legal framework of support for rural development called Pillar 2, while all the 
measures of price support and direct farm income payments conveyed into Pillar 1. All 
measures of rural development converged into a single multiannual budgeting and 
programming approach defined every seven years. Since then, Member States have designed 
their Rural Development Programmes (RDPs) on a national or regional basis by choosing 
among a menu of rural development measures established at the EU level. The national or 
regional design of RDPs allows to account for the heterogeneity in the agricultural systems 
and in the natural resource conditions throughout the EU. All the RDPs must include the 
AESs and the RDPs are cofinanced by the EU and the Member States.  
The 2003 CAP reform (Council Regulation of the European Community, 2003), also called 
the Fishler reform, enhanced the environmental concern of the CAP by introducing the cross 
compliance. The coupled direct payments introduced by the Mac Sharry reform has been 
replaced by a decoupled direct payment, based on historical farmer payments, which is 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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subject to the compliance of minimum requirements about sustainable farming. Furthermore, 
the reform made modulation compulsory, meaning that a percentage of farm income support 
was cut and shifted to Pillar 2. In the new budget period 2007-2013 the RD measures have 
been reorganized and classified in four axes according to their objectives as set out in Council 
Regulation 1698/2005. The first three axes are thematic axes and aim at specific goals, while 
the fourth axis, the Leader, is a methodological axis, which promotes local bottom-up rural 
development strategies. Axis 1 groups the measures that aim at increasing the competitiveness 
of agriculture; axis 2 consists of the measures that protect the environment and maintain the 
rural landscape; the measures of axis 3 target towards the guarantee of the quality of life in 
rural areas and the diversification of rural activities. National and regional RDPs have to 
include all the four axes and each Member State or region decides which measures to activate 
in each axis from a EU list of 43 measures, as well as the EU and national budget allocation to 
each axis. AESs are included in axis 2 and they are compulsory for all RDPs. Each Member 
State must guarantee a minimum percentage of RD budget allocated to each axis: 10% for 
axis 1, 25% for axis 2, 10% for axis 3 and 5% for Leader. The new RD framework introduced 
also a single funding and programming instrument for rural development, the European 
Agriculture Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). For candidate countries a specific fund 
has been created called IPARD, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance for Rural 
Development.  
Table 1.1 lists all the RD measures proposed by the EU, grouped in the four axes, and shows 
the programmed allocation of EAFRD among the four axes and among measures in each axis 
for the budget period 2007-2013. In addition to the 43 measures proposed to all Member 
States there are two measures specifically devoted to Romania and Bulgaria ‘Provision of 
farm advisory and extension services in Bulgaria and Romania’ and ‘Complement to direct 
payment’ and there is an additional measure named ‘Technical assistance’. The EU budget 
addressed to RD in the financial period 2007-2013 is 96.2 billion euro and most of the budget 
is assigned to axis 2 (45.1%), followed by axis 1 (33.1%) and axis 3 (13.4%). The Leader axis 
absorbs only 6.3% of the budget. At the EU level, the measure within axis 1 gaining the 
highest share of the EAFRD is “Modernization of agricultural holdings” (36.1%), while to 
AESs are allocated more than 50% of EAFRD money addressed to axis 2. AESs is the most 
significant measure in terms of EU funding for Rural Development, since it absorbs 22.7 
billion (23.6% of the total EU budget for RD), followed by ”Modernisation of agricultural 
holdings” (11.9%) and “Payments to farmers in less favoured area, other than mountain” 
(7.6%) (Figure 1.1). Considering the breakdown of the EU budget among the three axes in 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
  
6 
 
each Member States (and redistributing the Leader funds to the respective axis), significant 
differences arise (Figure 1.2). Eight countries, Belgium, Spain, Cyprus, Lithuania, Hungary 
Poland, Portugal and Romania address more than 40% of the EAFRD to axis 1, while Ireland, 
the UK and Austria allocate more than 70% of their funds to axis 2. None of the EU countries 
assign more than 35% of the EU budget to axis 3. Within axis 1 the measure ‘Modernisation 
of agricultural holdings’ represents the most relevant measure in terms of EAFRD budget in 
most of the countries, and the same is true for AESs within axis 2. In particular, for AESs the 
share equals 82.6% in Belgium, 74.2% in the UK, 74% in Sweden and 72.1% in the 
Netherlands. ‘Basic services for the economy and rural population’ and ‘Village renewal and 
development’ are the two measures of axis 3 with the highest allocation of EU funds in most 
Member States (Figure 1.3, Figure 1.4, Figure 1.5). 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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Table 1.1 Planned allocation of the EAFRD contribution over the axes and the measures, 2007-2013 
Measures 
Financial Plan 2007-2013 
000 euro %axis 
 
 
  
Axis 1 - Improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sector 
111 Vocational training and information actions 953,625 2.9 
112 Setting up of young farmers 2,890,772 9.1 
113 Early retirement 2,502,738 7.9 
114 Use of advisory services 289,286 0.9 
115 Setting up of management, relief and advisory services 68,956 0.2 
121 Modernisation of agricultural holdings 11,508,393 36.1 
122 Improvement of the economic value of forests 536,664 1.7 
123 Adding value to agricultural and forestry products 5,650,023 17.7 
124 Cooperation for development of new products, processes and technologies in the 
agriculture and food sector and forestry sector 
323,832 1.0 
125 Infrastructure related to the development and adaptation of agriculture and forestry 4,822,287 15.1 
126 Restoring agricultural production potential damaged by natural disasters  545,251 1.7 
131 Meeting standards based on Community legislation 80,942 0.3 
132 Participation of farmers in food quality schemes 17,2624 0.5 
133 Information and promotion activities 174,815 0.6 
141 Semi-subsistence farming 883,854 2.8 
142 Producer groups 234,239 0.7 
143 Provisions of farm advisory and extension services in Bulgaria and Romania 15,773 0.05 
144 Holdings undergoing restructuring due to a reform of a common market organisation 194,018 0.6 
Total axis 1 31,848,092 33.1 
    
Axis 2 - Improving the environment and the countryside through land management 
211 Natural handicap payments to farmers in mountain areas 6,503,150 15.0 
212 Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than mountain areas 7,288,947 16.8 
213 Natura 2000 payments and payments linked to Directive 2000/60/EC (WFD) 621,022 1.4 
214 Agri-environment payments 22,743,913 52.4 
215 Animal welfare payments 717,568 1.7 
216 Non-productive investments 587,948 1.4 
221 First afforestation of agricultural land 2,095,997 4.8 
222 First establishment of agro-forestry systems on agricultural land 17,875 0.04 
223 First afforestation of non agricultural land 283,557 0.7 
224 Natura 2000 payments 71,877 0.2 
225 Forest-environment payments 196,724 0.5 
226 Restoring forest potential and introducing prevention actions 1,546,929 3.6 
227 Non-productive investments  742,563 1.7 
Total axis 2 43,418,070 45.1 
    
Axis 3 - Improving the quality of life in rural areas and encouraging diversification of economic activity 
311 Diversification into non-agricultural activities 1,308,279 10.2 
312 Business creation and development 2,097,805 16.3 
313 Encouragement of tourism activities 1,244,089 9.7 
321 Basic services for economy and rural population 3,400,838 26.4 
322 Village renewal and development 3,332,644 25.9 
323 Conservation and upgrading of the rural heritage 1,249,638 9.7 
331 Training and information 114,207 0.9 
341 Skills acquisition, animation and implementation of local development strategies 130,788 1.0 
Total axis 3 12,878,288 13.4 
    
Axis 4 - Leader 
411 Implementing local development strategies. Competitiveness 551,383 9.1 
412 Implementing local development strategies. Environment/land management 171,106 2.8 
413 Implementing local development strategies. Quality of life/diversification 4,066,244 67 
421 Implementing cooperation projects 276,690 4.6 
431 Running the local action group, acquiring skills and animating the territory  1,006,225 16.6 
Total axis 4 6,071,648 6.3 
    
511 Technical assistance 1,566,196 100.0 
611 Complement to direct payments 459,428 100.0 
    
 TOTAL 96,241,722 100.0 
Source: European Commission, 2012: 346  
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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Figure 1.1 Top measures of RDPs in terms of the EAFRD contribution, 2007-2013  
 Source: European Commission, 2012: 294 
Figure 1.2 Allocation of the EAFRD budget over the three RD axes in each Member State, 2007-2013 
 Source: European Commission, 2012: 292 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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Figure 1.3 Share of the EAFRD contribution allocated to each axis 1 measure in each Member States, 2007-2013  
 
Source: European Commission, 2012: 297
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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Figure 1.4 Share of the EAFRD contribution allocated to each axis 2 measure in each Member States, 2007-2013  
 
Source: European Commission, 2012: 297
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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Figure 1.5 Share of the EAFRD contribution allocated to each axis 3 measure in each Member States, 2007-2013  
 
Source: European Commission, 2012: 297
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
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1.2 THE AGRI-ENVIRONMENTAL SCHEMES IN THE EU: SOME FIGURES 
The current AESs have maintained similar objectives and institutional settings of the AESs 
introduced in the eighties. They are voluntary contracts, of at least 5 years, stipulated between 
the farmer and the government. Under these contracts, the farmer provides environmental 
goods that go beyond the minimum requirements of the cross compliance and of the European 
and national compulsory environmental regulations, and they receive a fixed per hectare 
payment to face the additional costs and the loss of income linked to these commitments. The 
main objective of the AESs consists of reducing the agricultural pollution risks as well as 
protecting biodiversity and landscape. As part of RDPs, the AESs can be designed at national, 
regional or local level and this allows to take into account the heterogeneity of the natural 
characteristics and agricultural systems throughout the EU Member States. The agri-
environmental and animal welfare programmes are the only measures that are compulsory 
present in all RDPs and they represent the main policy instrument to fulfil the environmental 
objectives of the CAP. It is possible to classify the AESs in the EU through several broad 
categories: organic farming, input reduction, crop rotation, reduction of irrigation, 
extensification of farming systems, action to conserve soil, management of landscape, pasture 
and high nature value farming, protection of rare varieties of plants and of animal breeds in 
danger of extinction, biodiversity maintenance. These broad categories are built up of 
different measures which may or may not be the same across Member States.  
The AESs are not only the measures with the highest share of EU budget allocated to RD but 
their relevance is strengthened by the share of EU land subject to them and by the upward 
trend of the EU budget allocated to these measures. The percentage of the EU utilized 
agricultural area (UAA) under AESs equalled 21% in 2009 with an higher share for the EU-
15 (25%) as compared to EU-12 (10%) (Table 1.2). At the Member State level, Luxembourg 
was the country displaying the highest share (92%), followed by Finland (91%), Sweden 
(82%) and Austria (70%). The EU contribution to the AESs shows an increasing trend over 
the period 1993-2010 (Figure 1.6). In 2010 the EU money allocated to these schemes 
amounted to 3.03 billion euro compared to only 76 million euro in 1993, the first year of 
integration of the AESs into the CAP framework. The drop of this contribution in 2007 
compared to 2006 can be explained by the slow start in the implementation of AESs in the 
new financial period 2007-2013. If we look at the average total contribution (EU and national 
contribution) paid in the period 2007-2009 per hectare of UAA under AESs, this was about 
163 euro at the EU level, with large differences across Member States (Figure 1.7). Malta and 
Environmental concerns and price volatility: the new challenges for agriculture 
  
13 
 
Cyprus were the countries which guaranteed the largest average payment to their farmers 
under an AE contract, respectively 618 euro/ha and 609 euro/ha per year. The Netherlands 
and Greece compensated the participation to AESs with more than 400 euro/ha per year, 
while in Estonia, Luxemburg and Austria the contribution was larger than 300 euro/ha. The 
UK and Belgium corresponded to their AESs adopters less than 60 euro/ha, which was the 
lowest contribution among the EU Member States over the period 2007-2009. 
Table 1.3 shows the breakdown of the area under AESs by type of action in each Member 
State in 2009, while Figure 1.8 refers to the EU level only. Only the land put under contract 
since 2007 has been considered. Management of landscape, pasture and high nature value 
actions (HNV) were the measures which covered the largest share of the UAA under AESs 
commitments at the EU-level (38.6%), as well as in the EU-15 (35.8%) and EU-12 (64%). 
The countries in which these measures were most important were Estonia (100%), Romania 
(99%), France (88%), Bulgaria (81%) and Sweden (71%). At the EU level these measures 
were followed by measures promoting extensification (14.2%) and entry level schemes 
(13.3%). Although organic farming covered only 8% of the EU land committed in 2009, this 
share was up to 78.7% in Denmark, 59.2% in Latvia and 49% in Lithuania. All the land under 
AESs in Luxembourg and most of the committed land in the UK and Finland was under the 
‘entry level scheme’, which refers to a broad categories of environmental management actions 
aiming at providing environmental benefits just above a reference baseline, in order to receive 
the agri-environmental payment. 
The overview presented above clarifies the main steps of the integration of the environmental 
concerns in the EU agricultural policy and the relevance of AESs within the CAP. The 
expectation is that the focus on environmentally-friendly practices of agriculture will be 
further strengthened in the future; the ‘greening’ proposed for the post-2013 CAP supports 
this prediction. 
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 Table 1.2 Area under AESs in 2009  
 UAA under AESs (ha) UAA (ha) 
Share of UAA under AESs 
(%) 
    
EU-27 38,552,918 184,887,000 21 
EU-15 33,561,363 133,208,600 25 
EU-12 4,991,555 51,678,400 10 
Belgium 349,465 1,365,200 26 
Bulgaria 407,38 5,029,600 1 
Czech Republic 624,897 3,545,800 18 
Denmark 311,123 2,639,000 12 
Germany 5,880,000 16,889,600 35 
Estonia 423,508 931,800 45 
Ireland 773,200 4,189,900 18 
Greece 412,000 3,819,000 11 
Spain 4,093,189 24,190,400 17 
France 4,053,323 35,177,800 12 
Italy 2,496,903 13,337,700 19 
Cyprus 11,000 120,900 9 
Latvia 375,000 1,833,000 20 
Lithuania 179,935 2,689,000 7 
Luxemburg 120,000 130,800 92 
Hungary 1,078,000 5,783,300 19 
Malta 758 10,300 7 
Netherlands 93,036 1,921,400 5 
Austria 2,205,771 3,168,600 70 
Poland 472,262 15,624,600 3 
Portugal 345,451 3,691,100 9 
Romania 931,815 13,711,300 7 
Slovenia 205,000 468,500 44 
Slovakia 648641 1,930,300 34 
Finland 2,097,864 2295900 91 
Sweden 2,525,039 3,067,200 82 
UK 7,805,000 17,325,000 45 
Source: Eurostat  
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Figure 1. 6 Trend of the EU contribution to AESs 1993-2010, million euro 
 
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data  
Figure 1. 7 Total public (EU +national) payment per ha of UAA under AE commitments, annual average 
2007-2009 (euro) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data  
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Figure 1.8 Share of UAA under AESs by type of action, 2009 (contract signed and implemented since 
2007, RDPs 2007-2013) 
 
Source: own elaboration on Eurostat data 
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Table 1.3 Breakdown of the share of UAA under AESs per type of action in each EU Member State, 2009 
  
Entry 
Level 
Scheme 
Organic 
farming 
Integrated 
production 
Extensification 
Crop 
rotation, 
set-aside 
Reduction of 
irrigation  
Soil 
conservation 
Management of 
landscape, 
pastures and 
HNV 
Creation of 
ecological 
features 
Maintenance of 
habitats for 
biodiversity 
Endangered 
species 
Other  
actions 
EU-27 13.33  8.41  2.12  14.24  4.15  0.06  8.14  38.58  0.60  5.48  0.16  4.71  
EU-15 14.78  8.00  2.07  14.58  4.55  0.07  8.27  35.82  0.67  5.81  0.16  5.22  
EU-12 0.00  12.14  2.58  11.13  0.51  0.00  7.02  64.00  0.00  2.41  0.21  0.00  
Belgium 0.00  18.81  0.00  5.31  1.83  0.00  16.60  10.66  39.72  6.85  0.21  0.00  
Bulgaria 0.00  8.77  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  7.06  81.04  0.00  0.00  3.12  0.00  
Czech Republic 0.00  28.62  4.41  15.58  0.00  0.00  1.67  48.92  0.00  0.80  0.00  0.00  
Denmark 0.00  78.71  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.06  0.00  20.56  0.67  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Germany 0.00  17.21  0.70  10.28  18.54  0.00  13.23  32.76  0.33  6.86  0.00  0.08  
Estonia 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Ireland 0.00  0.74  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  99.26  
Greece 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  
Spain 0.00  12.81  4.46  5.14  1.99  0.00  1.71  7.58  0.45  45.30  0.68  19.87  
France 0.24  0.93  0.00  2.11  5.13  0.27  0.22  88.40  1.33  1.33  0.04  0.01  
Italy 0.00  26.06  24.82  11.38  3.83  0.00  3.48  27.18  0.37  1.43  1.43  0.02  
Cyprus 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  
Latvia 0.00  59.22  0.29  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  22.35  0.00  18.15  0.00  0.00  
Lithuania 0.00  49.07  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  25.31  0.00  25.61  0.00  0.00  
Luxembourg 100.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Hungary 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  100.00  
Malta 0.00  0.00  0.00  85.51  0.00  0.00  0.00  5.85  1.24  0.00  7.40  0.00  
Netherlands 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  14.65  0.96  84.39  0.00  0.00  
Austria 0.00  9.34  2.64  47.04  0.00  0.00  18.13  14.62  0.00  1.96  0.29  5.97  
Poland 0.00  18.93  0.00  32.27  0.00  0.00  25.10  23.46  0.02  0.00  0.21  0.00  
Portugal 0.00  18.28  48.35  10.40  0.00  0.00  3.08  19.89  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
Romania 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.70  98.73  0.00  0.57  0.00  0.00  
Slovenia 0.00  8.58  20.52  0.23  6.38  0.00  21.51  40.75  0.00  0.32  1.72  0.00  
Slovakia 0.00  5.94  3.92  65.20  0.00  0.00  11.29  0.00  0.00  13.65  0.00  0.00  
Finland 40.79  2.75  0.00  28.19  3.82  0.00  23.96  0.21  0.06  0.06  0.00  0.16  
Sweden 0.00  13.07  0.00  15.99  0.00  0.00  0.00  70.68  0.25  0.00  0.00  0.00  
UK 93.90  4.33  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  1.77  
Source: Eurostat 
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1.3  THE PRICE VOLATILITY ON AGRICULTURAL MARKETS: THE INCREASE 
OF UNCERTAINTY FOR FARMERS  
Another recent challenge that EU farmers must face is the increase in agricultural price 
volatility that has been experienced in recent years. By price volatility we refer to price 
variation, which becomes a problem when it is large and unpredictable, and as such creates 
uncertainty which may lead to sub-optimal producer decisions. The price volatility leads to an 
uncertain farmer’s income which may produce negative effects on investment decisions. 
Looking at the long term development of agricultural commodity prices there is no evidence 
of a rising trend in volatility, but if we look at the medium term, since 2006 volatility has been 
higher compared to the previous two decades and it shows an increasing trend since 1990 
(Figure 1.9). According to a study of the European Commission (2010) the price volatility of 
agricultural products has increased in both the EU and world markets in the period 1997-
2010. The price volatility in world markets has been stronger than in the EU; however, the EU 
had a sharper increase in volatility than the world market in the period 2004-2010 compared 
to 1997-2003. Such higher price volatility increase in the EU is the consequence of the 
reforms of the CAP towards liberalisation. The expectation is that the recent price volatility 
has not been a temporary phenomenon, but it will likely persist in the future on agricultural 
markets, while agricultural prices are expected to increase (OECD, 2011). The reasons for this 
expectation are the increasing connection of the agricultural markets with financial markets, 
which may lead to speculative activities, the rising demand of agricultural products by the 
energy markets, which links agricultural markets with oil markets, and the uncertainty about 
the impact of climate change (DG Agricultural and Rural Development, 2011). Furthermore, 
world agricultural production should increase by 70% in 2050 to feed a world population 
which is prospected to reach 9 billion (OECD, 2011); as a consequence of the tigth balance 
between demand and supply the volatility will be stressed and the prices will rise. In addition, 
the CAP is no longer a price stabilising policy, hence European farmers are exposed directly 
to the world price fluctuations.  
The increase in price volatility is just one of the many sources of uncertainty and risk in 
agriculture. Agricultural activities are exposed to different kinds of risk such as production 
risk, market risk, personal risk, financial risk and institutional risk (Hardaker et al., 1997) and 
an increase in price volatility affects market risk. In a risky environment, the farmer makes his 
production plan based on his expectations on future and uncertain outcomes and these 
expectations are often based on past experiences. Most empirical studies showed that farmers 
are averse to risk as they are willing to sacrifice some income to ensure against the risk 
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consequences. Given the risk averse attitude of the farmers, high commodity price volatility is 
negative as it makes farmer income uncertain. This may lead to non-optimal production 
decisions in the short run and may discourage farm investments, thus leading to a decrease in 
farm profitability and competitiveness in the medium-long run.  
In order to reduce the negative impact of large price variations on farmer income, there has 
been a large debate in order to identify market stabilisation tools that may be implemented 
(see for example OECD, 2011, and European Commission, 2011). Some of these tools are 
already in place in the EU, others should be developed. Although the OECD report has a 
broad focus on both developing and developed countries, we will focus only on the potential 
market stabilization instruments in the EU.  
The agricultural derivatives (futures and options) have progressively been evaluated in recent 
years as risk management tool in agricultural markets and we expect they will become an 
important instruments in the future in the EU. However, in order for this tool to be effective, 
some effort is required to assist farmers in its implementation.  
One of the most important income stabilizer currently in place in the EU is the direct income 
payment; although the payment is intended to support farmer income, it also acts as a risk 
management tool by guarantying a certain level of income which is independent of the price 
fluctuations. The EU intervention prices of agricultural commodities have been largely 
reduced by the CAP reforms; nowadays, they are set at rather low level and they work as a 
safety net in times of severe crisis. Other tools such as private storage aids and state aids may 
be useful to contrast the price fluctuations.  
The European Commission in its legal proposal on the support for Rural Development after 
2013 (2011) has proposed the introduction of an income stabilization tool financed by mutual 
funds supported by the EU budget. The income stabilization tool would compensate farmer 
for an income drop of at least 30% compared to the farmer average income in the previous 
three years and the compensation could not exceed 70% of the income loss. Although this tool 
would even out the extreme downward peak of income, its implementation does not seem 
straightforward. First, a farm’s accountancy is required in order to monitor the current 
farmer’s income and the income of the previous three years; second, it is not clear how such 
an instrument may be financed since in years of crisis we may expect that most of the EU 
farmers may be eligible for compensation leading to a large expense.  
The OECD report stresses the importance of creating a network of up-to-date and transparent 
information about the fundamentals of agricultural markets as a way to improve market 
efficiency and to reduce price fluctuations.  
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Figure 1. 9 Agricultural commodity prices in real terms (2005=100) 
 
Source: OECD, 2011: 7 
1.4  RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This thesis develops from the challenging context discussed above. The rising attention of the 
CAP to the environmental concern, the price volatility increase on the world and on the EU 
agricultural markets and the search for new farmer income stabilization tools represent the 
background motivation of this thesis, which aims at analysing the AESs from two viewpoints. 
Chapter 2 performs an ex-post comparative analysis wishing to investigate the effects of 
AESs adoption on farmer’s practises and economic performances across five EU Member 
States. The existing literature does not comprise any study on the AESs which is focused on 
the impact on farm income and which compares the effects in different countries. Since the 
implementation of the AESs differs across countries as well as the agricultural systems, we 
expect heterogeneous effects. This comparison may have significant policy implications since 
it may reveal the countries where the participation in AESs requires a deeper change of the 
farmers’ production plans and where the effects on farm income are stronger. The analysis 
may also indicate whether the amount of the AE payment provides a fair compensation to 
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participants. In addition, the study may also evaluate the ability of the AESs to promote 
sustainable practices and, by this, it may indirectly shed light on the environmental impact of 
such schemes. 
The ex-post analysis on AESs has been carried out by the application of a semi parametric 
Difference-in-Differences Propensity Score Matching estimator. Propensity Score Matching 
(PSM)  is a methodology applied to evaluate the impact of a treatment in a non-experimental 
setting. Recently it has been applied to the analysis of some Rural Development measures 
(Pufahl and Weiss, 2009; Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013). The most recent applications 
integrates PSM with a Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator when panel data are 
available in order to control for selection bias on both observed and time-invariant 
unobserved covariates. The combination of PSM and DID estimators is suitable for our goal 
as our research consists in a program evaluation in a non-experimental setting. Moreover, the 
availability of farmers’ panel data coming from the FADN dataset allows to control for the 
bias on time-invariant unobserved variables. 
Chapter 3 studies the AESs from an innovative viewpoint as it performs an ex-ante analysis 
investigating their role as farm income stabilizer. Although the traditional role of these 
schemes consists in the provision of environmental benefits and their payments wish to 
compensate the income forgone because of the adoption, we argue that they may play a new 
role in presence of increasing agricultural price volatility. Indeed, the farmers participating in 
AESs receive a fixed payment per hectare which represents a stable share of their income 
independent of crop price fluctuations. 
This study has developed a new methodological approach, which represents one of the few 
attempts to integrate the risk component in a Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) 
framework. Given the importance of accounting for risk in agricultural production and the 
powerful calibration ability of PMP, we think that the introduction of risk in PMP modelling 
will be one of the new research frontier in the area of mathematical programming. The 
combination of PMP with risk modelling allows the use of a calibrated model in analysing 
farm behaviour under uncertainty. Our approach differs from the few earlier attempts since it 
merges the first linear phase with the second non-linear phase of a PMP farmer expected 
utility maximisation problem. This allows to use all the information available in the dataset to 
estimate simultaneously the farmer’s risk aversion coefficient, the farm non-linear cost 
function as well as the shadow prices of resources and activities. In addition, a set of Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker conditions provides the economic foundation of the model. The proposed model 
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has been tested on three farm samples and it has been applied to investigate the potential role 
of an AES, the option to convert a share of farmland to grassland, as a farmer strategy to cope 
with income risk under different scenarios of crop price volatility.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Impact of agri-environmental schemes on farm 
performances in five EU Member States: a 
difference-in-differences approach 
2.1  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND  
In recent years in developed countries there has been an increasing concern about the 
relationship between agriculture and the environment. In the European Union (EU), the 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has introduced environmental measures in order to 
discourage negative environmental externalities and to promote positive externalities of 
agricultural activities. For example, negative externalities are sanctioned by a reduction in 
direct income payments if cross-compliance is not respected, while some ad hoc directives 
have been implemented for addressing some specific problems (i.e. the nitrates directive). 
Positive externalities are encouraged by some Rural Development measures which promote 
environmentally sustainable farming practices, through payments that compensate farmers for 
the provision of environmental goods that the market does not reward. One of these measures 
are the agri-environmental schemes (AESs) introduced in the late 1980s as an option to be 
applied by Member States. Since 1992, with the Mac Sharry reform, the development of AE 
programs has become compulsory for all Member States with the Regulation 2078/92, while 
their application by farmers is still voluntary. Since 1999, with the Agenda 2000 CAP reform 
(EEC n. 1257/99) the AESs have become a section of the Rural Development Programs 
(RDPs) which represents Pillar II of the CAP. 
Agri-environmental contracts are voluntary contracts, of at least 5 years, stipulated between 
the farmer and the government; under these contracts, the farmer provides environmental 
goods that go beyond the minimum requirements of the cross compliance and of the European 
and national compulsory environmental regulations and they receive a fixed per hectare 
payment to face the additional costs and the loss of income linked to these commitments. The 
main objective of the AESs consists of reducing the agricultural pollution risks as well as 
protecting biodiversity and landscape. AESs payments are co-financed by Member States and 
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they represent a large share of the public budget for Rural Development. They can be 
designed at national, regional or local level and this allows to take into account the 
heterogeneity of the natural characteristics and agricultural systems throughout the EU 
Member States. The agri-environmental and animal welfare programmes are the only 
measures that are compulsory in all RDPs and the AESs are the most significant measure in 
term of EU funding for Rural Development, 23.6%, followed by ‘Modernisation of 
agricultural holdings’, 12%, and ‘Payments to farmers in areas with handicaps, other than 
mountain areas’, 7.6%. In some EU countries the AESs are mainly defined at national level 
with little decision power at regional level (e.g. France and the Netherlands), while in other 
countries they are defined and implemented at regional or subregional level (e.g. Italy, 
Germany, Spain). 
There is quite a lot of literature about AESs; most of it tries to analyze the factors affecting 
farmer’s participation to agri-environmental contracts (Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; 
Defrancesco et al., 2007). Another widely studied topic concerns the analysis of the 
environmental effectiveness of farmers’ environmental practices; most of these studies outline 
the importance of accounting for farm heterogeneity, by applying more farm-specific 
measures (Aakkula et al., 2011). A few studies analyse the effects of AESs on farms’ 
practices and economic results. Sauer et al. (2012: 6) argued that “only a few studies so far 
have attempted to empirically measure the actual impact of being subject to AESs on 
producer behaviour at individual farm level using statistical or econometric tools”. The 
expectation is that farmers are heavily affected by participation to AESs, which may lead to a 
deep reorganisation of the farm and to a change in the sources of income.  
An ex-post analysis tool recently applied to analyse the effects of agricultural policy measures 
on farm’s performances is the Propensity Score Matching (PSM). Propensity score analysis 
has been widely developed in the last thirty years as a program evaluation method based on 
observational data in a broad range of disciplines, such as medicine, epidemiology, 
psychology, social sciences, education. More recently it has been applied also to 
environmental economics and to the analysis of some measures of RDPs. The most recent 
applications integrates PSM with a Difference-in-Differences (DID) estimator. 
Pufahl and Weiss (2009) and Chabé-Ferret and Subervie (2011) applied a DID PSM estimator 
in order to evaluate the effect of AESs on farm choices. Pufahl and Weiss analysed the impact 
of AESs adoption on input use and output produced of a large sample of German farms 
observed over the period 2000-2005. Their work showed that farmers participating in AESs 
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experience higher positive growth rates in sales, on-farm labour, area under cultivation, 
grassland and rented land compared to the ones non participating; by contrast, they have 
higher negative growth rates in livestock density, fertilizer and pesticide expenditure. Chabé-
Ferret and Subervie (2011) investigated the land allocation changes linked to AESs 
participation on a sample of French farms as well as they analysed the different sources of 
bias and the windfall effect. The PSM estimator has also been applied to compare voluntary 
and compulsory environmental measures in terms of their impact on farm production choices. 
Sauer et al. (2012) found that voluntary AESs affect farmers’ decisions heavier than non 
voluntary measures. Their analysis on a sample of the UK cereal farms showed that farmers 
participating into AESs do not reduce their efficiency as they efficiently adjust their 
production plan to the new constraints, especially by becoming less specialized and more 
diversified. The use of fertilizers and chemicals decreases, as well as the land and capital 
productivity, while labour productivity increases. Jaraitė and Kažukauskas (2012), applying a 
backward DID, showed that EU-15 farmers participating into voluntary AESs reduce 
chemical pollution more as compared to farmers not subject to voluntary AE program, 
indicating a cross positive effect between compulsory and voluntary measures, while the level 
of farm subsidy does not affect the degree of compliance with compulsory measures. PSM 
estimator has been also applied to the analysis of some Rural Development measures in North 
America. 
The work of Liu and Linch (2011) studied the impact of development right programs on 
preventing farmland loss in six Mid-Atlantic US states. Tamini (2011) analysed the effect of 
extension advisory activities on farmer’s adoption of best management practices in Quebec. 
His results showed that environmental advisory activities increase the environmental 
performance of farmers by increasing the rate of adoption of best management practices and 
this increase is larger in the case of practices related to compulsory regulations.  
Despite the increasing use of PSM methods to study the effects of some Rural Development 
measures on farm decisions, to the best of our knowledge there are no studies that compare 
the effects of agri-environmental contracts on farmer’s choices and economic performances in 
different EU countries. In addition none of the studies found in the literature focus on the 
impact of AESs on the farm economic variables, such as farm income. AESs are expected to 
differently affect farmers in different EU Member States given the different climatic 
conditions, the different characteristics of agriculture as well as the different national 
implementations of AESs. The comparison among EU countries may indicate the countries 
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where the AESs adoption requires a deeper change of farmer’s production plans and where 
the effects on farm income are stronger. This may also indicate how the AESs perform in 
different Member States and the reasons of different participation rates. This paper aims at 
filling this gap by applying a DID PSM estimator in order to perform comparative analysis on 
the effects of AESs on farmer’s practises and economic performances across five EU Member 
States: France, Germany, Spain, the UK and Italy.  
2.2 METHODOLOGY  
In applied research, matching analysis is generally applied to evaluate the impact of a 
treatment in a non-experimental setting. The main advantage of matching compared to the 
standard regression models is that matching does not require any functional form 
specification, avoiding potential bias due to misspecification. In addition, it allows for 
heterogeneous effects of the treatment among individuals (Pufahl and Weiss, 2009).  
The core problem of a treatment analysis is the evaluation problem. Evaluating the effect of a 
treatment requires being able to observe at the same time the outcome of the same individual 
in both states, subject and not subject to the treatment (Smith and Todd, 2005). If we indicate 
with 1Y  the outcome of an individual subject to the treatment and with 0Y  the outcome of the 
same individual in the case he had not been subject to the treatment, the effect of the 
treatment can be measured as: 1 0Y Y− . Obviously, for each individual only one state can be 
observed, 1Y or 0Y , hence there is a missing data problem that is the core of the evaluation 
problem. The use of all non treated individuals as counterfactual for the treated group causes a 
selection bias problem, since in a non-experimental setting it is likely that the treatment is not 
randomly assigned and the treated and control groups differ with respect to the treatment 
status but also with respect to other characteristics. 
Matching estimators aim at overcoming the selection bias on observables by matching each 
treated individual with one or more non treated individuals that have similar observed 
characteristics, the covariates , and interprets the difference in their outcomes as the effect of 
the treatment (Smith and Todd, 2005). In order for the matching estimator to be unbiased, 
some assumptions must be satisfied. The central assumption is the conditional independence 
assumption (CIA) or strong ignorability: after conditioning on a set of covariates,	, the 
potential outcomes are independent of treatment assignment (Rosembaum and Rubin, 1983): 
 1 0( , ) |Y Y D X⊥   (2.1) 
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where D  is a dummy variable that takes value of 1 for treated individuals and 0 for non-
treated individuals and ⊥ indicates independence
1
.  
Another important assumption is the common support condition, which guarantees that 
individuals with the same  values have a positive probability of being both treated and not 
treated: 
 0 ( 1| ) 1P D X< = <    (2.2) 
This assumption guarantees that a match can be found for each treated and untreated 
individual.  
If the two assumptions are satisfied the matched control group can be used as counterfactual 
to know how the treated group would have performed in the absence of treatment. Since 
conditioning on a large set of covariates X may be cumbersome, Rosembaum and Rubin 
(1983) proposed the idea of conditioning on a function of X , the so-called “balancing score” 
( )P X , such that the conditional distribution of X given ( )P X is independent of the 
assignment into treatment. This condition is called balancing condition:  
 | ( )D X P X⊥    (2.3) 
The balancing score measures the probability of treatment participation given the covariates: 
 ( ) Pr( 1| )P X D X= =   (2.4) 
Rosembaum and Rubin (1983) showed that if the potential outcomes are independent of the 
treatment conditional on X , they are also independent of the treatment conditional on the 
balancing score ( )P X .  Hence, assumption (2.1) becomes: 
 1 0( , ) | ( )Y Y D P X⊥   (2.5) 
If conditioning is based on the balancing score, matching is called PSM.  
After matching has been performed, the most common parameter used to evaluate the effect 
of an intervention is the ‘average treatment effect on the treated’ (ATT), defined as the 
difference in the mean outcomes of the treated and the matched control group:  
                                                          
1 If the interest is the average effect of the treatment on the treated, it is sufficient that ()⍊/. (
)⍊/ is a necessary 
condition when we want to calculate the mean impact of the treatment on the untreated, while (, 
)⍊/ is required as a 
necessary condition when we calculate the average effect of the treatment on a randomly assigned individual (Heckman et al., 
1997).  
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 1 0( | 1, ( )) ( | 0, ( ))ATT E Y D P X E Y D P X= = − =    (2.6) 
Heckman et al. (1997) demonstrated that if the interest is in the estimation of the ATT, then 
assumptions (2.1) and (2.2) are too strong; in such a case they proposed two weaker 
assumptions. The first is the conditional mean independence assumption, stating that the mean 
outcome is independent of the treatment assignment conditional on the propensity score 
( )P X : 
 0 0( | ( ), 1) ( | ( ), 0)E Y P X D E Y P X D= = =    (2.7) 
The second restricts the probability of the treatment to be lower than one: 
 ( 1| ) 1P D X= <    (2.8) 
The replacement of assumption (2.2) by assumption (2.8) relies on the construction of ATT 
which requires to find for each participant an analogue non participant but it is not interested 
in the opposite (Smith and Todd, 2005). 
Matching can be performed applying different matching algorithms: nearest neighbour, 
caliper and radius matching, stratification and interval matching, kernel and local linear 
matching (see Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008, for a review of all these matching procedures). 
The algorithms differ for the weights given to each non treated unit and the choice of the 
algorithm depends on the specific situation and it always presents a trade off between 
variance and bias. The choice of the matching estimator becomes more important when there 
is a minimum overlap between the treated and the control group (Dehejia and Wahba, 2002). 
The general notation of a matching estimator that estimates the ATT is as follows: 
 
1 0
1 1
1 I S J S
i ij j
i j
Y W Y
N
α
∩ ∩
= =
 
= − 
 
∑ ∑   (2.9) 
where i  identifies the treated individuals, j identifies the non treated individuals, α is the 
matching estimator for the ATT, N is the number of units of the treated group falling in the 
region of common support, ijW , 0 1ijW< < , indicates the weights which depends on the 
distance between iP  and jP  and S indicates the region of common support. The common 
support is the region where the propensity scores of treated and non treated individual have 
both positive density: 
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 ˆˆ : ( | 1) 0S P f P D= = >  and ( | 0) 0f P D = >  (2.10) 
Matching is usually performed over the region of common support. Although restricting 
matching to the common support region prevents bad matching, it may also discharge from 
the analysis a large number of units, which fall out of the region of common support. 
Sometimes a ‘trimming level’ is specified such that the common support is the region where 
the density function of the probability of treated and non treated individuals are both larger 
than the declared level.  
Cross-section matching methods correct for the selection bias on observables, which occurs 
when there are variables that affect simultaneously treatment assignment and outcomes. 
However, Heckman et al. (1997) pointed out that there may be variables apart from X that are 
unobserved and that affect both treatment status and outcomes. These variables may lead to 
the selection bias on unobservables. In order to partially overcome this problem, Heckman et 
al. (1997) proposed to combine the PSM estimator with a DID estimator. The conditional 
DID matching estimator differs from the conventional DID estimator as it compares outcomes 
conditional to  and calculates the treatment effect in a semi-parametric way. The conditional 
DID estimator compares the conditional before-after outcome of the treated individuals with 
that of the matched counterparts: 
 ( ) ( )1 0 0 0' '
1 1
1
| 1 | 0
I S J S
it it ij jt jt
i j
DID Y Y D W Y Y D
N
∩ ∩
= =
 
= − = − − = 
 
∑ ∑   (2.11) 
where ′ is the pre-treatment period and  is the post-treatment period. The DID matching 
estimator allows for time invariant differences in outcome levels between the treated and the 
control group; however, it requires that, conditional on the propensity score, in absence of 
treatment the average outcomes of the treated and control group would have followed parallel 
paths over time. Therefore, the conditional mean independence assumption (2.7) is replaced 
by a weaker assumption, the DID mean independence (equation 2.12), while the support 
condition must still be satisfied.  
 0 0 0 0
' '( | ( ), 1) ( | ( ), 0)t t t tE Y Y P X D E Y Y P X D− = = − =   (2.12) 
The double difference of the DID estimator removes the bias due to time-invariant 
unobserved characteristics and the bias due to common time trends unrelated to the treatment. 
Another advantage of this technique is the possibility to use pre-programme outcomes. When 
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the DID estimator is applied, the ATT measures the difference in the average growth of the 
outcome between the treated and the control group: 
 1 0 0 0
' '( | ( ), 1) ( | ( ), 0)t t t tATT E Y Y P X D E Y Y P X D= − = − − =   (2.13) 
In order to analyse and compare the effects of the adoption of agri-environmental contracts on 
farm practises and economic results in different EU countries we have applied the DID PSM, 
since this estimator is suitable for our goal. First, our research problem is a program 
evaluation problem where the treatment is the participation in AESs. Second, the non-
experimental setting of the analysis likely leads to selection bias, as it is reasonable to think 
that farms that decide to participate in AESs have different characteristics compared to farms 
that do not and these characteristics may also affect the outcomes. Third, the use of a non 
parametric analysis allows to consider individual-specific effects as well as avoiding 
functional form misspecification. Fourth, the availability of farm-level panel data allows the 
application of the DID estimator, which removes the bias due to time-invariant unobserved 
characteristics and allows the use of pre-treatment outcomes in the matching procedure. 
The adoption of the DID PSM estimator is further motivated by the studies conducted by 
Smith and Todd (2005) and by Heckman et al. (1997), which showed that DID matching 
estimators perform better compared to cross-sectional estimators. Finally, Heckman et al. 
(1997: 612) stated: “ ... placing comparison group members in the same economic 
environment and administering them the same questionnaire as participants substantially 
improves the performance of non-experimental estimators”. The characteristics of the FADN 
database used in this study guarantee the homogeneity of the data collection between 
participants and non participants and the analysis conducted separately by each Member State 
ensures a homogenous economic environment.   
2.3  EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
We have conducted the analysis of the effects of AESs participation on farmer choices and 
performances separately for each country. This allows heterogeneous effects in different 
countries and account for country specific characteristics and country specific AESs. We 
started from a balanced panel of farms of each country observed over the period 2003-2006 
and we applied DID matching estimator (Heckman et al., 1997). The pre-treatment period 
Impact of agri-environmental schemes on farm performances 
31 
 
considered is 2003, while the post-treatment period is 2006. 2006 is the last year of the 2000-
2006 EU budget period and corresponds also to the last year of the 2000-2006 RDPs. 
Farms of the country panel have been assigned to the treated group if they did not participate 
in AESs in 2003 but they did participate in 2006, and they enter the control group if they did 
not participate for the whole period 2003-2006. Each country treated group has been split into 
two subsamples according to the share of the agri-environmental payments on farm income 
and the analysis of the effect of AESs adoption has been carried out for each subsample; if the 
share is lower than the median of the full country treated sample the farm belongs to 
subsample 1, while if the share is larger than the median the farm belongs to subsample 2. 
The reason behind this splitting is that the effects of AE adoption on farmers’ behaviour may 
differ according to the share of income dependent on AE payments. Number of farms in each 
sample are reported in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Number of farms in each country group before and after the matching 
 Before the matching  After the matching 
 Treated 
sub 
sample  1 
Control 
group 
 Treated sub 
sample 2 
Control 
group 
 Treated 
sub 
sample 1 
Control 
group 
 Treated 
sub 
sample 2 
Control 
group 
        
France 202 2101   205 2101  200 1082  202 983 
        
Germany 129 915  129 915  129 524  128 563 
        
Spain 48 1619  47 1619  45 216  45 143 
        
UK 264 523  261 523  253 462  260 433 
        
Italy 161 5239  162 5239  160 1119  162 1007 
The farm level data used come from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN), the EU 
database that collects yearly data of technical characteristics and economic results of a large 
sample of farms from each Member State. The data on macroeconomics indicators come from 
official national statistics and Eurostat. The five countries considered in our study are France, 
Spain, Germany, the UK and Italy, for which a balanced panel of farms observed over the 
period 2003-2006 has been analysed. France is the only country among the five considered 
where the AESs are mainly defined at national level; French regions can only partially 
determined the amount of payments of each measures. In the other four countries the AESs 
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are mostly determined at regional level and in some cases they can be detailed further at local 
level. In Spain the regions can choose which AESs to implement from a national list. In 
Germany the AESs are decided by each state although there are some ‘horizontal measures’, 
which equally applied across all the states. In the UK each state, England, Scotland, Wales 
and Northern Ireland, defines the framework of AESs, which are detailed further at local 
level. Finally, in Italy the regions define the AESs to be implemented. 
If we consider the share of utilised agricultural area (UAA) under AE contracts in 2006, we 
notice differences across Member States. While the EU-25 average share was 15.7%, 
Germany was the country with the highest share of UAA covered by AESs (42.1%). The 
percentage of the three Mediterranean countries, Italy, Spain and France, was 12.3%, 13.8% 
and 11.5%, respectively.  
2.3.1 Propensity Score Matching 
The first step of the matching procedure is to estimate a binary model of the participation in 
AESs selecting the variables that affect simultaneously farmers’ participation and outcomes 
(Liu and Lynch, 2011). We estimated a country-specific logit model for the pre-treatment 
period 2003. 
The decision of how many variables to include in a propensity score binary model is a widely 
discussed issue in the literature. Bryson et al. (2002) outlined that including too many 
variables in the binary model is not worth because it may exacerbate the common support 
problem and it may increase the variance of the estimator. By contrast, according to Rubin 
and Thomas (1996), one should include all variables even if they are not statistically 
significant with the exception of a few cases: if there is consensus that a variable does not 
affect the outcome, if the treated and full control mean values of a variable are ‘very close’, or 
if a variable is highly correlated with variables that are already in the model. We started from 
a large set of variables derived from economic theory and results of applied research and we 
performed likelihood ratio tests on groups of variables in order to select the best specification 
of each country-specific logit model. A given group of variables was kept in the model if not 
rejected by the test and variables of that group were included in the model even though they 
were not statistically significant. 
The groups of variables considered in our model to explain the AESs participation and the 
corresponding variables in each group concern both farm technical and economic 
characteristics as well as macroeconomic environment and farm regional location and 
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altitude. The groups of variables identified are: age of the farmer, altitude of the farm location 
(dummy variables for hill and mountain), farm size (farm UAA and rented land), farm 
production intensity (total farm output value per hectare, share of grassland on farm land and 
value of fixed assets per farm working units), use of chemical products (per hectare 
expenditure on fertilisers and crop protection products), farm labour (number of family 
working hours and hired labour working hours), farm profitability (farm income per hectare), 
level of farm dependence on subsidies (farm direct income payment per hectare). In order to 
take into account the differences in the economic environment throughout the regions of a 
country we included also a group for two macroeconomic indicators at the regional level: the 
gross domestic product per capita and the share of the agricultural value added over the total 
value added of the region. Finally, dummy variables have been used to indicate farm type 
(livestock or arable crops) and geographical location
2
. The results of each country logit model 
are the farm’s propensity scores that are used in the matching procedure (Table A2.1 and 
Table A2.2).  
Different matching algorithms have been implemented and the one that performs better has 
been selected. Since we did not condition directly on the covariates but on the propensity 
scores, we checked the ability of the matching procedure to balance the covariates between 
the treated and the matched control group. The matching quality of each algorithm has been 
tested by three different procedures. The first procedure consists in a t-test on the differences 
of the covariates means of the two groups and the null hypothesis of no differences should not 
be rejected after the matching. The second consists in the calculation of the standardised bias 
before and after the matching. The standardised bias measures the distance of the marginal 
distribution of the covariates and it is calculated for each covariate as the difference of the 
sample mean between treated and matched control group over the square root of the average 
of the samples variances: 
 1 0
1 0
100*
0.5*( ( ) ( ))
before
X X
SB
V X V X
−
=
+
   (2.14) 
 1 0
1 0
100*
0.5*( ( ) ( ) )
M M
after
M M
X X
SB
V X V X
−
=
+
  (2.15) 
                                                          
2 The macroeconomic indicators are specified for each NUTS2 region in France, Spain and Italy and for each NUTS1 region 
in Germany and United Kingdom. The country geographical dummy are specified for NUTS1 regions or aggregation of 
them. 
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where beforeSB  and afterSB are the standardised bias before and after the matching respectively, 
1X  and 1MX  are the covariates means of the treated before and after the matching 
respectively, while 
0X and 0 MX  have the same meaning for the control group. 1( )V X and 
1 ( )MV X  are variances of the covariates before and after the matching for the treated group 
while 0 ( )V X  and 0 ( )MV X  have the same meaning for the control group. It is interesting to 
compare the standardised bias before and after the matching to detect the ability of the 
matching in reducing the bias. Although a significance level on the standardised bias does not 
exist, in empirical works a standardised bias below 5% is considered good (Caliendo and 
Kopeinig, 2008). Finally, the third procedure consists in re-estimating the logit model after 
the matching when the pseudo R-square should appear very small (Sianesi, 2004). When the 
tests on the matching quality resulted in a poor balancing of the covariates between the two 
groups we have better specified the model until all the three tests showed good quality of the 
matching. We have checked the robustness of our results by comparing the results of our 10 
nearest neighbours estimator with other PSM estimators that satisfy the balancing property for 
the covariates. Since results are similar, this supports the robustness of our findings
3
. 
 
After testing different matching algorithms and checking the covariates balancing property, 
we chose to implement the nearest neighbour matching with ten neighbours, with replacement 
and with a caliper of 0.1. The caliper indicates the maximum distance between the propensity 
scores of the treated and the matched control individuals. The ten nearest neighbour matching 
estimator has been applied for both subsamples in each country, in order to make the results 
comparable. Ten nearest neighbours estimator with caliper and with replacement resulted in 
good matching quality in all samples analysed; it satisfied always the covariates balancing 
property, it reduced the standardised bias of most of the covariates and it showed a small 
pseudo R-square of the logit model after the matching (see Tables A2.3 and A2.4 in the 
Appendix A2.A). The use of ten nearest neighbours compared to the single nearest neighbour 
matching decreases the variance, because more individuals are used to construct the 
counterfactual of each treated individual, but it also increases the bias, because the additional 
individuals used are poorer matches. In order to avoid high increase in the bias, we have 
restricted the matching within a caliper  of 0.1 and we have allowed for replacement. In the 
                                                          
3 These results are available from the authors upon request. 
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ten nearest neighbour algorithm we have also imposed the common support condition in order 
to avoid bias due to the failure of common support (Heckman et al., 1997). Once the 
matching has been performed on 2003 data and the matching quality has been checked, the 
ATT on the treated is calculated using the DID estimators for different outcomes (equation 
2.11) . In the DID framework, the before-after outcome differences for each participating 
farmer has been compared to those of the matched non participants. The outcomes analysed 
as potentially affected by AESs adoption concern the farmer production choices and the farm 
economic performances. Among production choices, we have considered the per hectare 
expenditure on fertilisers and crop protection, the farm total UAA, the rented land, the farm 
share of grassland, the number of crops grown on the farm, the family and hired labour 
working hours. The economic outcomes investigated are the farm output value per hectare 
and the variable costs per hectare, the total farm income and the farm income per hectare, 
computed both including and not including AE payments. The results indicate for each 
outcome the mean difference in the 2003-2006 growth between farmers who adopted AESs 
after 2003 and farmers who did never adopt AESs over the period 2003-2006. The DID 
estimator has been applied on each country treated subsample and on the corresponding 
control group. Thus, in total ten estimators have been calculated. Finally we have 
implemented a placebo test (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013) to test whether our data verify 
the DID mean independence assumption (equation 2.12), meaning that in the absence of 
treatment the outcomes of the treated and matched control groups would have followed 
parallel path conditional on the observed variables. We applied the placebo test on the period 
2002-2003 in order to avoid large loss of farms in the balanced panels.   
2.3.2  Variance estimation 
It is worthy to briefly present the different approaches proposed in the literature to estimate 
the variance of the ATT estimator. The most applied and cited are mainly three. 
The first one is the bootstrapping method, which is widely used in the applied works with 
PSM. The bootstrapping procedure consists of estimating the variance by randomly drawn 
samples with replacement and repeating the estimation procedure on each drawn sample. The 
collection of the ATT drawn from the bootstrap approximates a distribution that is used to 
estimate the variance. The bootstrapping procedure is computationally easy as most PSM 
packages perform it automatically and it allows to take into account the uncertainty which 
derives from the first phase of the matching procedure, the estimation of the propensity score. 
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Although the widespread use of the bootstrap procedure as a way to estimate the variance of 
ATT, Abadie and Imbens (2008) showed that bootstrap standard errors are not valid in the 
case of nearest neighbour matching with replacement and with a fixed number of neighbours. 
In such a case they proposed an analytical formula for a consistent estimator of the variance 
of the ATT in the case of homoscedasticity and in the case of heteroscedasticity (Abadie and 
Imbens, 2006). 
A third approach to ATT variance estimator has been offered by Lechner (1999): 
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where var( )ATT is the variance of the ATT, 1N is the number of treated units and jw  is the 
weight associated to each unit of the control group and var( )Y  is the outcome variance. This 
formula of the variance assumes fixed weight, independent observations, homoscedasticity of 
the variances of the outcomes within the treated and the control group. 
We have used the variance approximation approach by Lechner to calculate the variance of 
ATT, and consequently the significance of the ATT, in our study. The bootstrapping was not 
suitable as our matching algorithm is the nearest neighbour with replacement, for which 
bootstrap standard errors are not valid. The analytical formula proposed by Abadie and 
Imbens in the case of homoscedastic outcomes variance is very similar to the variance 
approximation by Lechner, who in addition extended the variance approximation to the case 
of DID matching (Eichler and Lechner , 2002). In such a case the outcomes variance is 
replaced with the variance of the before-after outcome differences such that: 
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where 'var( )t tY Y− is the variance of the difference of the outcomes before and after the 
treatment.  
Impact of agri-environmental schemes on farm performances 
37 
 
2.4  RESULTS  
In order to discuss the effects of AESs adoption on farm performances, we will focus our 
attention on the ATT estimator, which indicates the difference in the average growth of the 
outcomes between the treated and the matched control group. The significance of the ATT has 
been calculated according to the variance equation 2.17. The results are shown from Table 2.2 
to Table 2.4. In Table 2.2 the ATT for each outcome in each country subsample are reported, 
while Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 indicate the average positive or negative growth of the 
outcomes over the period 2003-2006 for both the treated and the matched control groups, 
from which the ATT have been calculated. A positive ATT indicates that the increase in the 
outcome of the treated group (adopters) is larger than the increase of the control group (non 
adopters); a positive ATT may also indicate that the decrease in the outcome of the treated is 
smaller than the decrease of the controls. On the other hand, a negative ATT indicates that the 
decrease in the outcome of the treated is larger than the decrease in the outcome of the 
controls as well as an increase in the treated outcome is smaller than the increase in the 
controls. We will present the results by distinguishing the effects of the participation in AESs 
on farmer technical production decisions and on farm economic results. Similarities and 
differences of these effects among the five Member States will be discussed. Finally the 
results of the placebo test on each country subsample will be presented in Appendix A2.B.  
2.4.1 Results on farm production choices  
The adoption of AESs is expected to affect farm technical decision variables as they introduce 
new requirements/constraints in the farm management. The effects differ across country 
samples as a consequence of differences in agricultural characteristics and heterogeneous 
adoption of different AESs. As expected, the AESs affect more heavily the production 
choices of the treated subsamples 2, the subsamples for which the share of agri-environmental 
payments on farm income is larger than the median of the full treated sample, while in 
subsamples 1 the impact is lower.  
We will consider the effects of AESs on the country treated subsamples 2 first, then we will 
draw some considerations on the subsamples 1. 
In the country subsamples 2 the AESs participation leads to an increase in farm size in four 
out of five countries: Germany, the UK, France and Italy; in the last two countries this is the 
consequence of the rise in farm rented land. The increase in the farm size because of AESs 
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adoption is in line with the results obtained by Pufahl and Weiss (2009) in a large sample of 
German farms.  
Farm crop diversification, fertilizer and crop protection expenditure per hectare and share of 
grassland on the farm may be considered as indicators of the effectiveness of the AESs in 
terms of addressing farms towards more environmentally-friendly practices. Our study shows 
differences in the evolution of these variables across countries. The expansion of farm size 
promotes farm crop diversification in Italy and France and avoids loss of crop diversification 
in the UK. The growth in fertilizer expenditure of participants is lower than the one of non 
participants in France and the UK, and such difference is statistically significant, while in 
Italy participating farmers experience on average a decrease in fertilizer expenditure 
compared to the increase of the control group. Spanish adopters surprisingly rise their 
fertilizer expenditure in contrast to a fall of the Spanish non adopters. Germany is the only 
country where the AESs adoption has a statistically significant effect on crop protection; 
however, the effect is opposite to what we may expect, since this expenditure per hectare 
increases more for the treated group than for the control group. This may be explained by the 
higher prices of environmentally friendly products. This differs from the findings of Pufahl 
and Weiss (2009). The share of grassland is affected positively by the adoption of AESs in 
France, Germany and Italy, even though the percentage increase is small. The differences in 
the effects of the AESs adoption on farm practices may be explained by the heterogeneity of 
the measures adopted in each country. In Italy and France the most widespread measures are 
the ones concerning the management of landscape, maintenance of pasture and high nature 
value (Eurostat, 2013); such measures represent 88% and 27% of the UAA under 
commitments in France and Italy, respectively
4
. This may explain the similar reaction of 
French and Italian participants in terms of farm size, fertiliser expenditure and crop 
diversification. Actions to maintain habitats favourable to biodiversity is the most widespread 
measure in Spain; this may explain the different evolution of farm practices among Spanish 
participants.    
In our study the AESs participation does not seem to affect family labour as the dynamics of 
family labour follows the same negative growth in both the treated and the control groups. 
Hired labour is affected by participation only in Germany and Spain, where in the treated 
group it shows a negative growth statistically different from the path of the matched control 
group.  
                                                          
4 This data refers to 2009 when the new RDPs were already in place. Data on the breakdown of UAA under different agri-
environmental commitments are not available for 2006.  
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If we consider the treated subsamples 1 and their matched counterfactuals we see a few 
technical outcomes affected by agri-environmental contract participation. AESs adoption 
increases farm size in Germany, Spain and Italy and reduces the use of fertiliser products 
among Italian adopters. If we consider a significance level of 10%, we see that the AESs 
adoption increases crop protection expenditure in Spain, while this is reduced in Italy and it 
restrains the family labour drop in the UK. Rented land, share of grassland, number of crops 
and hired labour force are not affected in any of the five countries. Hence, if the payment 
represents a small share of farm income, the production choices and assets of the farm are 
only slightly affected. 
2.4.2 Results on farm economic performances 
AESs adoption does not affect only the farmer production choices but also the economic 
results of the farm. As for the technical impact, the effect of AESs participation on farm 
economic performances, the role of AE payments and the differences among countries are 
more evident in the country subsamples 2. Thus, as in the previous section, we will start 
discussing the results of subsamples 2 and then we will draw some considerations on 
subsamples 1.  
If we consider the value of total farm output per hectare as a measure of the degree of 
production intensity, we would expect a negative ATT as a consequence of extensification of 
farms that participate in AESs. The corresponding ATT for subsamples 2 is indeed negative 
and statistically different from zero in France, Italy, Germany and Spain. In the first two 
countries both the output value per hectare and the variable costs per hectare decrease 
compared to an increase in the matched control groups. In Germany the negative ATT comes 
from the smaller growth of the two variables compared to the growth in the matched control 
group. The negative effect on farm output value may be explained by the potential 
introduction of low yield crops, by the increase in the share of grassland and by a reduction in 
fertilizer expenditure per hectare. The Spanish treated subsample shows a negative ATT for 
the output value per hectare, while the variables costs per hectare of adopters increase 
compared to a fall of the non adopters.  
Another key economic variable that we expect being affected by AESs adoption is farm 
income. We may consider the farm income per hectare without AE payments as an indicator 
of the effect of AESs adoption on the farm economic performances, while comparing the 
evolution of this variable with the path of the farm income per hectare including the AE
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 Table 2.2 Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) of AESs participation in the five countries over the period 2003-2006  
 
Subsamples 1  Subsamples 2 
Farm outcomes France Germany Spain UK Italy  France Germany Spain UK Italy 
UAA (ha) 0.317 5.544** 5.148*** 1.209 5.009*  1.645 * 4.379* 0.190 4.815** 5.577** 
Rented land (ha) -0.243 3.839 1.294 2.107 3.444  2.289 ** 1.397 2.567 1.925 5.050** 
Number of crops grown on farm -0.011 0.167 -0.076 0.014 0.015  0.155 ** 0.043 -0.039 0.157** 0.288*** 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha -2.428 0.424 9.040 0.803 -24.06**  -4.405 ** -1.217 42.607** -6.624*** -19.168*** 
Crop protection expenditure per ha 1.630 -2.778 36.325* 1.369 -18.544*  -1.474 6.966* 34.298 -0.236 -11.336 
Share of grassland(%) 0.271 -0.666 0.324 0.765 0.055  0.783** 1.891 *** 0.063 -0.160 3.175* 
Family working hours 38.913 40.295 -183.468 121.844* 77.604  -26.800 -39.438 -128.837 59.005 39.184 
Hired labour working hours -19.514 188.622 145.052 34.267 21.508  34.939 -504.7 ** -307.013** -159.946 322.764 
Output value per ha(000 euro) 0.040 -0.057 -0.726*** -0.035 -0.244  -0.074* -0.14 *** -1.179*** -0.049 -0.599*** 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro) 0.062 * -0.10** 0.245*** -0.049 -0.157  -0.041* -0.072 ** 0.335*** -0.062 -0.068** 
Farm income (000 euro) 6.621** 11.444* -10.460** 7.495** 14.689*  -4.225** 22.72 *** -12.623*** 6.529** 0.420 
Farm income without AE payments 
(000 euro) 
3.504 8.799 -14.665*** 4.248 9.827  -10.38*** 13.973 * -19.445*** -0.619 -15.190*** 
Farm income per ha (000 euro) 0.031 0.080 * -0.516*** 0.076** 0.199  -0.050 ** -0.025 -0.866*** 0.059 -0.245** 
Farm income without AE payments 
per ha (000 euro) 
0.006 0.065 -0.647*** 0.052 -0.061  -0.104*** -0.080 ** -1.094*** 0.014 -0.542*** 
Source: estimation results            
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Table 2.3 Outcome mean difference of the treated subsample 1 and of the matched control group over the period 2003-2006 for each country 
 France  Germany  Spain  UK  Italy 
               
Farm outcomes 
Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
UAA (ha) 3.875 3.557  6.178 0.634  3.394 -1.754  1.769 0.560  5.214 0.205 
Rented land (ha) 2.373 2.616  -0.066 -3.905  -0.978 -2.271  0.671 -1.436  4.430 0.986 
Number of crops grown on farm -0.08 -0.069  0.124 -0.043  -0.133 -0.058  -0.071 -0.085  -0.006 -0.021 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha 10.692 13.120  17.839 17.415  -3.083 -12.122  8.924 8.121  -6.502 17.558 
Crop protection expenditure per ha 6.298 4.668  5.936 8.714  -21.828 -58.153  3.487 2.117  6.350 24.894 
Share of grassland(%) 0.063 -0.208  -1.208 -0.542  0.467 0.143  0.889 0.124  3.538 3.483 
Family working hours -41.18 -80.093  -11.961 -52.256  -398.733 -215.265  -149.530 -271.374  46.094 -31.511 
Hired labour working hours -66.185 -46.671  117.310 -71.312  278.311 133.260  14.403 -19.864  272.213 250.704 
Output value per ha(000 euro) 0.090 0.050  0.173 0.230  -0.873 -0.148  -0.044 -0.009  0.075 0.320 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro) 0.057 -0.005  0.040 0.143  0.071 -0.174  0.077 0.126  -0.065 0.091 
Farm income (000 euro) 12.807 6.186  25.251 13.806  -6.942 3.518  -1.870 -9.365  24.516 9.827 
Farm income without AE 
payments (000 euro) 
9.689 6.186  22.606 13.806  -11.146 3.518  -5.117 -9.365  15.321 9.827 
Farm income per ha (000 euro) 0.109 0.078  0.244 0.164  -0.179 0.336  0.004 -0.072  0.535 0.335 
Farm income without AE 
payments per ha (000 euro) 
0.084 0.078  0.229 0.164  -0.311 0.336  -0.020 -0.072  0.274 0.335 
Source: estimation results               
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Table 2.4 Outcome mean difference of the treated subsample 2 and of the matched control group over the period 2003-2006 for each country 
 France  Germany  Spain  UK  Italy 
               
Farm outcomes 
Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
 Treated 
group 
Control  
group 
UAA (ha) 5.560 3.915  6.598 2.218  -0.233 -0.423  5.011 0.196  3.619 -1.958 
Rented land (ha) 5.263 2.974  -0.222 -1.619  -0.199 -2.766  0.757 -1.168  2.217 -2.833 
Number of crops grown on farm 0.019 -0.135  0.063 0.019  -0.089 -0.050  -0.035 -0.191  0.352 0.064 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha 5.961 10.366  17.469 18.687  16.333 -26.274  6.923 13.546  -18.340 0.828 
Crop protection expenditure per ha 1.767 3.240  12.206 5.240  -47.674 -81.972  2.101 2.337  -7.714 3.622 
Share of grassland(%) 0.7 -0.082  0.687 -1.203  0.212 0.149  0.605 0.766  6.675 3.500 
Family working hours -114.842 -88.041  -12.820 26.618  -180.000 -51.163  -164.138 -223.144  -69.216 -108.400 
Hired labour working hours 33.267 -1.672  -550.516 -45.847  -80.289 226.724  -185.992 -26.047  182.117 -140.647 
Output value per ha(000 euro) -0.022 0.052  0.121 0.259  -1.503 -0.324  -0.033 0.016  -0.328 0.271 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro) -0.020 0.021  0.072 0.144  0.033 -0.302  0.024 0.086  -0.024 0.044 
Farm income (000 euro) 0.442 4.666  33.264 10.542  -10.622 2.001  -0.878 -7.407  6.722 6.301 
Farm income without AE 
payments (000 euro) 
-5.717 4.667  24.515 10.542  -17.443 2.001  -8.026 -7.407  -8.889 6.301 
Farm income per ha (000 euro) -0.014 0.036  0.166 0.191  -0.472 0.394  -0.022 -0.081  -0.046 0.199 
Farm income without AE 
payments per ha (000 euro) 
-0.067 0.036  0.112 0.191  -0.700 0.394  -0.067 -0.081  -0.344 0.199 
Source: estimation results               
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payment we have an indication of the ability of the AE payment to compensate the income 
foregone as a result of adoption. Finally the effect on the total farm income is a combination 
of the result concerning income per hectare and farm size. Spanish farmers are strongly 
negatively affected by AESs adoption as their income per hectare without AE payment falls 
on average by 700 euro compared to a rise of non adopters of 394 euro over the period 2003-
2006 (Table 2.4). The AE payment is not sufficient to compensate the income foregone of 
Spanish adopters, since in this case their income per hectare still drops on average by 472 
euro. A statistically significant drop in income per hectare as a consequence of participation 
appears also in France and Italy, where the AE payment is again not sufficient to compensate 
this drop. However, in these two countries the income foregone experienced by participant 
farmers is much lower than the one of Spanish farmers (Tables 2.2, 2.3 and 2.4). In the Italian 
subsample, however, the increase in farm size due to participation avoids a negative ATT for 
total farm income, as it happens in France. In Germany the smaller rise of per hectare income 
of participants compared to non-participants is compensated by the AE payments. Finally, the 
UK farmers of the treated subsample 2 shows the same negative growth of income per hectare 
of the corresponding matched control group with and without the payments. Thus, the 
participation in AESs seems to have no effect on the economic performance of this group of 
the UK farmers and the positive ATT of the total farm income derives from a larger rise in 
farm size of the participants. This last result complies with the finding of a research 
commissioned by the European Commission to Kantor Management Consultants and Institute 
for Rural Development Research (2012) which outlined that in the countries where the AESs 
absorb a large part of public budget for rural development, as it is the case for the UK, 
farmers declare that the main benefit of the adoption is the increase in their income. As it has 
been the case for the farm practices, the different impact of AESs adoption on farm economic 
performances may be partially explained by the heterogeneity of the measures across 
countries. The actions to maintain habitats favourable to biodiversity, which is the most 
widespread measure in Spain, seems to threat heavily the farm profitability (at least in Spain), 
while the Entry Level Schemes of the UK, which concern almost 94% of the UAA under 
environmental commitments in the UK, do not seem to damage farm income. The fair 
compensation of German and English adopters is confirmed by the higher uptake rate of 
AESs in these two countries compared to the other three countries considered, 42% and 37% 
of the UAA in 2006 respectively.   
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If we consider the treated subsamples 1 we get some different results. The farm income and 
the farm income per hectare of Spanish subsample 1 are strongly negatively affected by AESs 
participation as in the case of subsample 2. In the French subsample 1 the positive growth in 
the income per hectare of the treated group is not significantly different from the growth of 
the matched control group; however, these slight differences are summed up if we consider 
total farm income, which presents a positive ATT. In UK subsample 1 we see a kind of over-
compensation of the agri-environmental participation. Indeed, while the income per hectare 
without considering the payment drops equally in both groups, the income per hectare 
including the AE payment increases for the treated group. In Germany and Italy the income 
path differs between the two groups at the 10% significance level. In Germany the AE 
payment leads to an overcompensation, as it increases the income per hectare of participating 
farmers more than that of non-participants. In Italy the positive ATT of total farm income is 
linked to a rise in farm size. The potential overcompensation for the UK and German farms of 
subsamples 1 actually derives from an absence of income foregone due to participation, given 
the small contribution of AE payments to farm income. The results of subsamples 1 show 
some similarities with subsamples 2 as German and  the UK adopters are not negatively 
affected by AESs participation, while Spanish participants are.  
2.5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
Compared to the simple PSM estimator, the combination of PSM with DID estimator allows 
to remove the bias due to time-invariant unobserved variables when panel data are available. 
We have checked the robustness of our results by comparing the results of our 10 nearest 
neighbours estimator with other PSM estimators that satisfy the balancing property for the 
covariates. Since results are similar, this supports the robustness of our findings. 
Pufahl and Weiss (2009) remarked the importance of accounting for the heterogeneous 
response of treated individuals to the treatment. The different effects of AE participation in 
the two treated subsamples supports the need to account for heterogeneity even at a more 
detailed level. However, we could not split the samples further, in order to have a sufficient 
number of observations. In addition, the FADN data do not provide the disaggregation of 
payments by different AESs, which would allow to draw more specific conclusions related to 
each specific measure, with more clear policy implications. Finally, the FADN data on 
fertilisers indicates only the farm fertiliser expenditure, no data on fertiliser quantity applied 
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on the farm are provided which may be useful to judge the effect of AESs on the fertiliser 
units employed.  
Despite the above limitations, our study shows some interesting findings. First, the effects of 
the AESs on farm production choices and economic performances are stronger on farms whit 
a larger share of AE payments on farm income. In all countries considered, except Spain, the 
farm size increases after the AESs uptake, likely as a consequence of extensification. The 
adoption of AESs does not seem to prevent the drop of farm family labour in any countries, 
while hired labour is negatively affected in Spain and Germany. 
The results of our analysis seem to indicate that in Spain the AESs adoption negatively affects 
farmers, as the AE payment is not sufficient to compensate them for the income foregone. In 
addition, in Spain the AESs adoption does not seem to produce environmental benefits in 
terms of increasing the share of grassland or favouring crop diversification, but conversely it 
increases fertiliser expenditure. 
The AESs uptake leads to an increase in the share of grassland in France, Germany and Italy, 
and this extensification may partially explain the income foregone after adoption. The 
decrease in fertiliser expenditure and the rise in the average number of crops by Italian and 
French adopters may also contribute to the income foregone. In these two countries the AE 
payment is not sufficient to compensate the income drop per hectare, even though the drop in 
these countries is much smaller compared to Spain. German adopters are compensated for the 
income foregone, while in the UK the adoption of AESs does not show any effects on farm 
income even without the payment, it produces a reduction in the expenditure in fertilisers and 
it favours crop diversification. 
One may argue that a farmer is willing to participate in AESs only if he expects to increase 
his income by participation. However, the time lag between expectation and realisation may 
explain the actual negative impact on income of AESs adoption in some countries. Another 
reason of the negative effect on farm income in some countries may be the fact that 2000-
2006 is the first budget period of a systematic introduction of the AESs in the RDPs; as such 
it may be a period where the compensation to the participant farmers has to be tested in order 
to find an adequate compensation for the income foregone.  
In conclusion, our study suggests a potential revision of the AESs in Spain in order to produce 
environmental benefits and to fairly compensate participating farmers. In Italy and France, 
while farm practices seem to become more environmentally friendly after the AESs adoption, 
it would be interesting to evaluate the amount of AE payments in order to avoid 
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undercompensation and to increase participation. Germany and the UK show positive 
environmental benefits after the adoption and a fair compensation for the potential income 
foregone. Finally, our study suggests that some measures on rural employment safeguard may 
be introduced as employment in rural areas may imply better preservation of landscape and 
natural resources.  
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APPENDIX A2.A 
Table A2.1 Parameter estimates of logit models of farmers participation in AESs for the farm subsamples 
1 and the control groups 
 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Spain 
 
UK 
 
Italy 
     
Farm characteristics      
     
year of birth of farmer  0.017*    0.024***  0.025*** 
 (0.009)    (0.008)  (0.006) 
dummy mountain  0.306   -0.494   1.296*** 
 (0.428)   (0.507)   (0.255) 
dummy hill  -0.574*  0.841**  -1.299**   0.409** 
 (0.296)  (0.348)  (0.554)   (0.194) 
farm UAA (ha)  0.005***  0.002***    0.001* 
 (0.001)  (0.001)    (0.001) 
farm rented land (ha)      0.002* 
     (0.001) 
revenue per ha (000 euro)   -0.149**   -0.089*  
  (0.069)   (0.048)  
farm capital per working units (000 euro)   0.000  0.000  0.000  
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  
share of grassland on the farm (%)   -0.014***  -0.093   
  (0.004)  (0.097)   
fertilizer expenditure per ha (000 euro)  -6.211***   4.221*  4.033**  -0.603 
 (2.004)   (2.245)  (1.875)  (0.661) 
crop protection expenditure per ha (000 euro)    -3.286**  2.848  -1.297** 
   (1.481)  (2.855)  (0.597) 
number of family working hours   0.000**  0.000**  0.000***  0.000*** 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
number of hired labor working hours   0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
farm income per ha (000 euro)   0.743***  -0.947***   
  (0.217)  (0.252)   
farm decoupled subsidies per ha (000 euro)  -1.411   -8.868***   
 (0.895)   (2.063)   
dummy livestock farm  0.356*  1.001***   -0.529*  -0.016 
 (0.202)  (0.292)   (0.309)  (0.234) 
dummy permanent crop farm       0.571*** 
     (0.216) 
Macroeconomic indicators of the region^      
Gross Domestic Product per capita (000 euro)  0.146***   -0.657***   
 (0.022)   (0.243)   
value added of agricultural over total value added (%)  0.337***  -0.889**  0.182   0.723*** 
 (0.047)  (0.379)  (0.263)   (0.149) 
Geographical location^      
dummy north (dummy Scotland for the UK)  -0.675  0.894*   1.447***  
 (0.529)  (0.509)   (0.237)  
dummy east (dummy north-east for Italy)  0.203  -0.002  2.858*   1.150** 
 (0.502)  (0.508)  (1.502)   (0.459) 
dummy west (dummy northern Ireland for the UK; dummy 
north-west for Italy) 
 
-0.811 
 
-0.544 
  
-0.120 
 
3.324*** 
 (0.516)  (0.408)   (0.261)  (0.518) 
dummy south (dummy Wales for the UK)     -0.783***  
    (0.300)  
dummy centre    -4.788***   3.145*** 
   (0.918)   (0.510) 
constant  -7.254***  -2.477***  8.074**  -2.403***  -9.421*** 
 (0.981)  (0.717)  (3.518)  (0.541)  (0.849) 
     
Pseudo R2  0.093  0.071  0.346  0.134  0.120 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the coefficient estimates. 
^The macroeconomic indicators are specified for each NUTS2 region in France, Spain and Italy and for each NUTS1 region 
in Germany and United Kingdom. The country geographical dummies are specified for NUTS1 regions or aggregations of 
them.  
Source: estimation results
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Table A2.2 Parameter estimates of logit models of farmers participation in AESs for the farm subsamples 
2 and the control groups 
 
France 
 
Germany 
 
Spain 
 
UK 
 
Italy 
     
Farm characteristics      
year of birth of farmer  0.023**    0.019***  
 (0.009)    (0.007)  
dummy mountain      0732** 
     (0.304) 
dummy hill     0.642**  0.558*** 
    (0.268)  (0.191) 
farm UAA (ha)  0.003***   -0.009   0.001** 
 (0.001)   (0.006)   (0.001) 
farm rented land (ha)    0.012*   0.002* 
   (0.006)   (0.001) 
revenue per ha (000 euro)  -0.259**  -0.495***   -0.21***  -0.326*** 
 (0.117)  (0.106)   (0.070)  (0.062) 
farm capital per working units (000 euro)  0.001  -0.001*  0.001  0.000  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
share of grassland on the farm (%)  0.019***  -0.001  -0.163   -0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.194)   (0.004) 
fertilizer expenditure per ha (000 euro)  -7.576***  -8.511***  1.421  -6.367***  
 (2.330)  (2.893)  (2.588)  (2.231)  
crop protection expenditure per ha (000 euro)   5.384**  -3.397**  5.471*  
  (2.465)  (1.383)  (3.272)  
number of family working hours      
     
number of hired labor working hours      
     
farm income per ha (000 euro)  -0.567*   -1.119***   
 (0.324)   (0.275)   
farm decoupled subsidies per ha (000 euro)    -14.454***  1.738***  
   (2.717)  (0.644)  
dummy livestock farm  0.253  -0.156   -0.071  -0.070 
 (0.285)  (0.295)   (0.307)  (0.328) 
dummy permanent crop farm       0.321 
     (0.217) 
Macroeconomic indicators of the region^      
Gross Domestic Product per capita (000 euro)  0.139***   -0.664*   
 (0.024)   (0.344)   
value added of agricultural over total value added (%)  0.204***   0.217   1.280*** 
 (0.058)   (0.367)   (0.150) 
Geographical location^      
dummy north (dummy Scotland for the UK)  0.072  -1.529***   0.597**  
 (0.504)  (0.274)   (0.255)  
dummy east (dummy north-east for Italy)  0.871*  -2.166***  1.425   1.576*** 
 (0.449)  (0.421)  (2.122)   (0.586) 
dummy west (dummy northern Ireland for the UK; 
dummy north-west for Italy) 
 
-0.210 
 
-1.283*** 
  
-0.344 
 
3.543*** 
 (0.480)  (0.308)   (0.264)  (0.587) 
dummy south (dummy Wales for the UK)     -0.392  
    (0.271)  
dummy centre    -5.711***   3.851*** 
   (1.234)   (0.518) 
constant  -7.897***  1.100**  9.88**  -1.399***  -9.415*** 
 (1.021)  (0.471)  (4.744)  (0.543)  (0.815) 
     
Pseudo R2  0.154  0.096  0.477  0.105  0.184 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of the coefficient estimates. 
^The macroeconomic indicators are specified for each NUTS2 region in France, Spain and Italy and for each NUTS1 region 
in Germany and United Kingdom. The country geographical dummies are specified for NUTS1 regions or aggregation of 
them.  
Source: estimation results 
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Table A2.3 Covariates mean and standardized bias before and after the matching (subsamples 1 vs. control group in 2003) 
 
France Germany Spain UK Italy 
treated control % st bias treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control %st bias 
year of birth of farmer ^ 58.0 57.0* 12.7 50.0 48.0** 15.6 54.0 49.0*** 39.6 
58.0 58.0 4.4 50.0 50.0 -1.8 54.0 55.0 -3.1 
dummy mountain 0.044 0.024* 11.1 0.167 0.46*** -65.9 0.199 0.07*** 37.6 
0.045 0.048 -1.6 0.178 0.209 -7.0 0.194 0.189 1.3 
                
dummy hill 0.084 0.108 -7.9 0.233 0.147** 21.4 0.146 0.34*** -45.4 0.373 0.26*** 24.8 
0.075 0.073 0.8 0.233 0.217 4.0 0.156 0.142 3.2 0.375 0.396 -4.5 
farm UAA (ha) 140.46 10*** 39.4 193.87 125.2** 20.6 58.967 32.7*** 28.2 
133.99 136.23 -2.5 193.87 143.81 15 58.058 58.317 -0.3 
farm rented land (ha) 28.397 12.4*** 25.5 
27.312 24.998 3.7 
revenue per ha (000 euro) 2.699 2.719 -0.7 1.499 3.959** -21.5 
2.699 2.652 1.7 1.468 1.522 -0.5 
farm capital per working units (000 euro) 431.000 416.13 3.5 174.72 152.21 14.2 374.94 385.26 -1.5 
431.000 462.50 -7.5 182.58 186.18 -2.3 374.22 359.13 2.2 
share of grassland on the farm (%) 23.707 28.741* -17.5 0.149 1.313 -19.7 
23.707 22.942 2.7 0.159 0.039 2.0 
fertilizer expenditure per ha (000 euro) 0.01 0.125 -11.5 0.158 0.09*** 53.4 0.086 0.08*** 20.6 0.099 0.180 -7.9 
0.01 0.099 0.2 0.132 0.131 0.9 0.083 0.087 -8.3 0.1000 0.098 0.1 
crop protection expenditure per ha (000 euro) 0.154 0.07*** 67.7 0.040 0.02*** 30.7 0.096 0.17*** -27.0 
0.136 0.134 2.2 0.037 0.034 4.8 0.096 0.096 -0.1 
number of family working hours 3288 3132 12.0 2231 2302 -7.0 4056 3690*** 20.0 3591 3002*** 25.0 
3288 3333 -4.0 2190 2199 -1.0 3986 4080 -5.0 3571 3433 6.0 
number of hired labor working hours 4912 2454.2* 16.7 469 427 3.0 1470 1359 4.0 2073 1442 10.0 
4912 2792 14.4 486 408 5.6 1404 1565 -5.8 2086 2099 -0.2 
farm income per ha (000 euro) 0.518 0.353** 22.9 0.804 0.762 4.3 
0.518 0.502 2.1 0.829 0.785 4.5 
Continued 
Impact of agri-environmental schemes on farm performances- Appendix 
 
50 
 
Table A2.3 Continued 
 
France Germany Spain UK Italy 
treated control % st bias treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control 
% st 
bias 
treated control % st bias 
farm decoupled subsidies per ha (000 euro) 0.287 0.305** -17.6 0.082 0.15*** -69.8 
0.287 0.289 -1.9 0.087 0.089 -1.4 
value added of agricultural over total value added 
(%) 4.477 3.83*** 28.7 1.437 1.491 -9.2 4.438 5.15*** -52.5 3.179 3.357 -11.5 
4.435 4.376 2.6 1.437 1.431 1.0 4.418 4.387 2.3 3.186 3.243 -3.7 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (000 euro) 23.933 23.1*** 18.4 16.357 17.157 -25.6 
23.944 23.9 1.0 16.501 16.600 -3.2 
dummy livestock farm 0.569 0.505* 12.8 0.798 0.728* 16.6 0.693 
0.841**
* -35.5 0.342 0.24*** 23.3 
0.570 0.568 0.5 0.798 0.818 -4.6 0.707 0.718 -2.5 0.337 0.336 0.3 
dummy permanent crop farm  0.348 0.373 -5.3 
0.350 0.349 0.1 
dummy north (dummy Scotland for the UK) 0.495 0.442 10.7 0.558 0.557 0.2 0.352 0.10*** 62.1 
0.490 0.473 3.5 0.558 0.579 -4.2 0.328 0.314 3.5 
dummy west (dummy northern Ireland for the UK; 
dummy north-west for Italy) 
0.292 0.361* -14.7 0.186 0.245 -14.3 0.148 0.208** -15.9 0.292 0.13*** 40.8 
0.295 0.295 0.0 0.186 0.173 3.1 0.154 0.156 -0.5 0.287 0.265 5.6 
dummy east (dummy north-east for Italy) 0.183 0.167 4.1 0.101 0.105 -1.4 0.375 0.268* 23.1 0.093 0.25*** -42.2 
0.185 0.206 -5.5 0.101 0.089 3.8 0.400 0.405 -1.0 0.094 0.098 -1.0 
dummy south (dummy Wales for the UK) 0.076 0.22*** -41.4 
0.079 0.095 -4.5 
dummy centre 0.042 0.63*** -157.0 0.267 0.16*** 27.0 
0.044 0.049 -1.2 0.269 0.278 -2.3 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of covariates mean between the treated and the control group 
^ for all covariates the first line refers to  the unmatched samples, the second line refers to the matched samples. 
Source: estimation results 
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Table A2.4 Covariates mean and standardized bias before and after the matching (subsamples 2 vs. control group in 2003) 
France Germany Spain UK Italy 
 
treated control %st bias treated control %st bias treated control %st bias treated control %st bias treated control %st bias 
year of birth of farmer^ 59.0 57.0*** 20.5 50.0 49.0** 15.6 
59.0 59.0 1.8 50.0 50.0 6.2 
dummy mountain 0.1420 0.072*** 22.7 
0.1420 0.18 -12.3 
dummy hill 0.157 0.107** 14.8 0.5 0.258*** 51.4 
0.158 0.159 -0.2 0.5 0.4796 4.3 
farm UAA (ha) 121.92 105.8*** 23.5 46.095 64.633* -28.6 65.966 32.68*** 38.8 
120.76 120.8 -0.1 47.588 65.432 -27.6 65.966 55.719 11.9 
farm rented land (ha) 24.977 20.181 9.7 25.188 12.365 23.9 
25.854 40.147 -29.0 25.188 23.34*** 3.4 
revenue per ha (000 euro) 1.117 2.412* -16.5 1.859 2.719*** -32.1 0.996 3.959*** -25.8 1.6284 5.975*** -31.2 
1.123 1.121 0.0 1.873 1.884 -0.4 0.999 1.117 -1 1.6284 1.5609 0.5 
farm capital per working units (000 euro) 140.74 123.6*** 20.5 364.47 416.13 -14.8 176.33 152.210 14.5 582.89 385.26 10.4 321.23 285.610 8.0 
136.04 137.53 -1.8 366.76 352.12 4.2 178.36 174.150 2.5 431.32 434.32 -0.2 321.23 381.590 -13.6 
share of grassland on the farm (%) 48.458 26.53*** 68.6 24.395 28.741 -13.7 0.050 1.310 -21.4 24.3660 20.339 11.8 
47.822 47.404 1.3 23.804 25.187 -4.4 0.060 0.090 -0.7 24.3660 26.833 -7.2 
fertilizer expenditure per ha (000 euro) 0.083 0.125** -19.2 0.087 0.096 -16.7 0.154 0.093*** 64.1000 0.063 0.075*** -27.4 
0.084 0.084 -0.1 0.088 0.086 2.7 0.157 0.152 5.3000 0.063 0.059 10.6 
crop protection expenditure per ha (000 euro) 0.084 0.079 5.9 0.168 0.065*** 72.5 0.036 0.025*** 26.9 
0.084 0.081 4.4 0.174 0.156 12.6 0.036 0.038 -5.5 
farm income per ha (000 euro) 0.246 0.425** -22.1 0.863 0.762 10.0 
0.248 0.241 0.9 0.891 0.870 2.1 
Continued 
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Table A2.4 Continued      
 
France Germany Spain UK Italy 
treated control % bias treated control % bias treated control % bias treated control % bias treated control % bias 
farm decoupled subsidies per ha (000 euro) 0.041 0.146*** -128.1 0.206 0.152*** 40.3 
0.043 0.046 -4.6 0.206 0.201 3.9 
value added of agricultural over total value added (%) 3.781 3.832 -2.7 4.583 5.151** -42.8 4.326 3.357*** 62.5 
3.762 3.854 -4.8 4.576 4.523 4.0 4.326 4.459 -8.6 
Gross Domestic Product per capita (000 euro) 23.807 23.1** 15.9 15.305 17.16*** -63.7 
23.830 23.785 1.0 15.354 15.536 -6.3 
dummy livestock farm 0.727 0.505*** 46.7 0.612 0.728*** -24.7 0.709 0.841*** -32.1 0.21 0.236 -6.3 
0.723 0.715 1.7 0.609 0.616 -1.3 0.712 0.695 4.0 0.21 0.229 -4.5 
dummy permanent crop farm  0.290 0.373** -17.7 
0.290 0.252 8.1 
dummy north (dummy Scotland for the UK) 0.381 0.442* -12.4 0.449 0.557** -21.6 0.192 0.103*** 25.1 
0.381 0.404 -4.6 0.453 0.469 -3.3 0.192 0.175 4.9 
dummy west (dummy northern Ireland for the UK; dummy 
north-west for Italy) 0.268 0.361*** -20.0 0.209 0.245 -8.5 0.126 0.208*** -22.1 0.080 0.129* -15.9 
0.272 0.267 1.2 0.211 0.203 1.9 0.127 0.109 5.0 0.080 0.071 3.0 
dummy east (dummy north-east for Italy) 0.307 0.167*** 33.2 0.101 0.105 -1.4 0.192 0.268 -18.0 0.037 0.249*** -63.5 
0.302 0.286 3.9 0.102 0.094 2.6 0.200 0.239 -9.3 0.037 0.046 -2.8 
dummy south (dummy Wales for the UK) 0.157 0.22** -16.1 
0.158 0.162 -1.0 
dummy centre 0.021 0.625*** -168.6 0.222 0.157** 16.6 
0.022 0.018 1.2 0.222 0.180 10.8 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of covariates mean between the treated and the control group 
^ for all covariates the first line refers to  the unmatched samples, the second line refers to the matched samples. 
Source: estimation results
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APPENDIX A2.B 
In this Appendix the results of the placebo tests on each country subsample will be discussed. 
The placebo test (Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013) aims at testing the DID mean 
independence assumption (equation 2.12), which indicates that in the absence of treatment the 
outcomes of the treated and the matched control group would have followed parallel paths 
conditional on observed covariates. This guarantees the ATT be an unbiased measure of the 
treatment effect. In order to test the assumption we have calculated the ATT for each country 
treated subsample and the matched control group between 2002-2003; in none of the two 
years the treated and the control farmers have adopted AESs. If the data verify the assumption 
no significant ATT should be found in that period. Tables from A2.5 to A2.8 shows the 
results of the placebo tests. We could not implement such a test on Italian subsamples as in 
2003 a large number of Italian farmers were replaced by farmers newly monitored in the 
FADN database and thus the panel 2002-2006 would have been too small.   
Results of the placebo tests show that in most of the countries the ATT over the period 2002-
2003 is significant for a few outcomes only and this significance is at 10% significance level 
in most cases. The only exception is represented by the UK treated and control farmers from 
subsample 1 which show different pattern before the treatment for the farm UAA, rented land 
and output value and variable costs per hectare. The presence of some significant ATT before 
the treatment starts may be explained by anticipation effects, due to the time lag between the 
implementation of the agri-environmental practices and the administrative application. 
However, we may conclude that the parallel trend assumption holds in our data in most of the 
countries subsamples, while the results of the treatment effect on some outcomes of the UK 
subsample 1 should be interpret cautiously. . 
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Table A2.5 Results of the placebo test on France subsamples over the period 2002-2003  
 
 France subsample 1   France subsample 2 
 
     
Farm outcomes 
 Mean 
difference 
of the 
treated 
group 
Mean 
difference  
of the  
matched  
control  
group 
ATT  Mean 
difference of 
the treated 
group 
Mean 
difference of 
the matched 
control group 
ATT 
         
UAA (ha)  2.765 1.282 1.484  1.612 1.718 -0.106 
Rented land (ha)  2.969 1.190 1.779*  1.280 1.570 -0.291 
Number of crops grown on farm  0.032 0.014 0.019  -0.016 -0.002 -0.014 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha  -6.116 -7.407 1.290  -0.432 -6.485 6.053*** 
Crop protection expenditure per ha  -9.353 -5.544 -3.809*  -3.660 -4.898 1.239 
Share of grassland(%)  0.154 0.231 -0.077  -0.571 0.199 -0.770** 
Family working hours  106.773 113.441 -6.668  160.492 81.523 78.969 
Hired labour working hours  12.924 6.030 6.895  -75.956 -17.789 -58.167 
Output value per ha(000 euro)  -0.009 -0.031 0.022  -0.043 -0.066 0.023 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro)  -0.030 -0.032 0.003  0.013 -0.012 0.025 
Farm income (000 euro)  5.836 1.245 4.590  -1.899 -1.635 -0.265 
Farm income without AE payments 
(000 euro) 
 6.219 1.400 4.819  -0.369 -1.325 0.957 
Farm income per ha (000 euro)  0.042 0.020 0.021  -0.032 -0.034 0.002 
Farm income without AE payments 
per ha (000 euro) 
 0.047 0.022 0.025  -0.019 -0.031 0.011 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of mean differences in 
the treated and control group. 
Source: estimation results 
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Table A2.6 Results of the placebo test on Germany subsamples over the period 2002-2003  
 
 Germany subsample 1   Germany subsample 2 
 
     
Farm outcomes 
 Mean 
difference 
of the 
treated 
group 
Mean 
difference  
of the  
matched  
control  
group 
ATT  Mean 
difference of 
the treated 
group 
Mean 
difference of 
the matched 
control group 
ATT 
         
UAA (ha)  2.465 1.073 1.392  -0.563 1.842 -2.405 
Rented land (ha)  -0.258 -1.242 0.984  -7.333 2.172 -9.506* 
Number of crops grown on farm  -0.171 -0.046 -0.125  -0.078 -0.070 -0.009 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha  3.538 4.711 -1.173  2.909 2.505 0.404 
Crop protection expenditure per ha  0.037 1.270 -1.234  1.494 3.052 -1.559 
Share of grassland(%)  -0.199 0.050 -0.248  -0.100 0.861 -0.961* 
Family working hours  5.764 -18.005 23.770  -28.870 -26.585 -2.284 
Hired labour working hours  -849.114 52.113 -901.2*  -32.426 27.981 -60.407 
Output value per ha(000 euro)  -0.018 0.052 -0.071  0.018 -0.018 0.035 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro)  -0.009 0.067 -0.076*  0.004 0.019 -0.015 
Farm income (000 euro)  8.771 4.380 4.391  3.480 6.346 -2.866 
Farm income without AE payments 
(000 euro) 
 9.126 4.669 4.457  5.241 6.577 -1.336 
Farm income per ha (000 euro)  0.005 0.000 0.005  0.027 -0.030 0.058 
Farm income without AE payments 
per ha (000 euro) 
 0.008 0.003 0.006  0.037 -0.027 0.064 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of mean differences in 
the treated and control group. 
Source: estimation results 
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Table A2.7 Results of the placebo test on Spain subsamples over the period 2002-2003  
 
 Spain subsample 1   Spain subsample 2 
 
     
Farm outcomes 
 Mean 
difference 
of the 
treated 
group 
Mean 
difference  
of the  
matched  
control  
group 
ATT  Mean 
difference of 
the treated 
group 
Mean 
difference of 
the matched 
control group 
ATT 
         
UAA (ha)  1.391 2.194 -0.802  2.845 3.649 -0.804 
Rented land (ha)  1.142 2.297 -1.155  1.268 3.354 -2.086 
Number of crops grown on farm  -0.023 0.007 -0.030  0.044 -0.016 0.060 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha  17.338 3.767 13.572  -78.942 2.542 -81.484* 
Crop protection expenditure per ha  -0.291 1.669 -1.960  13.739 21.824 -8.086 
Share of grassland(%)  -0.103 -0.166 0.063  0.055 -0.096 0.151 
Family working hours  99.116 55.711 43.406  40.467 24.253 16.214 
Hired labour working hours  32.628 57.082 -24.454  71.089 60.693 10.396 
Output value per ha(000 euro)  0.097 0.036 0.060  0.259 0.220 0.039 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro)  -2.420 0.034 -2.453  -0.138 0.164 -0.30*** 
Farm income (000 euro)  47.886 1.249 46.637  3.042 4.116 -1.074 
Farm income without AE payments 
(000 euro) 
 49.292 1.283 48.009  4.058 4.132 -0.073 
Farm income per ha (000 euro)  2.426 -0.025 2.451  0.374 0.069 0.304 
Farm income without AE payments 
per ha (000 euro) 
 2.440 -0.025 2.464  0.382 0.069 0.312 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of mean differences in 
the treated and control group. 
Source: estimation results 
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Table A2.8 Results of the placebo test on UK subsamples over the period 2002-2003  
 
 UK subsample 1   UK subsample 2 
 
     
Farm outcomes 
 Mean 
difference 
of the 
treated 
group 
Mean 
difference  
of the  
matched  
control  
group 
ATT  Mean 
difference of 
the treated 
group 
Mean 
difference of 
the matched 
control group 
ATT 
         
UAA (ha)  -0.446 -6.002 5.556***  2.179 -0.754 2.933* 
Rented land (ha)  0.324 -7.105 7.429***  1.574 -1.154 2.728 
Number of crops grown on farm  -0.010 -0.008 -0.003  -0.010 0.059 -0.069 
Fertiliser expenditure per ha  1.586 6.238 -4.652  2.745 -1.340 4.085 
Crop protection expenditure per ha  -0.204 0.772 -0.977  1.313 0.936 0.376 
Share of grassland(%)  -0.036 0.612 -0.648  0.050 0.188 -0.138 
Family working hours  -35.465 -38.200 2.735  -16.863 -17.534 0.672 
Hired labour working hours  -62.320 -60.031 -2.289  20.887 -91.035 111.923 
Output value per ha(000 euro)  0.145 0.237 -0.092**  0.087 0.100 -0.013 
Variable costs per ha (000 euro)  0.044 0.121 -0.08***  0.048 0.057 -0.009 
Farm income (000 euro)  12.399 10.103 2.296  7.047 5.208 1.839 
Farm income without AE payments 
(000 euro) 
 12.437 10.109 2.328  7.251 5.228 2.023 
Farm income per ha (000 euro)  0.111 0.094 0.017  0.038 0.037 0.000 
Farm income without AE payments 
per ha (000 euro) 
 0.111 0.094 0.018  0.039 0.037 0.001 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively of a t test on the equality of mean differences in 
the treated and control group. 
Source: estimation results 
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3.1 INTRODUCTION  
Risk is an important component of agricultural production and it affects farmers’ production 
choices. Although the distinction between risk and uncertainty is commonly based on the 
knowledge of the probability of the outcomes, Hardaker et al. (1997) do not make such 
distinction. They define uncertainty as imperfect knowledge and risk as uncertain 
consequences of the imperfect knowledge. Agriculture by its nature is exposed to weather 
variability, plant and pest diseases and farmer faces different kinds of risk. Hardaker et al. 
(1997) classified the farmer’s risk in production risk, market risk, institutional risk, personal 
risk and financial risk and in recent years the increase in price volatility on agricultural 
markets have increased market risk. Under a risky environment, the decision-maker makes the 
choices based on his expectation of uncertain outcomes and these expectations are often based 
on past experiences. Most empirical studies showed that farmer is a risk averse agent as he is 
willing to sacrifice some income to ensure against the risky consequences (Feder, 1980). 
Since risk is a structural component of agriculture and the farmer is not a risk neutral agent, 
ignoring risk in modelling farm behaviour is likely to lead to biased results.  
There are several tools the farmer may adopt to mitigate the consequences of market risk and 
these options have been discussed in Chapter 1 of this thesis. In this chapter we will consider 
the agri-environmental schemes (AESs) from a different viewpoint, since we aim to analyse 
the potential role of a specific AES (the option to convert a share of farmland to grassland) as 
a farm strategy to cope with risk. The analysis has been performed by developing a new 
methodological approach which incorporates farm risk in a farm level Positive Mathematical 
Programming (PMP) model.   
                                                          
5 I would like to make special thanks to Michele Donati (University of Parma) for his fundamental help in the development of 
the theoretical model of this chapter and in its implementation in the GAMS software.  
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Although PMP is a powerful and widely used technique to calibrate mathematical 
programming models to the base year observed outcome levels, there are a few attempts in the 
literature to introduce risk modelling in a PMP framework (Paris and Arfini, 2000; Severini 
and Cortignani, 2011; Petsakos and Rozakis, 2011). This may be explained by the difficulty 
in estimating two different non-linear terms in the objective function, the cost function and 
the risk component. The idea of combining risk modelling with PMP relies on the information 
contained in the farm non-linear cost function estimated in the PMP procedure. As this cost 
function incorporates any type of model misspecification, data errors, aggregate bias, price 
expectation and risk behaviour (de Frahan et al., 2007), it should be possible to isolate the risk 
component such that the impact of risk on farmer’s choices may be studied. We think that the 
introduction of risk in PMP modelling will be one of the new research frontier in the area of 
mathematical programming. Our proposal presents some innovation compared to the previous 
literature, since it merges the first linear phase with the second non-linear phase of the PMP 
farmer expected utility maximisation problem. This allows to estimate simultaneously the 
farmer’s risk aversion coefficient, the farm non-linear cost function as well as the shadow 
prices of resources and activities.  
The proposed model has been tested on three farm samples and the ensuing calibrated model  
has been used to perform simulations to check the potential role of the grassland program as 
farm income stabiliser under different scenarios of crop price volatility. The idea is that, since 
the adoption of AESs guarantees a fixed payment to the farmer independent of market 
conditions and crop yields, these measures may act as an insurance against risk. The 
mathematical programming framework is suitable for our purpose as it allows to model easily 
the grassland program which competes with the other crops for farmland.  
The chapter is organized as follows: section 3.2 introduces the expected utility theory as the 
framework for risk modelling and section 3.3 compares the different types of mathematical 
programming models specifying how the risk may be included. Section 3.4 provides a 
literature review on the standard PMP approach and its extensions while section 3.5 describes 
the new methodological approach developed to incorporate risk in a PMP framework. Section 
3.6 presents an empirical application of the methodological approach and the simulated 
scenarios, whose results are discussed in section 3.7. Finally, section 3.8 draws some 
conclusions.  
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3.2  RISK MODELLING: THE EXPECTED UTILITY THEORY 
The most widely used framework for the analysis of decision making under uncertainty is the 
expected utility theory proposed by Bernoulli in 1738 and later developed by Von Neumann 
and Morgenstern in 1944 (Kaiser and Messer, 2011). According to such theory, the individual 
preferences can be represented by an individual utility function ( )U W of a monetary outcome, 
W . The individual utility function ( )U W  associates to each outcome of an action a scalar 
number indicating the level of satisfaction of the individual. In order for a well-defined 
single-dimensional individual utility function to exist the agent preferences must comply with 
three axioms: ordering and transitivity, independence and continuity. The agent chooses the 
action which maximizes his expected utility, ( )EU W , which is the sum of the utility 
associated to each potential outcome weighted by the probability of each outcome to occur. 
Letting 1W , 2W  be two uncertain monetary outcome levels and 1( )U W , 2( )U W  the 
corresponding utility values, we have:  
[ ]1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )EU W W U E W W<  if the agent is risk averse, meaning that he prefers a 
certain outcome compared to an uncertain outcome 
with the same expected value; 
[ ]1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )EU W W U E W W=  if the agent is risk neutral, meaning that he is 
indifferent between a certain outcome and an 
uncertain outcome with the same expected value;  
[ ]1 2 1 2( , ) ( , )EU W W U E W W>  if the agent is risk lover, meaning that he prefers an 
uncertain outcome to a certain outcome with the 
same expected value. 
The comparison presented above suggests that the shape of the individual utility function 
indicates the risk attitude of the agent, specifically: 
'( ) 0, ''( ) 0U W U W> <  for a risk averse agent, 
'( ) 0, ''( ) 0U W U W> =  for a risk neutral agent, 
'( ) 0, ''( ) 0U W U W> >  for a risk lover agent, 
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where 'U and ''U are respectively the first order and the second order derivatives of the 
individual utility function. 
Arrow (1974) and Pratt (1964) defined the absolute risk aversion coefficient and the relative 
risk aversion coefficient as two measures of the risk attitude of an agent. The two coefficients 
are defined as: 
''( )
 
'( )
U W
U W
α = −   (3.1)   
''( )
 
'( )
r
U W
W
U W
α = − ⋅   (3.2) 
whereα is the absolute risk aversion coefficient and rα  is the relative risk aversion 
coefficient. While α indicates the attitude to face a bet of fixed size, rα indicates the attitude 
towards a bet equal to a given share of the agent’s income. α takes positive, negative or zero 
values whether the agent is risk averse, risk lover and risk neutral respectively. The larger is 
the absolute value of α  the stronger is the risk aversion or risk loving of the agent. α  and rα
may vary depending on the level of wealth. It is reasonable to assume that if the level of 
wealth increases the willingness to face a bet of fixed size increases or at least it remains the 
same; in this case we have a decreasing absolute risk aversion coefficient (DARA) if such 
willingness increases or a constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) if it does not change. 
Similarly, we may expect that the willingness to face a bet of a fixed share of wealth 
decreases when the wealth increases or at least it remains the same. In this case the coefficient 
of relative risk aversion increases (IRRA) or remains the same (CRRA). 
3.3  MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING MODELS AND THE INTEGRATION OF 
RISK 
In a mathematical programming model, risk faced by farmers can be introduced either by 
randomising the behaviour of input and output prices or by introducing uncertainty in the 
supply of limiting inputs as well as in the technical coefficients specification. There are 
different techniques to accommodate risk in a mathematical programming framework, such as 
mean-variance approach, MOTAD, target MOTAD, chance constrained programming, 
discrete stochastic sequential programming. These techniques are exhaustively presented in 
most textbooks on mathematical programming (e.g. Kaiser and Messer, 2011).  
In this section we will present one of the first methodologies developed, which is still one of 
the most frequently applied, the mean-variance approach (E-V). This technique will be 
applied in section 3.5 in order to introduce price risk in a farm-level PMP model.  
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The E-V model was proposed by Freund in 1956 and it relies on the pioneering work of 
Markowitz (1952). This approach integrates risk into programming models by means of 
expected utility theory. Freund showed that under a given set of assumptions (normal 
distribution of unitary gross margin; negative exponential individual utility function, 
( ) 1 WU W e α−= − ; CARA preferences; expected utility hypothesis) the agent decision problem 
under uncertain input and output prices can be formulated as: 
 
1
max ( ) ( ) ' '
2
EU Eπ α= −g x x Vxɶɶ   (3.3) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   (3.4) 
  0≥x    (3.5) 
where ( )EU πɶ is the expected utility with respect to random income, πɶ , ( ) 'E gɶ is the expected 
unit gross margin vector and V  is the variance-covariance matrix of the unit gross margin 
vector; x is the vector of unknown activity levels, b is the vector of the supply of fixed input, 
while A  is the matrix of the technical coefficients which indicates the fixed input 
requirements per unit of activity. The quantity
1
'
2
αx Vx is the risk premium, which indicates 
the amount the agent is willing to pay to avoid the risky consequences of uncertain outcomes. 
The risk premium may be interpreted as an insurance against risk and therefore it is the cost 
for the uncertainty that the economic agent faces.  
The inclusion of the risk component in a mathematical programming model may improve the 
validation and the calibration of the model. Before proceeding further in the presentation of 
the different types of mathematical programming models and to show the integration of risk 
in each model, we need to define precisely the difference between the concept of validation 
and calibration in mathematical programming, which are sometimes wrongly used 
interchangeable  
3.3.1 Validation and calibration of mathematical programming models 
Validation of a mathematical programming model is an important step to check the model 
performances when the model is intended either for predictive or for prescriptive use. The 
meaning of validation is controversial: McCarl and Spreen (2004: 18-1) refers to validation as 
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‘exercises determining whether the model user and or modelling team feels the model 
behaviour is close enough to real world behaviour’. There are two kinds of validation 
categories: validation by construct and validation by results. Validation by construct does not 
test the model but assumes the model was built properly and therefore it is valid; validation by 
results compares the model outcomes with the real world outcomes. An exhaustive overview 
of the different tests of validation by results are presented in McCarl and Spreen (2004). 
The calibration of a mathematical programming model is the process of adjusting the model 
in order to reproduce the variable levels or the exogenous elasticities observed in the 
reference year. The calibration may consist in adding additional constraints or adjusting 
model parameters. PMP is a common calibration method in mathematical programming 
introduced in the eighties. 
3.3.2  Normative, Positive and Econometric Programming Models 
In this section a brief overview of the different categories of mathematical programming 
models is carried out, with a special attention to the possible ways of modelling risk. 
Mathematical programming models can be classified in three classes: normative, positive and 
econometric (Buysse et al., 2007b). 
Normative mathematical programming models (NMP) have mainly a prescriptive character 
indicating how the decision maker ought to behave. This kind of model is not calibrated to the 
base year observed data and they reproduce an outcome that may be largely different 
compared to the observed outcome. However, a wide divergence between the modelled 
outcome and the observed outcome may be unacceptable in policy analysis. Besides the lack 
of calibration, another disadvantage of NMP is the jumpy behaviour from one corner 
solutions to another when some parameters change. Linear models are the most common 
NMP models and the linearity is represented in both objective function and constraints. Often 
these models suffer of over-specialisation as the number of empirically justified constraints is 
usually lower than the number of observed activities. As in a linear formulation the number of 
constraints is the upper bound of the number of non-zero activities in the model, over-
specialisation occurs by construction. In order to overcome the overspecialization problem 
and to maintain the linear character of the model, the inclusion of additional binding 
constraints is required. However, although tightly constrained models may reproduce the 
observed situation, they are likely to be inappropriate to represent the reaction to policy 
changes. Another way to get results closer to the ones observed consists in the introduction of 
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non-linear terms in the objective function, such as a risk term. However, although the 
inclusion of non-linear components in the model may overcome the overspecialisation 
problem, these models often deviate from reproducing the observed situation. Despite these 
disadvantages, the NMP models have dominated the modelling efforts in agricultural 
economics for more than fifty years and nowadays they are still applied. The reasons for their 
success are the requirements of a minimum dataset and their ability to model new policies or 
practices for which data are not yet available.  
PMP models have been developed since the eighties with the aim of overcoming the 
drawbacks of NMP. PMP models assume that the observed activity levels correspond to the 
optimum choice which maximizes the objective function of the decision maker subject to 
some constraints. If the starting model with a set of linear constraints is not able to reproduce 
the observed activity levels it means that there is a non-linear term in the objective function 
and the optimal observed activity set is a combination of binding constraints and first order 
conditions (Howitt, 1995). Howitt (1995:330) stated that ‘The LP solution is an extreme point 
of the binding constraints. In contrast, the PMP approach views the optimal farm production 
as a boundary point, which is a combination of binding constraints and first order conditions’. 
PMP models allow to overcome two disadvantages of the NMP models: they reproduce 
exactly the base year observed situation and they react smoothly to parameter changes.  
A recent frontier of mathematical programming is what Buysse et al. (2007b) called 
econometric mathematical programming (EMP). When data are available, the EMP approach 
joins the econometric and mathematical programming techniques by estimating some 
parameters of the programming model by econometric techniques and later using the resulting 
estimated model to simulate new practices or policy changes. EMP combines the positive 
aspects of econometrics, i.e. the use of observed data to estimate some economic 
relationships, with that of mathematical programming, the possibility to model new activities, 
new constraints and policy changes. Examples of this integration can be found in Paris and 
Arfini (2000) and in Heckelei and Wolff (2003). 
3.4 POSITIVE MATHEMATICAL PROGRAMMING 
Since our study represents an attempt to incorporate risk modelling into a PMP framework, 
we will proceed by providing a literature review on the standard PMP approach and its 
developments (section 3.4.1 and 3.4.2). Later we will focus on the existing proposals of 
combining risk modelling with PMP (section 3.4.3).  
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3.4.1  The standard PMP approach 
PMP is a methodology to calibrate mathematical programming models to the base year 
observed outcomes by using the dual information provided by the calibration constraints. 
Besides the perfect calibration to the base year level of the endogenous variables, PMP avoids 
the introduction of artificial constraints and it guarantees smooth reactions to changes in 
parameter values. Although the PMP methodology was already applied in the eighties in 
agricultural economics research, it was formalised and published for the first time by Howitt 
in 1995. The basic assumption of PMP is that the observed choices of the decision maker are 
the optimum choices, which maximise the decision maker’s objective function. Howitt 
(1995:332) stated that ‘if the model does not calibrate to observed production activities with 
the full set of general linear constraints that are empirically justified by the model, a necessary 
condition for profit maximization is that the objective function be nonlinear in at least some 
of the activities’. The information contained in the dual values of the calibration constraints 
are used to infer the marginal cost of each activity level and by that to recover a farm non-
linear cost function such that the endogenous variables replicate exactly their level in the base 
year.  
The standard PMP approach is a three step procedure (Paris and Howitt, 1998). In the first 
step a linear or non-linear programming model is specified adding to the set of resource 
constraints (equation 3.7) a set of calibration constraints (equation 3.8) that bind the activities 
to the observed levels:  
 max ' 'π = −p x c x   (3.6) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   ( )y    (3.7)  
  ≤ +x x ε   ( )λ    (3.8)  
 ≥x 0   (3.9) 
where π  is the profit to be maximised, p  and c  are the 1×n vectors of output prices per unit 
of activity and accounting variable costs per unit of activity respectively and x  is the 1×n
vector of endogenous activity levels. In the standard PMP approach, the x  vector can be 
partitioned into a ( ) 1n m− ×  vector of preferable activities bounded by the calibration 
constraints and into a 1m× vector of marginal activities, or less profitable activities, bounded 
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by the resource constraints. A is the nm×  matrix of technical coefficients which indicates the 
amount of each resource used per unit of each activity, b is the 1×m vector of resource 
availability, x 	is the 1×n vector of observed activity levels in the reference year and ε is a 
small positive number vector (perturbance term vector) which prevents the linear dependency 
between the calibration and the resource constraints. The first step results in the dual value 
vectors y and λ associated to the resource constraints and to the calibration constraints 
respectively. The dual values vector of the calibration constraints λ  represents the differential 
marginal costs vector, which added to the activity observed accounting costs vector provides 
the total marginal costs to produce observed activity levels. The value of λ is equal to zero for 
the marginal activities, as these activities are bounded by the resource constraints. λ is not 
present in the accounting book of the farmer but it is implicitly included in the observed 
output level and it captures any type of model misspecification, data errors, aggregate bias, 
risk behaviour and price expectations (De Frahan et al., 2007).  
The second step of PMP uses the dual values of the calibration constraints to recover a non-
linear cost function. As stated by Heckelei and Britz (2005) “Any type of non-linear function 
with the required properties qualifies for phase 2. For reasons of computational simplicity and 
lacking strong arguments for other type of functions, a quadratic cost function is often 
employed.” The quadratic cost function usually applied is a multi-output quadratic functional 
form without input prices, which are assumed to be fixed at the market level: 
 
1
( ) ' '
2
C = +x d x x Qx    (3.10) 
where d is the 1n ×  linear term vector of the cost function and Qis the quadratic n n×  matrix 
which is symmetric and positive semi-definite to guarantee the convexity property of the cost 
function.  
The parameters of the cost function are recovered by using the information contained in the 
dual values of the calibration constraints by using the equation: 
 ( ) = + = +MC x c λ d Qx    (3.11) 
where MC is the farm marginal cost function vector. This marginal cost function does not 
include the opportunity cost of fixed inputs, which are implicitly accounted in the dual value 
of the resource constraints of the final model.  
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The estimation of d 	andQ implies the estimation of (n+n*(n+1)/2) parameters where n  
indicates the number of activity in the base year farm production plan. Originally PMP was 
proposed to calibrate mathematical programming models with a minimum dataset. The PMP 
pioneering works provided examples of recovering the farm cost function when only data on a 
single farm in one year was available. Besides the extreme case of just one observation 
available, most PMP problems are ill-posed, meaning that the number of parameters to be 
estimated is larger than the number of observations. To overcome the under-determination 
problem, PMP modellers adopted some ad hoc restrictions on the parameters (see de Frahan 
et al., 2007 and Heckelei and Britz, 2005 for an overview). The most common assumption of 
the first implementations of PMP was setting the off diagonal elements of the Qmatrix equal 
to zero, implying that the marginal cost of activity  is not affected by the level of activity . 
Under this assumption, the substitution and complementarity relationships between activities 
are not considered. 
Together with this common hypothesis, some additional restrictions were imposed. The most 
common ones consisted in setting the linear term d  of the marginal cost function equal to 
zero or equal to the accounting costs vector c ; one may also equates the accounting costs 
vector c to the average costs vector of the quadratic cost function. In all these cases the 
marginal costs of the less profitable activities, which are bounded by the resource constraints, 
are constant as their activity shadow values, λ , derived from the first phase of PMP, are equal 
to zero. An ad hoc solution to get an increasing marginal costs for the marginal activities 
consisted in retrieving some share of the dual values of the resource constraint and transfer it 
to the dual values of the calibration constraints. Helming (2005) used the exogenous supply 
elasticity to recover all the on-diagonal elements of the Q matrix.  
Paris and Howitt (1998) proposed the application of the Generalized Maximum Entropy 
(GME) technique in the second step of PMP in order to recover all the (n+n*(n+1)/2) 
parameters of the farm total cost function in the case of both ill-posed and well-posed 
problems. GME also allows the integration of exogenous information, such as supply 
elasticity, in the estimation phase and it accommodates multiple observations. By the 
introduction of GME in the mathematical programming framework, the authors started to 
cross the bridge between econometrics and mathematical programming. However, their work 
still used only one observation. Heckelei and Britz (2005) argued that the use of a single 
observation does not provide any information on the curvature of the cost function and hence 
the farm response to economic changes is largely dependent on the ad hoc restrictions or on 
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the support values applied in the GME estimation. One way to deal with inappropriate 
modelling of farm reaction to changes, when the problem is ill-posed, consists in the use of 
exogenous information, such as supply elasticities. Heckelei and Britz (2000) extended the 
use of GME in a PMP framework when multiple observations are available. Multiple 
observations give information on the second order derivatives of the cost function and if the 
problem is well-posed arbitrary curvature of the cost function is avoided. When multiple 
observations are available and the problem is well-posed either GME or Least Squares (LS) 
can be implemented in a PMP framework to estimate the non-linear cost function (Paris and 
Arfini, 2000).  
When all the parameters of the quadratic matrix are estimated either by GME or by LS, the 
Cholesky factorisation is applied in order to guarantee the symmetry and positive semi-
definiteness of the Q matrix. The Cholesky factorisation decomposes the quadratic matrix 
into a lower triangular matrix and a diagonal matrix such that: 
 '=Q LDL   (3.12) 
where L  is a unit lower triangular matrix and D  is a diagonal matrix whose elements are 
restricted to be non-negative. The estimation of the parameters of a mathematical 
programming model by the traditional econometrics techniques such as LS and GME on 
multiple observations are still a few (Heckelei et al., 2012).  
Once the non-linear cost function has been estimated, the third step of the standard PMP uses 
this function to recover a calibrated non-linear programming model (equations 3.13-3.15) 
which reproduces exactly the base period level of primal and dual solutions without the 
calibration constraints. 
 
1
max ' ' '
2
π = − −p x d x x Qx    (3.13) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b    ( )y   (3.14) 
  ≥x 0   (3.15) 
3.4.2  Developments of PMP 
Following the seminal papers by Howitt (1995) and Paris and Howitt (1998), there have been 
many methodological developments in the area of PMP, aiming to improve the standard 
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approach. Paris and Arfini work (2000) dealt with the problem of zero activity levels in some 
farms of an homogenous sample. They solved the self-selection problem by adding to the n
farm LP models of the first step an additional model for an artificial farm and through this 
they calibrated a frontier cost function. The artificial farm resulted by summing the resources 
and the crop activity levels of all farms in the sample.  
Paris (2001) proposed the Symmetric Positive Equilibrium Problem (SPEP) as a way to avoid 
the linear technology of the fixed input and to make the demand and supply of fixed input 
responsive to output levels and input price changes. The SPEP model contains symmetric 
primal and dual constraints in the first step, it recovers a total cost function which includes the 
cost of quasi-fixed inputs in the second step, and in the third step it results in a set of input 
demand, output supply, marginal cost and marginal revenue equations.  
One of the most important modifications to the original PMP approach was proposed by 
Heckelei and Wolff (2003). The authors argued that the standard PMP approach leads to 
inconsistent parameters estimates of the calibrated cost function when multiple observations 
are used. They showed that, when multiple observations are available, the dual values of the 
resource constraints of the first step of PMP are different from the values of the third step 
non-linear model, which is assumed to be the ‘true’ model. As the dual values of the first step 
are used to recover the non-linear cost function and these values are shown to be distorted, 
they concluded that the estimates of the cost function parameters are biased. Howitt (2005) 
showed that for a single observation the dual values are the same in the first phase model and 
in the third phase model; when multiple observations are available, he proposed a two-step LP 
calibration in order to avoid the inconsistency. The alternative calibration procedure proposed 
by Heckelei and Wolff consists of skipping the first step of PMP and employing directly the 
first order conditions of the desired programming model to estimate simultaneously the non-
linear cost function and the dual values. Let’s consider the desired programming model taking 
this form:  
 
1
max ' ' '
2
π = − −g x d x x Qx   (3.16) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   ( )y   (3.17) 
  0≥x   (3.18) 
where d  and Q need to be estimated and g is the per unit of activity gross margin vector. 
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Assuming that the observed activity levels deviate from the optimum choices by a small 
stochastic errore , with mean zero and standard deviationσ , and that all the resource 
constraints are binding, the optimality first order conditions are:  
 ( ) ' 0− − − − =g d Q x e y A   (3.19) 
  ( )− =A x e b   (3.20) 
The two optimality conditions (3.19) and (3.20) are used to estimate the parameters of non-
linear cost function by either GME or LS techniques.  
The work of Heckelei and Wolff represents a remarkable attempt to join mathematical 
programming model with econometric techniques within the new framework of EMP. De 
Frahan et al. (2007) showed the implementation of the direct estimation of the optimality 
conditions of the desired model to calibrate an agricultural model, SEPALE, composed by a 
collection of farm-level mathematical programming models. The authors did not include any 
resource constraints in the model, but the resources are considered tradable, thus entering the 
cost function as variable inputs. Another empirical application of the approach proposed by 
Heckelei and Wolff is represented by the work of Buysse et al. (2007a), which analysed the 
impact of the 2003 sugar reform in the EU by applying a PMP model to a sample of Belgian 
farmers. The authors applied directly GME estimation to the first order conditions of a farm 
level model with a quadratic cost function, assuming the tradability of land among farmers.  
A further extension to the standard PMP approach is represented by the model proposed by 
Arfini and Donati (2008). Paris in his book ‘Economic Foundations of Symmetric 
Programming’ (2011: 397-404) refers to this model as an ingenious answer to two problems 
arising from the standard PMP. The first problem is the tautology problem raised by the 
presence of calibration constraints in the first phase of PMP, while the second issue concerns 
the non- obvious connection between the - LP independent problems of the first phase and 
the recovery of a quadratic matrix of the cost function common to all farms in the second 
phase. The idea of Arfini and Donati is to merge the first linear phase with the second non-
linear phase of the PMP and to estimate simultaneously the parameters of the non-linear cost 
function, the shadow price of resources and the differential marginal costs. The theoretical 
representation of the model for the thn farm is: 
Incorporating risk in a PMP framework: the role of AESs as income stabilisers 
71 
 
 ( )
1 1
1
min ' ' '
2
N N
n n n n n n n n
n n
b y
= =
 
+ + − 
 
∑ ∑u u r x p x   (3.21) 
  subject to  'n n n nA y + ≥r p    (3.22) 
  n n n= +r Qx u   (3.23) 
 , 0n ny ≥r          (3.24) 
where nx is the vector of observed activity levels, nb is the land available on the farm, 'nA is 
the matrix of technical coefficients,  np is the vector of output prices, ny is the shadow price of 
land, nr  is the activity marginal cost vector, Q is the quadratic term of the non linear cost 
function, which is common to all farms, while nu  is the vector of farm deviations from the 
cost function  . The model merges the first linear phase with the second non-linear phase by 
minimising an objective function subject to a set of constraints. The objective function has 
two components: the square of the farm deviations from the average cost function and the 
differences between the primal and dual objective function of an LP problem which should be 
equal to zero. The constraint (3.22) is the dual constraint of the LP problem and it indicates 
the traditional economic equilibrium stating that marginal cost must be larger or equal to 
marginal revenue while the constraint (3.23) represents the link between the LP problem and 
the quadratic problem. Paris provided the Karush-Kunh-Tucker (KKT) conditions for the 
resolution of this model and he showed the ability of the model to reproduce the base year 
activity levels without explicit calibration constraints, which are nevertheless implicit in the 
setup of the problem.  
Arfini and Donati (2011) provided an empirical application of a similar model to analyse the 
effects of some Health Check CAP reform proposals on farm samples in three different 
European regions. The main contribution of this model compared to the 2008 version consists 
in the estimation of the specific variable accounting costs, c , together with the estimation of 
the non linear cost function, while the shadow value of land is approximated by some 
exogenous rental prices. In order to estimate c  correctly an additional constraint is added to 
the model which bounds the total estimated accounting cost to be lower or equal to the total 
variable costs included in the FADN database. Another constraint bounds the total estimated 
non-linear cost function to be larger or equal to the total variable costs included in the FADN 
database.  
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3.4.3 Positive Mathematical Programming and Risk Modelling 
The above literature review on PMP and its extensions has showed that PMP is a powerful 
and ‘alive’ technique to calibrate mathematical programming models. It is powerful in the 
way it allows for an exact reproduction of the base year activity levels and it is ‘alive’ as it is 
subject to modifications and improvements over time. A relatively new research frontier in 
the area of mathematical programming concerns the integration of risk modelling in a PMP 
framework. So far there have been a few studies in this direction. The idea is that if the dual 
values of the calibration constraints of PMP capture also the risk behaviour, it should be 
possible to make explicit the risk component separately from the other non-linear cost 
components. Modelling the risk component explicitly allows to identify the farmer attitude 
towards risk and the role of risk in farmer’s choices, as well as to perform simulation under 
different risk scenarios. Below we present three attempts of integrating risk into the PMP 
modelling recently proposed in the literature. 
The first attempt in this direction was made by Paris and Arfini (2000), who introduced the 
risk in a PMP model relying upon the E-V approach proposed by Freund (1956). The first 
step of their work consisted in calculating exogenously the farm absolute risk aversion 
coefficient, , by the application of a chance-constrained interpretation of the dual relation:
' ( )Eα+ ≥A y Vx pɶ . From the chance-constrained approach, they obtained an estimate for α
equals to 
τ−
xVx
where  is the standardized normal random variable and V is the exogenous 
variance-covariance matrix of output prices. After the exogenous calculation of α , they 
introduced  in the first phase of a PMP model which includes the price risk according to the 
mean-variance approach. The first step model is expressed by: 
 
1
max ( ) ( ) ' ' '
2
EU Eπ α= − −p x c x x Vxɶɶ    (3.25) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   ( )y   (3.26) 
           ≤ +x x ε    ( )λ  (3.27) 
The only endogenous variables in this first phase model is the vector of activity levels x . The 
recovery of the marginal cost equation follows the second phase of the standard PMP 
approach without risk and the final calibrated model results in: 
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1 1
max ( ) ( ) ' ' '
2 2
EU Eπ α= − −p x x Qx x Vxɶɶ   (3.28) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   (3.29) 
Given the lack of data, the two authors could not apply their proposed methodology to a farm 
sample. The Paris and Arfini (2000) study drove the attention of agricultural economists on 
the new challenging problem of incorporating risk into PMP and they made the first 
methodological proposal in this area; however, their model does not estimate directly the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient, which is calculated exogenously.   
A more recent attempt to introduce risk into a PMP framework has been carried out by 
Severini and Cortignani (2011). Their work extended the work of Heckelei and Wolff (2003) 
by the inclusion of a “gross margin risk” modelled by the mean-variance approach. In their 
work the gross margin risk is related to the random behaviour of prices and yields; however, it 
is not possible to isolate the price risk from the yield risk. They estimated endogenously the 
absolute risk aversion coefficient by skipping the first phase of PMP and applying directly the 
GME on the first order conditions of the desired model: 
     
1
max ( ) ' ln ' ln
t t
T
t t t
t
H ε ε
=
= − −∑w ,d,α,Q,L,y w w w w w    (3.30) 
    ( ) ( ) ( ) 0E − − − − − =t t t t t t tg y 'A d Q x Sw αV x - Swɶ   (3.31) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) 0E − − − − − <t t t t t t tg y 'A d Q x Sw αV x - Swɶ   (3.32) 
  '( )t t t− =A x Sw b   (3.33) 
  '=Q L L  (3.34) 
 ( )1 1 1 1 1( ' ) 'ε ε − − − − −  = −   
  
g
S w Q Q A A Q A A Q
x
⊙   (3.35) 
  
1
1
S
s=
=∑ j,t,sw   (3.36) 
  
1
1
S
s
ε
=
=∑ j,t,sw  (3.37)
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where ( )tH w  is the measure of entropy to be maximised, S  is the matrix of the support 
values of the error terms, tw is the vector of the weights associate to each support value, 
ε
S is 
the support matrix for the elasticities and εw  is the corresponding vector of the weights.; g  is 
the sample mean of gross margin per unit of activity; the other symbols have the same 
meaning as defined previously. This model maximises the uncertainty (entropy) associated to 
each activity level (equation 3.30) conditional on the equilibrium constraint, which sets the 
marginal cost equal to marginal revenue for activities that are actually observed in the farm 
production plan (equation 3.31) and marginal cost larger than marginal revenue for activities 
not currently produced by the farm (equation 3.32). The other constraints are the structural 
constraint (3.33), the Cholesky decomposition of the quadratic matrix  which guarantees the 
convexity of the estimated cost function (3.34), the elasticity reparameterization (3.35) and 
the probability constraints (3.36) and (3.37). The model estimates simultaneously the non-
linear cost function, the absolute risk aversion coefficient and the shadow price of land. The 
paper presents an illustrative empirical application to a small sample of farms located in the 
centre of Italy with the aim of evaluating the effect of a revenue insurance schemes on farm 
production choices and on farm gross margins. In their work, Severini and Cortignani (2011) 
did not consider any structural foundation behind the model.  
Petsakos and Rozakis (2011) proposed an innovative framework for integrating risk into 
PMP. They applied a second order Taylor expansion to a logarithmic utility function and they 
obtained an expected utility function. Although the risk aversion coefficient is not explicit in 
the model, it can be derived applying the Arrow-Pratt rule (equation 3.2) and it exhibits 
DARA preferences. They used the expected utility function in a three step procedure to 
estimate the true variance-covariance matrix of the gross margin per unit of activity. The first 
step consists in a farmer maximisation problem under the expected utility theory:  
 
2
0 1
0
( ) '1
max ( ) ln( ( ) ' ) '
2 ( ) '
E
EU W E
W E
 
= + −  
+ 
g
x g x x V x
g x
ɶ
ɶ
ɶ
  (3.38) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b    ( )y   (3.39) 
     ≥ −x x ε    ( )λ   (3.40) 
      0≥x    (3.41) 
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where 
0W  is the initial wealth, 1V is the variance-covariance matrix of the gross margin per 
unit of activity of the first phase and the other variables have the same meaning as previously 
declared. The idea is that 
1V  is a national or regional matrix, while the farm makes his choice 
based on an individual variance-covariance matrix which is not known. Petsakos and Rozakis 
proposed to use the dual information of the first phase to adjust the matrix 
1V  and get an 
individual farm matrix 
2V  which calibrates the model according to equation (3.42). 
2 22 2 1 1
2 3 2 3
0 0 0 0
( ) ' ' ( ) ' '
( ) ' ( ) '
( ( ) ' ) ( ( ) ' ) ( ( ) ' ) ( ( ) ' )
E E
E E
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   
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ɶ ɶ
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                                                                                                                                                    (3.42) 
where 
2V is the only unknown variables.  
The third step consists in a calibrated model which perfectly reproduces the base year 
observations without the calibration constraints 
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0
( ) '1
max ( ) ln( ( ) ' ) '
2 ( ) '
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EU W E
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 
= + −  
+ 
g
x g x x V x
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ɶ
ɶ
   (3.43) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b    (3.44) 
  0≥x   (3.45) 
The work of Petsakos and Rozakis represents a remarkable proposal to include risk into a 
PMP framework, without applying the E-V approach. Their proposal avoids the direct 
estimation of the absolute risk aversion coefficient which can be calculated by applying the 
Arrow-Pratt rule. In addition their model is based on DARA preferences. The weaknesses of 
their study concerns what they assume that the misspecification of the initial variance-
covariance matrix of the unitary gross margin is the only reason why the starting model does 
not reproduce the observed activity level. Besides the risk, the cost function is still linear.  
3.5 INTEGRATING  RISK INTO A PMP MODEL: A NEW 
METHODOLOGICAL PROPOSAL  
Given the few attempts found in the literature to integrate risk into a PMP framework, and 
lacking an established consensus on the most suitable one, we have elaborated a new proposal 
for the integration of agricultural risk in a farm level PMP model. The proposal has a 
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mathematical and economic justification and takes advantage of the recent developments in 
both PMP and risk modelling literature.  
We have explored this research area since we think the combination of PMP with risk 
modelling will be a new research frontier in the analysis of farmers’ behaviour. Given the 
importance of accounting for risk in agricultural production and the powerful calibration 
ability of PMP, the integration of the two elements represents a relevant development in farm 
modelling. The proposed model estimates both the farm non-linear cost function and the 
farmer’s absolute risk aversion coefficient.  
This new methodological proposal relies upon the model of Arfini and Donati (2008, 2011), 
that merges the first linear phase of PMP with the second non-linear phase by using the dual 
relationships of a farmer’s expected utility maximisation problem. The model estimates 
simultaneously the differential marginal cost and the shadow price of resources which usually 
belong to the first PMP phase, as well as the farm non-linear cost function and the farmer’s 
coefficient of absolute risk aversion. The model specification is the following: 
 
, , ,
1
min ' ' ' '( ) ' ( ) '
2
E
α
α+ + + + + −
u y λ
u u y b c x λ x ε x Vx p xɶ   (3.46) 
  subject to  ' ( )Eα+ + + ≥c Vx A y λ pɶ    (3.47) 
  + = +c λ Qx u   (3.48) 
  0, 0, 0α≥ ≥ ≥y λ   (3.49) 
The meaning of the symbols is the same as before. The objective function minimises the 
square of the individual farm deviations, 
1
'
2
u u , from the common cost function and the 
difference between the primal and the dual objective function of a farmer’s expected utility 
maximisation problem. This difference at the optimum should be equal to zero. The constraint 
(3.47) represents the dual constraint which indicates the economic equilibrium condition 
stating that the marginal cost must be larger or equal to the marginal revenue. The constraint 
(3.48) indicates the relationship between the marginal cost of the first phase of the standard 
PMP and the marginal cost of the farm non linear cost function. It is worth to notice that the 
observed activity levels are directly introduced in the model without defining any calibration 
constraints, which raised several critiques to the standard three-phase PMP approach. Solving 
the model either by GME or by LS leads to the simultaneous estimation of the shadow prices 
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of resources, y , the shadow prices of activities, λ , the quadratic matrix of the cost function, 
Q , the individual farm deviations from the cost function, u , and the farmer’s absolute risk 
aversion coefficient α . Since the model (3.46) - (3.49) is based on a farmer’s expected utility 
maximisation problem following the E-V approach, the coefficient of farmer’s absolute risk 
aversion, α , is farm specific and it is independent of the level of wealth (thus, it corresponds 
to CARA risk preferences).  
Since the model (3.46) - (3.49) is a mathematical programming model with inequality 
constraints and sign restricted variables, a set of KKT conditions provides the solution of the 
model. In order to derive the KKT conditions, we write the Lagrange function of the model: 
1
' ' ' '( ) ' ( ) ' '( ( ) ' ) '( )
2
L E Eα α= + + + + + − + − − − − + + − −u u x Vx y b λ x ε c x p x w p c Vx A y λ v c λ Qx uɶ ɶ
(3.50) 
where 'w and 'v represent the Lagrange multipliers associated to each constraint. From the 
Lagrange function we can derive the KKT conditions, where the sign is dictated by the 
direction of the optimisation and by the sign of the variables, and their associated 
complementary slackness conditions: 
0
dL
-
d
= =u v
u
 (3.51a)  ' '( ) 0
dL
-
d
= =u u u v
u
  (3.51b) 
0
dL
d
= − ≥b Aw
y
  (3.52a)  ' '( ) 0
dL
d
= − =y y b Aw
y
  (3.52b) 
0
dL
d
= + − + ≥x ε w v
λ
  (3.53a)  ' '( ) 0
dL
d
= + − + =λ λ x ε w v
λ
  (3.53b) 
' ' 0
dL
dα
= − ≥x Vx w Vx   (3.54a)  ( ' ' ) 0
dL
d
α α
α
= − =x Vx w Vx   (3.54b) 
( ) ' 0
dL
E
d
α= − − − − ≤p c Vx A y λ
w
ɶ   (3.55a) 
' '( ( ) ' ) 0
dL
E
d
α= − − − − =w w p c Vx A y λ
w
ɶ   (3.55b) 
Incorporating risk in a PMP framework: the role of AESs as income stabilisers 
78 
 
0
dL
d
= + − − =c λ Qx u
v
  (3.56a)     ' '( ) 0
dL
d
= + − − =v v c λ Qx u
v
 (3.56b) 
KKT condition (3.51a) indicates that the dual value, v , associated to the marginal cost 
function equation is equal to the farm deviation from the cost function, u ; since the model 
tries to keep u as small as possible, v should result in a small positive or negative number too. 
w  is the dual value of the economic equilibrium constraint (3.47) and it can be interpreted as 
the shadow output quantity, thus =w x . Substituting =v u and =w x  in (3.52a) and (3.53a), 
we can recognize in these two conditions the resource constraints and the calibration 
constraints respectively. Hence, the model (3.46)-(3.49) implicitly represents the constraints 
of a first phase model of the standard PMP and as a consequence the model calibrates to the 
base year activity level without making the first phase explicit. This prevents from the 
critiques raised against the standard PMP approach. The other KKT conditions represent a 
tautology (condition 3.54a) and the constraints of the model (conditions 3.55a and 3.56a). 
The estimated variables of the model (3.46) - (3.49) are then used to construct a non-linear 
model which includes both the estimated farm quadratic cost function and the estimated risk 
term (equations 3.57 -3.59). The model calibrates the endogenous variable levels to the base 
year without the calibration constraints and it can been used in simulation analysis: 
 
1 1
max ( ) ( ) ' ' ' '
2 2
EU Eπ α= − − −p x x Qx u x x Vxɶɶ   (3.57) 
  subject to  ≤Ax b   (3.58) 
     0≥x    (3.59) 
where x is the vector of endogenous activity levels, Q , u and α have been estimated 
previously by equations (3.46)-(3.49) and ( ) 'E p , V , A  and b are exogenous parameters. 
Equation (3.57) is the farmer expected utility to be maximised which is equal to the expected 
revenue minus the estimated farm non linear cost function and the risk premium. Equation 
(3.58) is the usual resource constraint.  
The new methodological proposal for the incorporation of risk in a PMP framework 
represents an innovative approach compared to the previous studies in this challenging 
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research area. Our model differs from the work of Paris and Arfini (2000) as we estimate 
endogenously the farmer’s coefficient of absolute risk aversion and we do not rely upon the 
standard three-step PMP. Although the endogenous variables in our model are the same 
variables estimated in the model of Severini and Cortignani (2011), our proposal differs from 
their model in the viewpoint adopted to solve the problem. While Severini and Cortignani 
skipped the first phase of the PMP and they estimated directly the optimality conditions of the 
desired model, we merged the first linear phase with the second non-linear phase by using the 
dual relationships of an expected utility maximisation problem. Finally, our approach differs 
from the proposal of Petsakos and Rozakis (2011) as it applies the E-V approach and it 
estimates both the non-linear cost function and the non-linear risk term.  
The advantages of our proposed estimation approach compared to the direct estimation of the 
optimality conditions of the desired model (Heckelei and Wolff,  2003; Severini and 
Cortignani, 2011) consists in the possibility of using additional information such as the 
variable accounting cost per unit of activity available in our dataset and the difference 
between the primal and the dual objective function of a farmer expected utility maximisation 
problem. In addition, our model specifies only the dual constraint on marginal costs while the 
estimation of the optimality conditions involves the specification of both the dual constraint 
and the resource constraint. However, one of the two constraints is redundant in an 
optimisation model and it may affect the parameters’ estimation. Finally, the estimation 
carried out by Severini and Cortignani, according to the procedure proposed by Heckelei and 
Wolff (2003) introduces the deviations in the output level, while our deviations concern the 
individual departure from the common cost function.  
3.6 EMPIRICAL MODEL AND DATA 
In this section an empirical application of the theoretical model presented in section 3.5 will 
be provided considering crop price risk only. First the model (3.46) –(3.49) has been 
estimated and the ability of the model to calibrate to the base year activity levels has been 
checked. This first step has estimated the farm non-linear cost function as well as the 
endogenous farmer’s absolute risk aversion coefficient and the shadow prices. Then, the 
calibrated model (3.57) – (3.59) has been applied to analyse the farmer’s reactions to the 
introduction of an agri-environmental program under different crop price volatility scenarios. 
The ability of the model to represent the farmer’s response to these scenarios has been 
investigated, as well as the potential role of a grassland program as a strategy to cope with 
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price risk. The model has been applied to three farm samples, differentiated by size (small, 
medium and large). Each sample is composed by fourteen farms and the small sample size is 
justified by the illustrative role of the empirical application. The estimation of the model and 
the simulations have been applied to each farm sample. 
3.6.1  Empirical model 
Four crops are included in the empirical model (sugar beet, common wheat, corn and barley), 
and it is assumed that these crops are grown in all farms in the base year. The base year (or 
baseline situation) is the year observed when no simulations are made. These crops are the 
most widely grown crops in the area under study. This simplification is justified by the 
interest in modelling risk in a PMP framework rather than modelling the activities not 
observed, which can be added following the proposal of Paris and Arfini (2000). According to 
most PMP theoretical papers, we have introduced the land constraint as the only resource 
constraint. We adopt a non-linear quadratic cost function, the most frequently used functional 
form in PMP works, while we assume that the absolute risk aversion coefficient is farm 
specific. 
The empirical model (3.46) – (3.49) for the thn  farm is the following: 
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where the subscripts , , ,sb w c b indicate sugar beet, wheat, corn and barley respectively, y and 
b are the shadow prices of land and land availability respectively and x is the observed crop 
production in the base year. V is the variance-covariance matrix of output prices
6
 and it is 
assumed to be equal for all farms. The other symbols are the same as previously defined.  
At this point, it is worth to remark which variables in the models are exogenous and which are 
endogenously estimated, as well as the farm specific variables and the variables common to 
all farms in the same sample. The observed crop production, x , the vector of the accounting 
variable costs per unit of production, c , the expected prices vector, ( )E pɶ , the available farm 
land, b , and the matrix of technical coefficients, A , are all farm-specific exogenous variables; 
the variance-covariance matrix,V , is exogenous and common to all farms, implying that all 
farmers face the same volatility of the crop market prices. The solution of the model results in 
the simultaneous estimation of the endogenous variables: the quadratic matrix of the cost 
function, which is common to all farms of the same sample, and the farm specific variables, 
which are the shadow values of the calibration constraints and of land, the farmer’s absolute 
risk aversion coefficient, and the farm deviation from the common cost function. The model 
has been estimated both by LS and by GME. The estimation of the endogenous variables of 
the baseline model has been carried out separately for each farm sample, such that the 
quadratic matrix Q of the cost function is common to all farms of the same sample. The 
consideration of three farm samples is justified by the purpose of analysing samples of 
homogenous farms in order to get better estimates of the common quadratic matrix of the cost 
function. 
The estimated and calibrated model is: 
                                                          
6 In this methodological proposal we have considered market risk as the only source of farm income variability, while yields 
are considered fixed from one year to another.  
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1 1
max ( ) ' ' ' '
2 2
Eπ α= − − −p x x Qx u x x Vxɶ                                (3.60) 
  ≤Ax b    ( )y  (3.61) 
  0≥x   (3.62) 
where x is the vector of the unknown output quantities, the other variables have been already 
defined and the equations logic is the same as that of equations (3.57)-(3.59). The calibrated 
model has been used in simulation scenarios. 
3.6.2  Simulation scenarios 
The calibrated model has been applied to investigate the potential role of an AES as farm 
income stabiliser tool, by detecting the amount of land the farmer is willing to place under 
environmental commitments in presence of different levels of crop price volatility. The 
simulation scenarios have been applied separately to each farm sample. The AES considered 
in our simulations is the option to convert a share of farmland to grassland or pasture. This 
type of AES aims at reducing soil erosion and nitrates leaching as well as improving water 
quality and protecting biodiversity. This kind of program has been introduced as a new 
activity in the model, which competes for land with the other crops. It is assumed that the 
variable cost of grassland under agri-environmental commitments is equal to the revenue from 
its sale; hence, this activity is a no-risk activity, since it affects farm income just by its fixed 
agri-environmental payment. The introduction of grassland under environmental program in 
the model does modify neither the cost function nor the risk term. 
While introducing the new activity we have simulated different levels of crop price volatility, 
in order to detect the amount of committed grassland and the changes in land allocation 
among crops at different price risk levels. The price risk (or price volatility) is represented by 
the variation in the price of a crop from time 
0t to time 1t . In order to simulate the crop price 
volatility we have used monthly times series data from the official statistics and thus we have 
assumed that all farms face the same price risk. The time series  have been manipulated by 
changing the variations of each monthly crop price on a year base in order to simulate 
different levels of volatility. From each time series we have constructed a variance-covariance 
matrix which correspond to a different level of price volatility.  
Incorporating risk in a PMP framework: the role of AESs as income stabilisers 
83 
 
In scenario 1 the crop price volatility is set equal to the baseline situation. Scenario 2 is the 
zero price volatility scenario, while in scenario 3 the simulated volatility is half of the 
baseline. Volatility in scenarios 4 and 5 is larger than the baseline by 50% and 100% 
respectively. Each simulated scenario has been applied to each farm sample separately.  
3.6.3  Data 
The three farm samples employed in the empirical model have been constructed from the 
2009 data on territorial aggregates of AGREA, the regional agency for the delivery of 
agriculture support in Emilia-Romagna region, and of RICA, the Italian section of the FADN 
(Farm Accountancy Data Network) database. In AGREA and RICA database a territorial 
aggregate is defined by four parameters: the province, the altitude, the farm type and the farm 
size. All farms that have the same four attributes belongs to the same cluster. 
In our work we have considered only crop farms in flat areas in Emilia-Romagna. From 
AGREA database we have derived information about the total hectares allocated to each crop 
in the same cluster. From the RICA database we have used the information about crop 
production in each aggregate and the average specific crop variable costs and crop prices for 
each cluster. From the data on territorial aggregates we have constructed the representative 
farms
7
 of the crop farms in the flat area of seven Emilia Romagna provinces (Piacenza, 
Parma, Reggio-Emilia, Modena, Bologna, Ferrara, Ravenna). The representative farms have 
been grouped into three samples according to the size of the farms they represent. The 
fourteen farms of the small sample are representative for the farms belonging to the two size 
classes of 0-10 hectares and 10-20 hectares of each provinces. The fourteen farms of the 
medium sample represent the farms belonging to the size classes of 30-50 hectares and 50-
100 hectares. The large farm sample is composed by fourteen average farms of the size 
classes 100-300 hectares and more than 300 hectares.   
As discussed before, in the empirical model the only crops considered are sugar beet, 
common wheat, corn and barley and it is assumed that all the farms grow all these crops. The 
farm Utilised Agricultural Area (UAA), the specific variable costs and the prices per unit of 
crop production of each farm are shown in Tables A3.1, A3.2 and A3.3 of Appendix A3.A. 
The time series data on monthly crop prices used in the variance-covariance matrix come 
                                                          
7 The representative farm of a territorial aggregate has been constructed from the aggregated data. The allocation of land 
among crops in the representative farm has been determined according to the crop proportion in the aggregates. The variable 
costs and the crop prices of the representative farm belong to the average costs and crop prices of the territorial aggregates. 
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from the Chamber of Commerce of Bologna and by ISMEA data and cover the periods 
January 2004-december 2009 on a monthly basis. The payment for grassland introduced in 
the simulation has been set at 300 euro/ha which is the contribution for crop land converted to 
grassland or pasture under the Action 8 of AESs (agri-environmental schemes) according to 
the Rural Development Program (RDP) of Emilia-Romagna (Regione Emilia-Romagna, 
2005).   
3.7  RESULTS 
In this section the results of the model estimation and of each simulated scenario will be 
presented for the three farm samples. The results widely discussed in this section comes by an 
estimation of the model by LS technique. The estimation results by GME are shown and 
briefly discussed in Appendix A3.C. The discussion on the estimate results will focus on the 
ability of the model to calibrate to the base year observed activity levels, on the estimation of 
the quadratic cost function and of shadow prices as well as on the estimation of the farmer’s 
absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients.  
The discussion of the simulation results will draw the attention on the share of land enrolled 
under agri-environmental grassland commitment as well as on the changes in the land 
allocation among crops under different scenarios of price volatility. The relationship between 
the crop price volatility and the share of land committed to grassland will be detected in order 
to investigate the role of grassland program as an option for the farmer to reduce income 
fluctuation. Simulation results also indicate the ability of the model to react to changes in 
parameter values. 
Under scenarios of increasing volatility the relationship between the share of land contracted 
and the risk averse attitude of the farmers becomes clear. While for risk neutral farmers the 
share of land involved in grassland program does not change with a rise in crop price 
volatility, this share increases for risk averse farmers under scenarios of volatility growth. 
This pattern shows the potential role of the AESs as risk management tool, which is used in 
combination with an increase in land allocated to lowest-risk crops in medium and large farm 
samples. 
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3.7.1  Estimation results  
In the subsections 3.7.1.1 – 3.7.1.3 the model estimates will be presented for each farm 
sample. The results show the calibration of the model and the ability to estimate reliable 
farmer’s risk aversion coefficients. 
3.7.1.1  Calibration of the model 
In section 3.5 it has been shown that the shadow value, w ,of the economic equilibrium 
constraint (3.47) is equal to the shadow output quantity x . Hence the comparison between the 
observed production x  and the shadow value w  indicates the ability of the model to calibrate 
to the observed activity levels. The model calibrates well for all farms in the samples as the 
percentage deviation between the observed production vector, x , and the production resulting 
from solving the model, x , is very small (Table A3.4). In the sample of small farms the 
highest deviation belongs to the production of barley in farm 11 (13.2%), while all the other 
deviations are smaller than 2.5% and most of them are lower than 0.3%. None of the farms in 
the medium farm sample shows a departure of x  from x larger than 0.95% and in the majority 
of them the percentage is lower than 0.04%. The model calibrates well also for the farms of 
the third sample, where the larger divergence is experienced by the production of barley for 
farm 3 (2.4%), while most of the other crop production shows a percentage divergence no 
larger than 0.05%. 
3.7.1.2   Non-linear cost function and shadow prices  
The non-linear cost function is represented by the term 
1
'
2
x Qx  which is common to all farms 
of the same sample and by the farm specific term 'u x  which indicates the individual farm 
deviation. Q and u are estimated in the model together with the shadow price of land, y , and 
the shadow price of the implicit calibration constraint, λ . The off-diagonal coefficients of the 
Q matrix indicate the relationship between the marginal cost of an activity and the crop 
production level of another activity. The estimated Q matrices (Table A3.5) show positive 
coefficients for all the activities in all the farm samples; this means that an increase in the 
production of a crop results in a rise in the marginal variable cost of the other crops.  
The model is not able to reveal the shadow value of land for all farms. As shown in Table 
A3.6 land shadow prices are equal to zero for some farms. This may be related to the potential 
presence of a degeneracy in the model which cannot be cancelled out even by the introduction 
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of the perturbance term ε . Nevertheless, the lack of some land shadow values does not affect 
the model calibration. The introduction of prior information on the shadow value of land may 
help in the estimation of that shadow values; indeed, Heckelei and Wolff (2003) showed that 
the use of prior for resource shadow value by GME technique improves the estimation when 
the sample size is small.  
Another divergence between the results of our model and the expected results of the standard 
three-step PMP model consists in the values of the shadow prices of the activity levels λ  . In 
the standard PMP model the shadow price associated to the least profitable activity should be 
equal to zero by construction, as this activity is bounded by the resource constraints. In our 
model some farms show a non-zero value of the shadow prices for all the activities (Table 
A3.7). This is not surprising as our model does not recover λ  from a first phase but these 
shadow prices are estimated directly in the model, together with the resource shadow prices 
and the non-linear cost function. 
3.7.1.3  Absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients 
The farmer’s absolute risk aversion coefficient, α , is directly estimated in the model, while 
the relative risk aversion coefficient can be calculated by multiplying α by the farm income 
resulting from the model.  
The model estimates a neutral attitude towards risk for five farmers of the small farm sample 
(farms 4, 6, 8, 10 and 14), two farmers of the medium farm sample (farms 4 and 8) and five 
farmers of the large farm sample (farms 4, 5, 6, 8 and 14), while all the other farmers exhibit 
risk averse behaviour. Risk neutral farmers do not care about risk and the risk component in 
the model disappear for them. If we compare the absolute risk aversion coefficients of the risk 
averse farmers belonging to the different farm samples (Table 3.1) we notice that all the 
coefficients of the large farms and the majority of the coefficients of the medium farms are 
lower than the estimates of the small farms, while it is not possible to identify scale priorities 
between medium and large farm coefficients. Although our model is based on CARA 
preferences, this comparison seems to indicate the ability of the model to differentiate the 
value of the  farmers’ absolute risk aversion coefficients according to the level of farmers’ 
wealth.  
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Table 3.1 Estimates of farmer’s absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients 
 
Small farm sample  Medium farm sample  Large farm sample 
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α ) 
Relative 
risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α ) 
 
Relative risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α ) 
Relative risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
          
1 0.001800 5.2410  0.000400  11.3560  0.000120 8.1050 
2 0.000200 1.7280  0.000017  1.1850  0.000004 1.3570 
3 0.000700 3.8470  0.000400  9.0240  0.000020 2.9600 
4 0.000000 0.0000  0.000000  0.0000  0.000000 0.0000 
5 0.002600 5.7380  0.000025  0.9510  0.000000 0.0000 
6 0.000000 0.0000  0.000076  3.9920  0.000000 0.0000 
7 0.000900 5.0380  0.000098  4.2120  0.000020 4.0850 
8 0.000000 0.0000  0.000000  0.0000  0.000000 0.0000 
9 0.001500 6.3790  0.000600  13.3550  0.000070 8.2110 
10 0.000000 0.0000  0.000039  2.0870  0.000002 0.6350 
11 0.001400 3.4220  0.000300  6.3180  0.000020 3.7450 
12 0.000500 4.1060  0.000020  1.2680  0.000007 2.1010 
13 0.000700 3.0090  0.000050  2.0570  0.000003 0.4280 
14 0.000000 0.0000  0.000075  3.3500  0.000000 0.0000 
Note: The absolute risk aversion coefficients are expressed in €
-1  
In order to check the reliability of the model estimates for the farmer risk attitude we need to 
consider the relative risk aversion coefficients. While the absolute risk aversion coefficient is 
dependent on the unit of measurement and does not allow easy comparisons, the relative risk 
aversion coefficient is a dimensionless number, thus allowing comparison with a benchmark. 
Most scientific studies on farmers risk attitude have indicated values for the relative risk 
aversion coefficients between 0 and 7.5 (Chavas and Holt, 1996). In our model all the relative 
risk aversion estimates of the farmers belonging to the small farm sample are between 0 and 
6.4. Three medium farms and two large farms exhibit values slightly above the suggested 
range. Given that few farmers deviate from the range indicated in the literature and the 
divergences are small, we can conclude that our model provides reliable estimates of the risk 
aversion coefficients.   
3.7.2  Scenario Results 
In this section the farmers’ responses to the introduction of agri-environmental grassland as 
an option in the farm production plan will be evaluated in terms of land allocation change 
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among crops and share of land allocated to grassland. The farmer’s reactions will be 
investigated under different scenarios of crop price volatility in order to assess the 
relationship between volatility, farmer’s attitude towards risk and participation to the AES 
under study. While scenario 1 analyses the effect of the introduction of the new 
environmental-friendly activity on the farm production plan setting the price volatility at the 
baseline situation, the other scenarios simulate different level of price variation. Tables 3.2, 
3.3 and 3.4 present the farmland share allocated to committed grassland under the five 
scenarios for small, medium and large farms respectively. Tables A3.8 - A3.12 compare the 
farmland allocation in the baseline to the allocation in each scenario.  
3.7.2.1  Scenario 1: baseline price volatility  
In scenario 1 the price volatility is set at the level observed in the base year situation and the 
new activity, grassland under environmental commitment, is introduced as an option for the 
farmer.  
Under this scenario most of the farmers commit a share of their land to grassland program 
independently of their attitude toward risk. This share in the farms’ adopters varies from 9.3% 
to 45.9% in the small farm sample, from 4.3% to 39.1% in the medium farm sample and from 
13.6% to 44.0% in the large farm sample.  
The adoption not only leads to a conversion of cropland to grassland but also to a reallocation 
of the remaining land among crops. The model shows that when the farmer converts a plot of 
his land to grassland, sugar beet and barley are the crops mostly negatively affected (Table 
A3.8). Most of the farms of the small farm sample which decide to participate in the grassland 
program reallocate all their sugar beet and barley land (and partially their wheat land) to corn 
and grassland under environmental commitments. Two risk neutral farmers (farmers 10 and 
14) reallocate their sugar beet and wheat land to corn, barley and grassland and just one farm 
experiences an increase in wheat production. In the medium farm sample barley exits all farm 
production plans of the participants. Wheat is negatively affected by the participation in all 
medium farms but one, while land allocated to corn rise. Land reallocation in the large farm 
sample is characterized by a cease in production of barley and wheat by all participant farms, 
as well as an increase in land allocated to corn. 
The share of land involved in agri-environmental programme and the extent of substitution 
with crops depends on the baseline production plan and on the degree of farmer risk aversion. 
The adoption of grassland under environmental commitment by risk averse farmers 
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substitutes mainly the less profitable crops, sugar beet and barley, and the highest-risk crop, 
wheat. The introduction of a new risk-free activity supports the shift of land towards corn 
which is the highest profitable activity. The risk neutral farmers who convert a plot of their 
land to grassland make the decision based on marginal profitability only as they do not care 
about risk. The share of land contracted by these farmers will be the same under the different 
scenarios of price volatility as their decisions are not affected by the risk level.  
3.7.2.2  Scenario 2: no price volatility 
In scenario 2 the crop price volatility is constrained at zero which corresponds to a situation 
without price risk. None of the farmers under scenario 2 contract an amount of grassland 
larger than the amount contracted under scenario 1 and many farmers in the zero risk situation 
do not participate in the AES (Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4). The share of land contracted by risk 
neutral farmers as well as the land reallocation among crops is the same as in scenario 1. 
In the small farm sample only two risk averse farmers (farm 2 and 12) participate in the AES 
and they contract a share of land smaller than the share contracted under scenario 1 (Table 
3.2). Independent of the participation in the AES, all risk averse farmers reallocate their land 
among crops as a consequence of the change in price volatility (Table A3.9). The less 
profitable crops, sugar beet and barley, exits the production plans of most farmers and wheat 
production is significantly reduced. The land allocated to corn, which is the most profitable 
crops for the majority of farmers, increases and for two farms it more than doubles.  
In the medium farm sample, only three risk averse farmers (farms 2, 6 and 12) allocate a share 
of their land to grassland under this scenario. As in the small farm sample, the production of 
barley and sugar beet disappears in most farmers’ plans. The land allocated to corn rises and 
for some farms wheat production grows as well.  
Four risk averse large farmers (farms 3, 7, 10 and 12) participate in the grassland program 
under the zero risk scenario and they shift land from barley and wheat to corn. 
Under this scenario the farmer’s choices are based only on marginal profitability of crops 
without taking into account the risk component. As a consequence, the less profitable and 
lower-risk crop, sugar beet, disappears in most farmers’ production plans of small and 
medium farms and production shifts towards more profitable crops. The adoption of the AES 
depends only on the marginal profit and the risk does not play any role. 
It is interesting to notice that most averse farmers who adopt the grassland program under this 
scenario exhibit a level of risk aversion smaller compared to the other farmers in their sample. 
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This low level of risk aversion together with the adoption of the environmental program may 
reveal that the participation for these farms is based mainly on a marginal profit evaluation 
rather than on a strategy against risk. 
3.7.2.3  Scenario 3: half price volatility with respect to the baseline 
If the volatility is set equal to half of the baseline volatility the amount of committed 
grassland increases as compared to the zero volatility scenario (scenario 2) but it is still lower 
than the land committed in scenario 1. In the small farm sample, eleven farmers are involved 
in the grassland program and they contract from 0.5% to 32.8% of their farmland. Nine 
medium farms commit to grassland a land share from 5.6% to 35.3%. All the large farms that 
are involved in the grassland program under the baseline scenario would be involved also if 
the price volatility was halved.  
3.7.2.4  Scenario 4: price volatility 50% higher than  the baseline 
The crop price volatility in scenario 4 is set higher than the baseline volatility by 50%. While 
the share of land committed to grassland by risk neutral farmers is equal to the share 
committed under the previous price volatility scenarios, this share increases for risk averse 
farmers. The increase is highly dependent on the value of risk aversion coefficient of farmers. 
All risk averse farmers in the small farm sample participate in the grassland program and the 
share of farmland committed is larger by more than 50% than the share under scenario 1, with 
the exception of farm 2. In the medium farm sample the land committed by ten risk averse 
farmers is larger compared to the land committed under scenario 1 by a percentage which 
varies from 2.4% (farm 2) to 398.3 % (farm 10) and there is a farm which starts to contract 
(farm 13). If we look at the share of grassland under contract this varies from 21.5% (farm 10) 
to more than 50% of farmland (farms 1, 3, 9, 11). Seven risk averse large farms are involved 
in the AES under this scenario and their commitment concerns from 26.2% (farm 10) to 
65.7% (farm 1) of farmland. Two risk averse farmers do not adopt the grassland program. 
The increase in crop price volatility results in a rise in the amount of grassland committed and 
in a new allocation of land among crops which differs among samples. Most small farms 
decrease sugar beet, barley and partially wheat production, while the production of the high 
profitable corn increases (Table A3.11). Medium and large farms reallocate most of their 
wheat and barley land to sugar beet and agri-environmental grassland. It may be argued that 
medium and large farms adopt the grassland program as a risk management tool in 
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combination with an increase in the share of land allocated to the lowest-risk crop, sugar beet. 
Small farms adopt the grassland program as a strategy to reduce income fluctuation, while 
they do not consider the option to increase the production of sugar beet.  
3.7.2.5  Scenario 5: double price volatility with respect to the baseline volatility 
Scenario 5 is characterized by a level of crop price volatility double compared to the baseline. 
The high crop price volatility stimulate the participation in the grassland program of most 
farmers and in some cases the uptake involves more than half of the farmland. Medium and 
large farms increase also the share of land allocated to the low-risk sugar beet crop as a 
strategy against price risk; sugar beet does not appear to be a choice for the small farms, who 
prefer to adopt the grassland program as the only risk prevention strategy. 
Under this scenario all risk averse farmers of the small farm sample adopt the grassland 
program and the adoption involves more than 50% of farmland for seven farms and even 
more than 70% of farmland for four farms (Table 3.2). The rate of participation is equal in the 
medium farm sample, where all risk averse farmers involve their land in the grassland 
program and the share of land contracted is larger than 50% of farmland for five of them 
(Table 3.3). The large farm sample confirms the trend of an higher share of land committed 
than in the other scenarios (Table 3.4). The increase in the share of agri-environmental 
grassland in this scenario compared to scenario 1 seems is related to the level of risk aversion 
of the farmers. 
The reallocation of farmland among crops in this scenario follows the same pattern as it is in 
scenario 4. Indeed, while most medium and large farms combine the adoption of the grassland 
program with an increase in the share allocated to the less-risky sugar beet, small farms rely 
on the conversion of a share of farmland to grassland as the sole risk management strategy 
(Table A3.12). 
The increase in the share of land committed to agri-environmental grassland when the crop 
price volatility rises shows that the adoption of the AES acts as an insurance against farmer’s 
income risk.  
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Table 3.2 Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the small farm sample 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
                   
1 1.24 24.78  0.00 0.00 -100.0  0.00 0.00 -100.0  2.70 53.97 117.76  3.39 67.80 173.61 
2 5.53 36.85  3.76 25.04 -32.04  4.84 32.28 -12.39  7.05 47.03 27.63  6.64 44.25 20.08 
3 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.45 6.02 n.f.*  1.37 18.23 n.f 
4 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 1.35 29.99  0.00 0.00 -100.0  0.03 0.55 -98.15  2.85 63.32 111.19  3.58 79.58 165.46 
6 4.81 28.31  4.81 28.31 0.00  4.81 28.31 0.00  4.81 28.31 0.00  4.81 28.31 0.00 
7 3.17 35.24  0.00 0.00 -100.0  1.33 14.77 -58.10  5.66 62.88 78.40  6.66 73.94 109.80 
8 1.12 9.32  1.12 9.32 0.00  1.12 9.32 0.00  1.12 9.32 0.00  1.12 9.32 0.00 
9 3.90 45.93  0.00 0.00 -100.0  1.97 23.15 -49.59  6.13 72.15 57.10  7.14 83.94 82.76 
10 7.16 39.80  7.16 39.80 0.00  7.16 39.80 0.00  7.16 39.80 0.00  7.16 39.80 0.00 
11 2.42 40.37  0.00 0.00 -100.0  1.33 22.09 -45.29  3.94 65.61 62.55  4.80 80.07 98.35 
12 4.71 33.62  0.71 5.09 -84.85  3.35 23.89 -28.94  6.91 49.33 46.72  7.37 52.65 56.58 
13 2.97 37.12  0.00 0.00 -100.0  1.92 24.03 -35.29  4.76 59.54 60.37  5.81 72.57 95.49 
14 6.23 32.81  6.23 32.81 0.00  6.23 32.81 0.00  6.23 32.81 0.00  6.23 32.81 0.00 
*n.f. indicates a division by zero  
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Table 3.3 Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the medium farm sample 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
                   
1 12.02 30.05  0.00 0.00 -100.00  3.53 8.83 -70.63  21.19 52.97 76.27  25.99 64.97 116.18 
2 31.38 35.66  30.77 34.96 -1.96  31.07 35.31 -0.99  32.14 36.53 2.43  33.19 37.71 5.76 
3 10.76 33.11  0.00 0.00 -100.00  1.97 6.07 -81.66  18.11 55.72 68.31  21.91 67.41 103.62 
4 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.50 1.13 n.f.* 
6 31.04 42.81  0.20 0.27 -99.36  21.91 30.22 -29.41  34.80 48.00 12.12  37.88 52.25 22.04 
7 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  13.16 27.12 n.f. 
8 28.61 31.44  28.61 31.44 0.00  28.61 31.44 0.00  28.61 31.44 0.00  28.61 31.44 0.00 
9 11.45 30.13  0.00 0.00 -100.00  2.13 5.61 -81.38  20.97 55.17 83.11  25.87 68.09 125.97 
10 2.53 4.32  0.00 0.00 -100.00  0.00 0.00 -100.00  12.59 21.52 398.26  18.30 31.28 624.02 
11 16.03 39.09  0.00 0.00 -100.00  7.43 18.12 -53.65  25.42 62.00 58.59  29.27 71.39 82.62 
12 15.98 19.97  4.47 5.59 -72.03  11.48 14.35 -28.13  22.22 27.78 39.09  25.38 31.73 58.87 
13 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  9.74 20.95 n.f.  16.26 34.98 n.f. 
14 21.43 34.84  0.00 0.00 -100.00  15.54 25.26 -27.49  24.71 40.18 15.32  27.86 45.30 30.02 
*n.f. indicates a division by zero 
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Table 3.4. Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the large farm sample 
 
Scneario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 Ha  
under 
AES 
Land 
share  
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
                   
1 52.83 44.03  0.00 0.00 -100.0  27.68 23.07 -47.60  78.86 65.72 49.27  91.86 76.55 73.87 
2 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  1.66 0.54 n.f.* 
3 58.48 27.78  24.32 11.55 -58.42  43.94 20.87 -24.86  85.62 40.67 46.40  108.06 51.34 84.78 
4 113.91 29.98  113.91 29.98 0.00  113.91 29.98 0.00  113.91 29.98 0.00  113.91 29.98 0.00 
5 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 83.79 23.24  83.79 23.24 0.00  83.79 23.24 0.00  83.79 23.24 0.00  83.79 23.24 0.00 
7 72.57 29.03  16.77 6.71 -76.90  55.32 22.13 -23.76  104.24 41.69 43.64  130.10 52.04 79.29 
8 106.49 26.62  106.49 26.62 0.00  106.49 26.62 0.00  106.49 26.62 0.00  106.49 26.62 0.00 
9 50.26 32.32  0.00 0.00 -100.00  23.08 14.84 -54.09  83.35 53.60 65.83  102.12 65.67 103.17 
10 74.19 23.04  66.99 20.80 -9.71  70.46 21.88 -5.04  84.39 26.21 13.74  96.72 30.04 30.36 
11 31.85 13.55  0.00 0.00 -100.00  7.38 3.14 -76.81  76.34 32.49 139.72  109.90 46.77 245.11 
12 163.20 39.81  146.32 35.69 -10.35  154.97 37.80 -5.04  182.84 44.60 12.03  205.31 50.08 25.81 
13 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 70.11 20.00  70.11 20.00 0.00  70.11 20.00 0.00  70.11 20.00 0.00  70.11 20.00 0.00 
*n.f. indicates a division by zero 
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3.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
In this chapter we have developed a new methodological approach which accommodates risk 
in a PMP framework. Risk modelling and calibration of mathematical programming models 
are two relevant issues in the analysis of farmer’s optimal behaviour. The literature is still 
rather scarce in this area and our proposal represents an innovative approach compared to 
previous studies. We merged the first and the second phase of the PMP by using both the 
primal and dual relationships of a farmer expected utility maximisation problem. The farmer’s 
absolute risk aversion coefficient is estimated endogenously in the model together with the 
farm non-linear cost function, the shadow prices of resources and the shadow prices of 
activities. The simultaneous estimation prevents from the critiques raised against the standard 
PMP approach. By the KKT conditions we have shown that the model calibrates to the base 
year observed activity levels without making any calibration constraint explicit.  
Our model differs from an earlier attempt of Paris and Arfini (2000) who applied an 
exogenous risk aversion coefficient and from the proposal of Petsakos and Rozakis (2011) 
whose model non linear term is represented by the risk component only. Our approach is an 
extension of the work by Severini and Cortignani (2011): while they skipped the first phase of 
the PMP and they estimated directly the optimality conditions of the desired model, we 
merged the first linear phase with the second non linear phase. In addition, the estimation 
carried out by Severini and Cortignani introduces the deviations in the output level, while our 
deviations concern the individual departure from the common cost function. Despite these 
innovations, our model still makes some strong assumptions. For example, we assume that 
farmers exhibit CARA risk preferences and that income volatility is due only to the price 
changes, while yields are kept constant over time. It would be interesting to further develop 
the model by assuming DARA preferences and by introducing variable crop yields over time. 
In the latter it would be challenging to separate the effects of yield variation and price 
variation on farmer’s behaviour.  
We have provided an empirical application of our model on three representative farm samples 
differing by farm size. We showed that the model calibrates to the base year observed activity 
levels for all farms. Moreover, the values of the estimated coefficients of farmers’ risk 
aversion are consistent with the range provided in the literature. Our proposal presents some 
weaknesses in the estimation of the shadow prices of resource and the shadow prices of 
activities. The land shadow price cannot be identified for all farms and for some farms the 
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shadow prices of activities are different from zero for all the activities. The divergence of 
these results with respect to the expected results of the standard PMP may be explained by the 
different procedure we applied to get the shadow prices. Despite this divergence, the 
calibration ability of the model is not threatened. An extension of our model would consist in 
modelling and calibrating activities whose base year level is equal to zero in some farms 
according to the proposal of Paris and Arfini (2000).  
Finally, we have performed some simulations to test the model’s ability to represent the 
farmers’ responses to changes in economic conditions as well as to investigate the role of 
agri-environmental grassland as a farmer’s strategy to cope with risk. The simulated scenarios 
have represented the introduction of an AES, the option to convert a share of farmland to 
grassland, under different levels of crop price volatility. The idea is that the AES may 
represent an income risk management tool for the farmer, since they guarantee a fixed 
payment independent of the market conditions and of the crop yields.  
The simulation results confirm the potential role of the grassland program as an insurance 
against farmer’s income risk. The introduction of the option to participate in a grassland 
program when crop price volatility is set at the level of the baseline shifts the farmland 
allocation from the less profitable crops, sugar beet and barley, and from the highest-risk 
crop, wheat, towards grassland. While the share of farmland involved in the AES does not 
change under different volatility scenarios for risk neutral farmers, this share rises for risk 
averse farmers and this increase depends on the level of farmers’ risk aversion. When the crop 
price volatility is doubled compared to the baseline most of the risk averse farmers would 
convert more than one third of their land to grassland program and for some of them this 
share is higher than 50%. The increase in the share of farmland committed to agri-
environmental grassland leads to a reallocation of land among the other crops. When the crop 
price volatility increases less than 50% of the baseline, farmers tend to substitute sugar beet, 
barley and partially wheat with the risk-free grassland, while land allocated to corn rises. 
When price volatility is set to twice the baseline volatility the reallocation of land among 
crops changes. Under this scenario the medium and large farms seem to combine a growth in 
grassland participation with an increase in the share of land allocated to the low-risk crop, 
sugar beet, while the small farms seem to adopt grassland program as the only production 
strategy to manage price risk.  
Given the lack of data and the complexity in simulating other AESs, such as the option of 
conversion to organic farming, we performed our simulations considering only the grassland 
option. Despite this limitation, the simulated scenarios show the ability of our proposal to 
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model the farmer’s reaction to changes in economic conditions. In addition, the simulations 
show the role of grassland program as a farm strategy to cope with risk. When more detailed 
data are available, it would be interesting to check this role for other AESs, such as the option 
to convert to organic farming. .  
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APPENDIX A3.A 
Table A3.1 Total Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA, ha) in each farm  
 
Small farm sample  Medium farm sample  Large farm sample 
1 5.0 
 
5.5 
 
7.4 
2 15.0 
 
14.2 
 
20.6 
3 7.5 
 
10.0 
 
14.1 
4 13.0 
 
15.9 
 
23.2 
5 4.5 
 
9.4 
 
11.3 
6 17.0 
 
21.8 
 
28.9 
7 9.0 
 
15.6 
 
19.9 
8 12.0 
 
19.1 
 
25.1 
9 8.5 
 
16.8 
 
20.1 
10 18.0 
 
24.8 
 
32.6 
11 6.0 
 
16.7 
 
18.6 
12 14.0 
 
24.5 
 
29.8 
13 8.0 
 
20.5 
 
24.1 
14 19.0 
 
31.2 
 
40.1 
 
Table A3.2 Average variable costs for each crop (euro/100kg) 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
1 2.0 9.7 9.2 6.7 1.3 9.4 6.9 6.6 2.0 9.0 5.0 6.1 
2 1.8 11.1 18.0 10.2 1.6 7.6 9.2 6.7 1.5 7.5 11.0 6.1 
3 2.0 8.9 9.2 6.7 1.8 9.0 8.2 6.6 1.9 9.7 9.4 6.1 
4 1.9 9.1 8.7 10.2 2.0 8.7 8.3 6.7 2.1 9.6 8.3 6.1 
5 2.4 8.0 10.7 6.7 1.3 8.6 6.0 7.6 1.7 11.1 4.4 5.2 
6 3.4 7.8 6.1 8.0 2.1 8.1 10.1 9.0 2.0 8.8 6.4 6.1 
7 2.1 7.3 4.8 6.8 1.7 6.7 7.9 4.9 1.4 6.1 5.3 4.2 
8 0.8 7.9 6.9 8.6 2.7 5.2 4.4 6.8 2.7 5.2 4.4 6.8 
9 2.1 7.3 4.8 6.8 2.2 8.3 7.6 4.9 1.6 2.9 5.3 4.2 
10 2.5 11.8 9.5 8.6 1.4 6.6 5.3 4.4 1.4 6.6 5.3 4.4 
11 2.1 8.9 12.7 11.3 1.8 9.1 14.2 7.4 1.7 7.8 6.0 5.2 
12 2.1 8.1 9.1 8.2 1.9 7.7 11.1 6.7 2.5 10.3 7.7 6.1 
13 2.4 9.0 4.3 14.3 2.6 6.8 3.6 7.6 1.7 11.1 4.4 5.2 
14 3.4 9.8 10.2 8.1 2.1 9.6 11.8 9.0 2.0 8.8 6.4 6.1 
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Table A3.3 Average crop prices (euro/100 kg) 
Small farm sample Medium farm sample Large farm sample 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
1 4.0 21.9 23.0 20.3 4.0 22.1 23.9 21.7 4.0 21.4 20.6 20.0 
2 4.2 22.3 20.2 21.0 4.1 23.2 21.0 20.2 4.8 24.4 24.4 23.2 
3 3.9 22.4 23.0 20.3 3.9 22.5 24.2 21.7 3.8 22.2 18.9 20.0 
4 3.7 22.5 22.8 21.0 3.9 22.4 20.9 20.2 3.2 24.4 22.1 23.2 
5 4.1 22.3 23.3 18.7 4.0 19.9 18.5 20.8 3.8 19.8 19.2 20.0 
6 4.7 21.4 20.9 20.4 4.2 22.9 23.0 17.9 4.4 23.2 21.4 23.2 
7 4.0 20.8 19.0 19.0 4.1 23.7 19.7 23.4 3.5 22.2 20.4 20.0 
8 4.8 22.5 18.5 19.8 4.1 23.9 19.7 21.0 4.1 23.9 19.7 21.0 
9 4.0 20.8 19.0 19.0 3.7 24.0 22.1 23.4 4.0 22.6 20.4 20.0 
10 3.6 22.3 23.1 19.8 3.3 21.9 20.0 21.7 3.3 21.9 20.0 21.7 
11 4.0 22.3 24.2 18.9 4.0 23.4 23.1 20.8 3.8 21.6 19.8 20.0 
12 4.2 23.0 23.4 19.5 4.1 21.8 21.3 20.2 5.3 22.0 22.0 23.2 
13 4.1 21.2 19.7 20.0 4.4 18.8 19.8 20.8 3.8 19.8 19.2 20.0 
14 4.7 21.8 21.4 18.1 4.2 19.1 23.4 17.9 4.4 23.2 21.4 23.2 
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 APPENDIX A3.B 
 
Table A3.4 Calibration check of the model 
 Crop production baseline, 100 kg  w, 100 kg  Percentage change x / w  
 
Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
 Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
 Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm 
1 249.3 168.9 90.1 11.4  249.7 168.0 90.9 11.7  0.14 -0.50 0.86 2.23 
2 1392.0 470.8 239.2 21.7  1391.2 470.6 239.0 21.9  -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 1.27 
3 247.6 172.5 281.9 5.3  247.4 172.4 281.9 5.4  -0.07 -0.06 -0.01 2.35 
4 610.7 303.8 517.5 8.7  610.8 303.8 517.5 8.7  0.02 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
5 79.5 138.5 92.6 12.0  79.6 138.2 93.0 12.0  0.04 -0.17 0.37 -0.42 
6 592.5 563.6 457.0 30.0  592.7 563.5 456.9 30.0  0.04 -0.02 -0.03 0.08 
7 243.5 218.9 222.6 57.1  243.9 218.9 222.7 57.0  0.13 0.00 0.04 -0.13 
8 562.7 371.3 339.7 61.1  563.0 371.5 339.6 61.0  0.05 0.05 -0.02 -0.17 
9 379.7 248.9 129.4 43.9  380.1 248.9 129.5 43.8  0.10 0.00 0.09 -0.18 
10 1814.8 555.2 343.6 62.9  1814.8 555.1 343.6 62.8  0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 
11 161.3 222.4 96.6 12.6  161.7 223.1 97.7 10.9  0.24 0.30 1.13 -13.21 
12 828.6 469.3 269.5 23.1  828.9 469.3 269.7 22.9  0.03 0.00 0.06 -0.65 
13 298.8 261.3 198.3 40.2  299.1 261.7 198.8 39.4  0.12 0.16 0.21 -1.99 
14 916.6 513.0 478.1 77.0  914.7 511.7 476.8 76.6  -0.21 -0.26 -0.28 -0.59 
 
Medium farm 
1 5045.7 1318.5 846.0 37.3  5046.0 1318.3 846.3 37.3  0.01 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 
2 11047.1 2273.7 1706.1 160.6  11047.1 2273.8 1706.1 160.6  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
3 2192.3 687.4 1279.7 20.8  2192.5 686.9 1280.1 21.0  0.01 -0.07 0.03 0.95 
4 4616.3 1420.7 2428.9 45.2  4616.2 1420.8 2428.8 45.2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.04 
5 2086.8 1357.5 1405.0 67.6  2086.7 1357.4 1405.0 67.7  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.09 
6 4050.0 1996.5 2085.7 151.9  4050.1 1996.7 2085.7 151.7  0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.11 
7 3664.5 1351.8 1096.3 152.6  3664.6 1351.9 1096.2 152.6  0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
8 7979.7 2759.2 2815.5 223.1  7979.6 2759.2 2814.9 223.0  0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 
9 4903.2 1043.3 617.6 97.7  4902.5 1043.2 617.6 97.8  -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.12 
10 6310.9 1730.5 1407.5 152.6  6310.9 1730.5 1407.5 152.6  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
11 2269.0 1381.4 757.1 44.8  2268.0 1381.0 757.2 45.1  -0.05 -0.03 0.02 0.60 
12 3643.2 2841.4 1715.4 209.3  3643.2 2841.4 1715.4 209.3  0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
13 2081.6 1242.2 1723.6 195.5  2081.8 1242.1 1723.8 195.5  0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.02 
14 5482.5 1357.8 2151.3 144.3  5482.3 1357.7 2151.4 144.3  0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Large farms 
1 11334.2 3054.0 3413.7 182.4  11337.3 3049.4 3417.2 184.4  0.03 -0.15 0.10 1.07 
2 31037.8 8617.5 4784.5 598.0  31037.5 8616.7 4785.7 597.7  0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.06 
3 15479.8 4507.9 8819.8 76.9  15472.5 4508.6 8816.5 78.7  -0.05 0.02 -0.04 2.41 
4 34883.5 8213.9 14933.3 511.3  34881.9 8214.4 14932.6 511.3  -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
5 9591.1 4682.9 4789.3 282.4  9592.4 4677.1 4793.0 285.4  0.01 -0.12 0.08 1.04 
6 9422.0 8011.3 12835.9 1525.8  9423.4 8011.7 12835.7 1525.5  0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 
7 16007.3 6958.3 8994.7 669.7  16008.3 6958.8 8995.0 669.1  0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.10 
8 35075.5 12128.6 12375.8 980.5  35074.5 12126.7 12371.2 977.6  0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.29 
9 10505.4 3323.8 4980.2 636.7  10507.9 3324.1 4981.6 635.2  0.02 0.01 0.03 -0.24 
10 34736.8 9525.2 7747.4 840.1  34735.6 9524.9 7747.2 840.5  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
11 12457.2 7651.7 5019.7 595.4  12458.6 7651.3 5020.7 595.0  0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.06 
12 32761.5 11001.7 7429.4 1779.7  32762.4 11000.7 7429.8 1780.5  0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.05 
13 8771.0 3809.2 5646.1 762.1  8772.4 3805.0 5649.4 763.7  0.02 -0.11 0.06 0.21 
14 14309.5 7686.9 13093.9 677.9  14310.5 7686.7 13093.7 678.2  0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 
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Table A3.5 Estimates of the Q matrices of the cost functions (10-3) 
Small farm sample Medium farm sample Large farm sample 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
Sugar 
beet 0.03 0. 15 0. 27 0. 05 0. 02 0. 07 0. 05 0. 07 0. 07 0. 10 0. 09 0. 11 
C. wheat 0.15 2.0 2.0 2.0 0. 07 0. 36 0. 29 0. 33 0. 10 0. 94 0. 82 0. 52 
Corn 0.27 2.0 2.0 1.0 0. 05 0. 29 0. 47 0. 23 0. 09 0. 82 0. 84 0. 92 
Barley 0.05 2.0 1.0 3.0 0. 07 0. 33 0. 23 0. 32 0. 11 0.052 0. 92 2.0 
Table A3.6 Shadow price of land ( y ), euro 
 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
  
 
 
 
 
1 206.8  0.00  0.00 
2 14.28  0.00  473.10 
3 309.72  63.56  92.90 
4 308.14  302.77  2.80 
5 70.72  420.67  445.80 
6 0.00  0.00  157.90 
7 101.29  412.86  12.40 
8 255.15  0.00  0.00 
9 34.01  0.00  163.50 
10 0.00  279.95  134.40 
11 0.00  0.00  248.20 
12 0.00  104.76  0.00 
13 0.00  340.82  419.50 
14 0.00  0.00  192.80 
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Table A3.7 Shadow price of activities ( λ ), euro 
 Small farm sample Medium farm sample Large farm sample 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn 
Barle
y  
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn 
Barle
y  
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn 
Barle
y 
               
1 2.1 0.0 4.3 1.5 
 
3.3 0.0 6.2 3.2 
 
2.6 0.0 5.0 2.2 
2 2.5 8.6 0.0 8.4 
 
2.4 14.7 11.0 12.5 
 
2.3 7.4 4.7 7.3 
3 1.7 2.4 5.6 2.3 
 
2.6 0.0 4.7 2.2 
 
2.0 6.6 4.9 8.1 
4 1.2 7.6 10.6 3.6 
 
1.4 7.8 9.2 7.1 
 
1.1 14.7 13.7 17.0 
5 2.3 1.7 2.3 0.0 
 
1.9 2.6 7.2 2.5 
 
1.2 0.0 8.2 6.3 
6 1.3 13.6 14.8 12.4 
 
2.4 9.5 8.5 4.0 
 
2.1 11.5 12.9 14.1 
7 2.2 3.4 6.4 2.2 
 
1.9 5.6 2.8 4.9 
 
2.4 10.2 10.2 10.4 
8 3.6 10.4 8.9 5.5 
 
1.4 18.7 15.2 14.2 
 
1.4 18.7 15.2 14.2 
9 2.5 2.2 5.1 1.6 
 
1.9 1.5 2.3 5.1 
 
2.6 6.1 4.53 3.2 
10 1.1 10.5 13.7 11.1 
 
1.6 8.7 9.8 9.4 
 
1.7 12.4 12.6 13.9 
11 2.4 5.1 4.8 0.0 
 
2.8 3.6 0.1 3.6 
 
1.9 4.7 7.1 5.9 
12 2.4 9.2 9.5 6.0 
 
2.1 10.7 7.5 9.7 
 
2.9 9.4 12.4 15.0 
13 2.1 6.0 10.2 0.0 
 
1.4 3.4 10.8 3.0 
 
1.3 0.0 8.2 6.4 
14 1.3 12.0 11.2 10.0 
 
2.3 5.4 8.0 5.0 
 
2.0 10.8 12.5 13.5 
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Table A3.8 Land allocation (ha) among crops in the baseline and in scenario 1 
Baseline Scenario 1 % change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.48 3.15 1.13 0.25 0.00 2.11 1.65 0.00 -100.00 -33.01 46.71 -100.00 
2 2.80 8.63 3.06 0.51 0.00 3.66 5.81 0.00 -100.00 -57.55 90.02 -100.00 
3 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
4 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.13 2.61 1.48 0.28 0.00 1.95 1.20 0.00 -100.00 -25.13 -19.10 -100.00 
6 1.19 9.91 5.26 0.64 0.00 5.63 6.56 0.00 -100.00 -43.22 24.65 -100.00 
7 0.45 4.61 2.50 1.44 0.00 2.43 3.40 0.00 -100.00 -47.31 35.78 -100.00 
8 0.87 6.07 3.70 1.36 0.00 6.68 4.20 0.00 -100.00 10.01 13.57 -100.00 
9 0.70 5.24 1.46 1.11 0.00 1.67 2.92 0.00 -100.00 -68.10 100.96 -100.00 
10 3.18 10.27 3.15 1.40 0.00 0.00 7.31 3.53 -100.00 -100.00 131.64 151.96 
11 0.30 4.07 1.31 0.32 0.00 1.91 1.67 0.00 -100.00 -53.15 27.19 -100.00 
12 1.50 8.69 3.27 0.54 0.00 4.15 5.15 0.00 -100.00 -52.28 57.21 -100.00 
13 0.50 4.37 2.25 0.89 0.00 2.18 2.85 0.00 -100.00 -50.06 26.78 -100.00 
14 1.84 10.06 5.47 1.64 0.00 8.65 4.12 -100.00 -100.00 58.28 151.44 
Medium farm sample 
1 8.72 22.39 8.06 0.84 5.80 10.24 11.94 0.00 -33.41 -54.25 48.13 -100.00 
2 21.12 42.13 21.39 3.37 34.16 0.00 22.46 0.00 61.75 -100.00 5.03 -100.00 
3 4.01 13.09 14.93 0.47 1.44 0.00 18.20 0.00 -64.03 -83.94 21.89 -100.00 
4 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 7.33 40.44 21.16 3.57 11.44 1.09 28.94 0.00 56.12 -97.32 36.76 -100.00 
7 6.40 23.63 14.85 3.62 6.40 23.63 14.85 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
8 13.91 42.64 30.32 4.14 32.87 0.00 29.53 0.00 136.33 -100.00 -2.60 -100.00 
Continued 
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Table A3.8 Continued 
Baseline Scenario 1 % change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
9 8.18 19.74 7.77 2.32 5.37 0.00 10.85 0.00 -34.30 -47.67 39.67 -100.00 
10 9.98 28.55 16.71 3.27 10.55 28.74 16.69 0.00 5.69 0.69 -0.14 -100.00 
11 4.09 27.18 8.78 0.94 1.38 9.90 13.69 0.00 -66.32 -63.58 55.90 -100.00 
12 8.57 46.29 20.75 4.39 15.65 25.93 22.45 0.00 82.56 -44.00 8.22 -100.00 
13 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 9.92 24.37 23.82 3.39 12.09 27.98 0.00 21.92 -100.00 17.46 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 21.80 59.04 35.50 3.66 8.73 0.00 58.44 0.00 -59.94 -100.00 64.61 -100.00 
2 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
3 29.10 82.46 97.40 1.54 23.30 0.00 128.72 0.00 -19.92 -100.00 32.16 -100.00 
4 56.46 156.02 157.84 9.69 56.17 0.00 209.92 0.00 -0.50 -100.00 33.00 -100.00 
5 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 17.07 150.33 164.19 28.92 19.40 0.00 257.31 0.00 13.65 -100.00 56.71 -100.00 
7 35.57 106.32 95.91 12.19 23.10 0.00 154.34 0.00 -35.08 -100.00 60.91 -100.00 
8 61.13 187.42 133.26 18.19 61.83 0.00 231.69 0.00 1.14 -100.00 73.87 -100.00 
9 23.47 67.33 53.11 11.59 14.84 0.00 90.39 0.00 -36.76 -100.00 70.22 -100.00 
10 54.92 157.12 91.97 17.99 56.56 14.98 176.26 0.00 2.99 -90.47 91.66 -100.00 
11 25.56 140.46 57.61 11.37 24.06 82.29 96.81 0.00 -5.89 -41.42 68.03 -100.00 
12 61.31 232.41 82.55 33.73 57.89 0.00 0.00 0.00 -5.58 -100.00 128.85 -100.00 
13 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
14 25.93 144.24 167.49 12.85 28.18 2.37 249.84 0.00 8.71 -98.36 49.17 -100.00 
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Table A3.9 Land allocation (ha) among crops in the baseline and in scenario 2 
 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 2 
  
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.48 3.15 1.13 0.25 0.00 2.10 2.90 0.00 -100.00 -33.32 157.64 -100.00 
2 2.80 8.63 3.06 0.51 0.00 5.19 6.05 0.00 -100.00 -39.84 97.97 -100.00 
3 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 0.00 2.42 5.08 0.00 -100.00 -28.58 44.18 -100.00 
4 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.13 2.61 1.48 0.28 0.00 3.51 0.99 0.00 -100.00 34.57 -33.00 -100.00 
6 1.19 9.91 5.26 0.64 0.00 5.63 6.56 0.00 -100.00 -43.22 24.65 -100.00 
7 0.45 4.61 2.50 1.44 0.00 4.36 4.64 0.00 -100.00 -5.36 85.26 -100.00 
8 0.87 6.07 3.70 1.36 0.00 6.68 4.20 0.00 -100.00 10.01 13.57 -100.00 
9 0.70 5.24 1.46 1.11 0.00 3.98 4.52 0.00 -100.00 -24.08 210.72 -100.00 
10 3.18 10.27 3.15 1.40 0.00 0.00 7.31 3.53 -100.00 -100.00 131.64 151.96 
11 0.30 4.07 1.31 0.32 0.00 3.77 2.23 0.00 -100.00 -7.41 69.76 -100.00 
12 1.50 8.69 3.27 0.54 0.00 7.64 5.64 0.00 -100.00 -12.02 72.36 -100.00 
13 0.50 4.37 2.25 0.89 0.00 4.67 3.33 0.00 -100.00 6.94 48.22 -100.00 
14 1.84 10.06 5.47 1.64 0.00 0.00 8.65 4.12 -100.00 -100.00 58.28 151.44 
Medium farm sample 
1 8.72 22.39 8.06 0.84 0.00 18.11 21.89 0.00 -100.00 -19.12 171.72 -100.00 
2 21.12 42.13 21.39 3.37 35.17 0.00 22.06 0.00 66.55 -100.00 3.16 -100.00 
3 4.01 13.09 14.93 0.47 0.00 3.56 28.95 0.00 -100.00 -72.85 93.90 -100.00 
4 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 0.00 28.88 15.12 0.00 -100.00 20.29 7.33 -100.00 
6 7.33 40.44 21.16 3.57 0.00 44.01 28.30 0.00 -100.00 8.81 33.72 -100.00 
7 6.40 23.63 14.85 3.62 0.00 33.92 14.58 0.00 -100.00 43.57 -1.83 -100.00 
8 13.91 42.64 30.32 4.14 32.87 0.00 29.53 0.00 136.33 -100.00 -2.60 -100.00 
Continued 
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Table A3.9 Continued 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 2 
 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
9 8.18 19.74 7.77 2.32 0.00 16.58 21.42 0.00 -100.00 -15.99 175.78 -100.00 
10 9.98 28.55 16.71 3.27 0.18 42.09 16.23 0.00 -98.19 47.46 -2.87 -100.00 
11 4.09 27.18 8.78 0.94 0.00 20.69 20.31 0.00 -100.00 -23.90 131.26 -100.00 
12 8.57 46.29 20.75 4.39 0.00 55.47 20.06 0.00 -100.00 19.83 -3.32 -100.00 
13 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 0.00 27.85 18.65 0.00 -100.00 25.27 16.44 -100.00 
14 9.92 24.37 23.82 3.39 0.00 33.77 27.73 0.00 -100.00 38.57 16.41 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 21.80 59.04 35.50 3.66 0.00 0.00 120.00 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 238.02 -100.00 
2 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 55.19 223.24 0.00 31.58 -10.46 41.92 -100.00 178.65 
3 29.10 82.46 97.40 1.54 10.15 0.00 176.03 0.00 -65.11 -100.00 80.74 -100.00 
4 56.46 156.02 157.84 9.69 56.17 0.00 209.92 0.00 -0.50 -100.00 33.00 -100.00 
5 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 17.07 150.33 164.19 28.92 19.40 0.00 257.31 0.00 13.65 -100.00 56.71 -100.00 
7 35.57 106.32 95.91 12.19 0.00 54.55 178.69 0.00 -100.00 -48.70 86.30 -100.00 
8 61.13 187.42 133.26 18.19 61.83 0.00 231.69 0.00 1.14 -100.00 73.87 -100.00 
9 23.47 67.33 53.11 11.59 0.00 0.00 155.50 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 192.82 -100.00 
10 54.92 157.12 91.97 17.99 55.17 21.50 178.34 0.00 0.46 -86.32 93.92 -100.00 
11 25.56 140.46 57.61 11.37 1.92 102.23 130.84 0.00 -92.47 -27.22 127.10 -100.00 
12 61.31 232.41 82.55 33.73 52.26 0.00 211.42 0.00 -14.76 -100.00 156.12 -100.00 
13 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 15.59 67.76 94.66 11.99 -13.39 -8.97 14.02 -17.58 
14 25.93 144.24 167.49 12.85 28.18 2.37 249.84 0.00 8.71 -98.36 49.17 -100.00 
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Table A3.10 Land allocation (ha) among crops in the baseline and in scenario 3 
Baseline Scenario 3 % change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.48 3.15 1.13 0.25 0.00 0.00 2.91 2.10 -100.00 -100.00 157.99 751.63 
2 2.80 8.63 3.06 0.51 0.00 4.18 5.98 0.00 -100.00 -51.58 95.58 -100.00 
3 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 0.00 0.00 5.25 2.25 -100.00 -100.00 48.92 1892.92 
4 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.13 2.61 1.48 0.28 0.00 2.64 1.83 0.00 -100.00 1.46 23.55 -100.00 
6 1.19 9.91 5.26 0.64 0.00 5.63 6.56 0.00 -100.00 -43.22 24.65 -100.00 
7 0.45 4.61 2.50 1.44 0.00 0.00 4.63 3.04 -100.00 -100.00 84.94 110.82 
8 0.87 6.07 3.70 1.36 0.00 6.68 4.20 0.00 -100.00 10.01 13.57 -100.00 
9 0.70 5.24 1.46 1.11 0.00 0.00 4.07 2.47 -100.00 -100.00 179.52 122.27 
10 3.18 10.27 3.15 1.40 0.00 0.00 7.31 3.53 -100.00 -100.00 131.64 151.96 
11 0.30 4.07 1.31 0.32 0.00 2.61 2.07 0.00 -100.00 -36.02 57.50 -100.00 
12 1.50 8.69 3.27 0.54 0.00 5.16 5.50 0.00 -100.00 -40.67 67.99 -100.00 
13 0.50 4.37 2.25 0.89 0.00 2.92 3.16 0.00 -100.00 -33.10 40.48 -100.00 
14 1.84 10.06 5.47 1.64 0.00 0.00 8.65 4.12 -100.00 -100.00 58.28 151.44 
Medium farm sample 
1 8.72 22.39 8.06 0.84 4.34 17.67 14.47 0.00 -50.24 -21.09 79.55 -100.00 
2 21.12 42.13 21.39 3.37 33.88 23.05 0.00 60.46 -100.00 7.76 -100.00 
3 4.01 13.09 14.93 0.47 0.03 9.20 21.31 0.00 -99.37 -29.76 42.73 -100.00 
4 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 1.26 28.24 14.50 0.00 -71.05 17.64 2.91 -100.00 
6 7.33 40.44 21.16 3.57 6.80 14.58 29.21 0.00 -7.16 -63.96 38.06 -100.00 
7 6.40 23.63 14.85 3.62 2.90 30.36 15.24 0.00 -54.68 28.48 2.65 -100.00 
8 13.91 42.64 30.32 4.14 32.87 29.53 0.00 136.33 -100.00 -2.60 -100.00 
Continued 
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Table A3.10 Continued 
Baseline Scenario 3 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
9 8.18 19.74 7.77 2.32 4.90 16.58 14.39 0.00 -40.11 -16.01 85.32 -100.00 
10 9.98 28.55 16.71 3.27 7.43 34.27 16.80 0.00 -25.54 20.07 0.54 -100.00 
11 4.09 27.18 8.78 0.94 0.00 17.80 15.77 0.00 -100.00 -34.53 79.57 -100.00 
12 8.57 46.29 20.75 4.39 7.52 39.53 21.46 0.00 -12.24 -14.60 3.44 -100.00 
13 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 0.23 29.24 17.04 0.00 -94.03 31.50 6.38 -100.00 
14 9.92 24.37 23.82 3.39 8.44 8.91 28.61 0.00 -14.88 -63.45 20.12 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 21.80 59.04 35.50 3.66 7.82 0.00 84.50 0.00 -64.13 -100.00 138.02 -100.00 
2 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 59.21 184.68 45.87 20.25 -3.93 17.41 -42.48 78.67 
3 29.10 82.46 97.40 1.54 19.96 0.00 146.61 0.00 -31.43 -100.00 50.52 -100.00 
4 56.46 156.02 157.84 9.69 56.17 0.00 209.92 0.00 -0.50 -100.00 33.00 -100.00 
5 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 17.07 150.33 164.19 28.92 19.40 0.00 257.31 0.00 13.65 -100.00 56.71 -100.00 
7 35.57 106.32 95.91 12.19 17.99 0.00 176.69 0.00 -49.44 -100.00 84.22 -100.00 
8 61.13 187.42 133.26 18.19 61.83 0.00 231.69 0.00 1.14 -100.00 73.87 -100.00 
9 23.47 67.33 53.11 11.59 11.21 0.00 121.22 0.00 -52.25 -100.00 128.26 -100.00 
10 54.92 157.12 91.97 17.99 55.91 18.45 177.19 0.00 1.79 -88.26 92.67 -100.00 
11 25.56 140.46 57.61 11.37 19.67 101.78 106.17 0.00 -23.05 -27.54 84.27 -100.00 
12 61.31 232.41 82.55 33.73 55.70 0.00 199.33 0.00 -9.15 -100.00 141.47 -100.00 
13 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 17.26 69.11 90.69 12.93 -4.08 -7.15 9.25 -11.13 
14 25.93 144.24 167.49 12.85 28.18 2.37 249.84 0.00 8.71 -98.36 49.17 -100.00 
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Table A3.11 Land allocation (ha) among crops in the baseline and in scenario 4 
 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 4 
 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.48 3.15 1.13 0.25 0.17 1.23 0.90 0.00 -63.75 -60.83 -20.52 -100.00 
2 2.80 8.63 3.06 0.51 0.17 2.52 5.26 0.00 -94.11 -70.78 72.03 -100.00 
3 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 2.02 3.55 1.48 0.00 325.21 4.78 -58.12 -100.00 
4 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.13 2.61 1.48 0.28 0.00 1.10 0.56 0.00 -100.00 -57.98 -62.48 -100.00 
6 1.19 9.91 5.26 0.64 0.00 5.63 6.56 0.00 -100.00 -43.22 24.65 -100.00 
7 0.45 4.61 2.50 1.44 0.00 0.65 2.69 0.00 -100.00 -85.85 7.35 -100.00 
8 0.87 6.07 3.70 1.36 0.00 6.68 4.20 0.00 -100.00 10.01 13.57 -100.00 
9 0.70 5.24 1.46 1.11 0.00 0.22 2.15 0.00 -100.00 -95.90 47.90 -100.00 
10 3.18 10.27 3.15 1.40 0.00 0.00 7.31 3.53 -100.00 -100.00 131.64 151.96 
11 0.30 4.07 1.31 0.32 0.00 0.93 1.13 0.00 -100.00 -77.09 -13.94 -100.00 
12 1.50 8.69 3.27 0.54 0.48 2.60 4.01 0.00 -68.24 -70.04 22.60 -100.00 
13 0.50 4.37 2.25 0.89 0.00 0.92 2.31 0.00 -100.00 -78.83 2.89 -100.00 
14 1.84 10.06 5.47 1.64 0.00 0.00 8.65 4.12 -100.00 -100.00 58.28 151.44 
Medium farm sample 
1 8.72 22.39 8.06 0.84 7.33 2.81 8.67 0.00 -15.91 -87.45 7.64 -100.00 
2 21.12 42.13 21.39 3.37 34.67 0.00 21.19 0.00 64.18 -100.00 -0.94 -100.00 
3 4.01 13.09 14.93 0.47 3.22 0.00 11.17 0.00 -19.66 -100.00 -25.18 -100.00 
4 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 11.56 0.00 14.63 17.81 165.57 -100.00 3.87 1048.47 
6 7.33 40.44 21.16 3.57 15.10 0.00 22.61 0.00 106.02 -100.00 6.84 -100.00 
7 6.40 23.63 14.85 3.62 12.30 0.00 14.08 22.13 92.08 -100.00 -5.18 510.85 
8 13.91 42.64 30.32 4.14 32.87 0.00 29.53 0.00 136.33 -100.00 -2.60 -100.00 
Continued 
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Table A3.11 Continued 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 4 
 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
9 8.18 19.74 7.77 2.32 5.77 4.39 6.87 0.00 -29.45 -77.74 -11.53 -100.00 
10 9.98 28.55 16.71 3.27 17.20 11.46 17.25 0.00 72.37 -59.87 3.27 -100.00 
11 4.09 27.18 8.78 0.94 3.74 1.06 10.79 0.00 -8.59 -96.11 22.79 -100.00 
12 8.57 46.29 20.75 4.39 26.76 7.36 23.66 0.00 212.23 -84.11 14.05 -100.00 
13 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 11.57 10.06 15.13 0.00 207.09 -54.76 -5.55 -100.00 
14 9.92 24.37 23.82 3.39 15.01 0.00 21.78 0.00 51.33 -100.00 -8.57 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 21.80 59.04 35.50 3.66 10.27 0.00 30.87 0.00 -52.89 -100.00 -13.03 -100.00 
2 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 67.54 118.18 124.29 0.00 9.58 -24.87 55.86 -100.00 
3 29.10 82.46 97.40 1.54 30.02 0.00 94.86 0.00 3.17 -100.00 -2.61 -100.00 
4 56.46 156.02 157.84 9.69 56.17 0.00 209.92 0.00 -0.50 -100.00 33.00 -100.00 
5 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 17.07 150.33 164.19 28.92 19.40 0.00 257.31 0.00 13.65 -100.00 56.71 -100.00 
7 35.57 106.32 95.91 12.19 33.37 0.00 112.39 0.00 -6.18 -100.00 17.18 -100.00 
8 61.13 187.42 133.26 18.19 61.83 0.00 231.69 0.00 1.14 -100.00 73.87 -100.00 
9 23.47 67.33 53.11 11.59 20.07 0.00 52.08 0.00 -14.50 -100.00 -1.93 -100.00 
10 54.92 157.12 91.97 17.99 58.43 5.51 173.66 0.00 6.39 -96.49 88.83 -100.00 
11 25.56 140.46 57.61 11.37 32.76 47.21 78.69 0.00 28.18 -66.39 36.58 -100.00 
12 61.31 232.41 82.55 33.73 63.43 0.00 163.74 0.00 3.45 -100.00 98.35 -100.00 
13 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 20.35 87.97 62.78 18.89 13.10 18.18 -24.38 29.88 
14 25.93 144.24 167.49 12.85 28.18 2.37 249.84 0.00 8.71 -98.36 49.17 -100.00 
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Table A3.12 Land allocation (ha) among crops in the baseline and in scenario 5 
 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 5 
 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.48 3.15 1.13 0.25 0.32 0.83 0.46 0.00 -33.75 -73.67 -58.88 -100.00 
2 2.80 8.63 3.06 0.51 2.56 3.03 2.78 0.00 -8.68 -64.91 -9.19 -100.00 
3 0.48 3.39 3.52 0.11 2.51 2.94 0.68 0.00 427.94 -13.17 -80.73 -100.00 
4 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 1.12 5.71 5.96 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 0.13 2.61 1.48 0.28 0.00 0.65 0.27 0.00 -100.00 -75.13 -81.65 -100.00 
6 1.19 9.91 5.26 0.64 0.00 5.63 6.56 0.00 -100.00 -43.22 24.65 -100.00 
7 0.45 4.61 2.50 1.44 0.36 0.11 1.87 0.00 -19.33 -97.53 -25.24 -100.00 
8 0.87 6.07 3.70 1.36 0.00 6.68 4.20 0.00 -100.00 10.01 13.57 -100.00 
9 0.70 5.24 1.46 1.11 0.00 0.00 1.37 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -6.19 -100.00 
10 3.18 10.27 3.15 1.40 0.00 0.00 7.31 3.53 -100.00 -100.00 131.64 151.96 
11 0.30 4.07 1.31 0.32 0.00 0.41 0.79 0.00 -100.00 -89.93 -40.21 -100.00 
12 1.50 8.69 3.27 0.54 1.91 2.52 2.19 0.00 27.23 -70.95 -32.99 -100.00 
13 0.50 4.37 2.25 0.89 0.17 0.30 1.73 0.00 -65.26 -93.22 -23.27 -100.00 
14 1.84 10.06 5.47 1.64 0.00 0.00 8.65 4.12 -100.00 -100.00 58.28 151.44 
Medium farm sample 
1 8.72 22.39 8.06 0.84 7.34 0.36 6.32 0.00 -15.84 -98.39 -21.60 -100.00 
2 21.12 42.13 21.39 3.37 35.17 0.00 19.64 0.00 66.56 -100.00 -8.16 -100.00 
3 4.01 13.09 14.93 0.47 3.76 0.00 6.84 0.00 -6.35 -100.00 -54.21 -100.00 
4 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 9.03 27.75 27.77 0.95 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
5 4.35 24.01 14.09 1.55 16.28 0.00 12.33 14.89 274.07 -100.00 -12.50 860.54 
6 7.33 40.44 21.16 3.57 17.48 0.00 17.15 0.00 138.51 -100.00 -18.97 -100.00 
7 6.40 23.63 14.85 3.62 15.38 5.52 12.16 2.29 140.22 -76.66 -18.09 -36.80 
8 13.91 42.64 30.32 4.14 32.87 0.00 29.53 0.00 136.33 -100.00 -2.60 -100.00 
Continued 
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Table A3.12 Continued 
Baseline 
 
Scenario 5 
 
% change 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
9 8.18 19.74 7.77 2.32 5.36 2.27 4.50 0.00 -34.49 -88.51 -42.03 -100.00 
10 9.98 28.55 16.71 3.27 20.37 2.86 16.98 0.00 104.12 -90.00 1.63 -100.00 
11 4.09 27.18 8.78 0.94 4.49 0.00 7.24 0.00 9.77 -100.00 -17.56 -100.00 
12 8.57 46.29 20.75 4.39 31.65 0.00 22.97 0.00 269.25 -100.00 10.71 -100.00 
13 3.77 22.23 16.02 4.48 15.67 0.00 14.57 0.00 315.83 -100.00 -9.04 -100.00 
14 9.92 24.37 23.82 3.39 16.99 0.00 16.66 0.00 71.25 -100.00 -30.08 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 21.80 59.04 35.50 3.66 10.27 0.00 17.87 0.00 -52.87 -100.00 -49.66 -100.00 
2 61.63 157.30 79.74 11.33 74.97 104.12 129.25 0.00 21.65 -33.81 62.09 -100.00 
3 29.10 82.46 97.40 1.54 34.97 0.00 67.47 0.00 20.16 -100.00 -30.73 -100.00 
4 56.46 156.02 157.84 9.69 56.17 0.00 209.92 0.00 -0.50 -100.00 33.00 -100.00 
5 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 19.68 91.51 70.42 5.39 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
6 17.07 150.33 164.19 28.92 19.40 0.00 257.31 0.00 13.65 -100.00 56.71 -100.00 
7 35.57 106.32 95.91 12.19 40.96 0.00 78.94 0.00 15.16 -100.00 -17.70 -100.00 
8 61.13 187.42 133.26 18.19 61.83 0.00 231.69 0.00 1.14 -100.00 73.87 -100.00 
9 23.47 67.33 53.11 11.59 21.74 0.00 31.64 0.00 -7.36 -100.00 -40.43 -100.00 
10 54.92 157.12 91.97 17.99 60.92 0.00 164.36 0.00 10.93 -100.00 78.71 -100.00 
11 25.56 140.46 57.61 11.37 39.03 25.66 60.41 0.00 52.69 -81.73 4.85 -100.00 
12 61.31 232.41 82.55 33.73 69.49 0.00 135.19 0.00 13.35 -100.00 63.77 -100.00 
13 18.00 74.44 83.02 14.55 24.12 105.26 36.11 24.52 34.03 41.40 -56.50 68.52 
14 25.93 144.24 167.49 12.85 28.18 2.37 249.84 0.00 8.71 -98.36 49.17 -100.00 
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APPENDIX A3.C MAXIMUM ENTROPY RESULTS 
In this Appendix we analyse the results of the model estimated by GME and the 
corresponding simulation scenarios. The model estimated by GME calibrates to the baseline 
activity levels as the deviation of the unknown output quantities, x , from the observed 
quantity, x , is small (Table A3.13). The estimates of the shadow price of land (Table A3.15) 
differs from the one estimated by LS, as GME estimation is able to reveal a positive shadow 
price for all farms. The estimates of the shadow prices of activities are different from zero for 
all activities (Table A3.16). The GME estimation results in positive absolute risk aversion 
coefficients for all farmers in the samples and the relative coefficients are consistent with the 
range of 0-7.5 provided in the literature (Table A3.17). If we compare the absolute risk 
aversion coefficients of the farmers belonging to different samples, the coefficients of the 
large farms are smaller than the coefficients of the small farms and the coefficients of most 
medium farms. This path was also shown by LS estimation. The analysis of the relative risk 
aversion coefficients reveals that the large farms have a coefficients larger than all the small 
farms but one. 
The model estimated by GME reacts stronger than the model estimated by LS to the changes 
in crop price volatility and to the introduction of the grassland program. In scenario 1 all the 
farms participate in the grassland program with a share of their land varying between 36.7% 
and 99.03% for small farms, from 31.3% to 64.7% for medium farms and from 28.5% to 
58.3% for large farms (Tables A3.18, A3.19 and A3.20). The conversion of a share of 
farmland to grassland concerns mainly sugar beet and barley, which exit the production plans 
of most of the farms (Table A3.21). When the risk term is set equal to zero (scenario 2) only 
five small farms adopt the AES and they decrease the production of all the other crops. The 
non-participants re-organise their crop mix such that the production of sugar beet and barley 
disappears for most of them while corn production rises (A3.22). If crop price volatility is set 
higher than the baseline volatility (scenarios 4 and 5) the grassland program involves more 
than 68% of farmland in scenario 4 and more than 83% of farmland in scenario 5. When the 
volatility doubles compared to the baseline (scenario 5) most of the farms increase land 
allocation to agri-environmental grassland by more than 50% compared to the hectares 
committed in scenario 1 and in some of them this increase is larger than 100%. Land 
allocation to the other crops decreases substantially (Table A3.25). Although the simulated 
scenarios shows a stronger reaction compared to the responses simulated in the model 
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estimated by LS estimation framework, the estimation by GME confirms the role of the 
grassland program as potential income risk management tool, since farms increase the share 
of land committed as a response to an increase in crop price volatility. In addition, sugar beet 
and barley are the crops most negatively affected by the introduction of the grassland 
program. 
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Table A3.13 Calibration check of the model 
Crop production baseline (x), 100kg w, 100 kg Percentage change x / w  
 
Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C.Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 249.3 168.9 90.1 11.4 247.3 169.6 92.2 12.0 -0.80 0.43 2.28 5.39 
2 1391.9 470.8 239.2 21.7 1390.3 472.3 221.9 22.7 -0.12 0.32 -7.23 4.78 
3 247.5 172.5 281.9 5.3 245.6 173.2 283.3 5.7 -0.81 0.39 0.50 7.76 
4 610.7 303.8 517.5 8.7 608.6 304.2 518.6 8.0 -0.34 0.13 0.20 -7.31 
5 79.5 138.5 92.6 12.0 77.3 139.7 94.3 12.1 -2.86 0.87 1.75 0.81 
6 592.5 563.6 456.9 30.0 589.9 563.6 457.7 29.6 -0.43 0.01 0.16 -1.33 
7 243.5 218.9 222.6 57.1 241.5 219.3 223.6 56.9 -0.82 0.21 0.45 -0.41 
8 562.7 371.3 339.6 61.1 561.8 372.1 340.0 60.5 -0.16 0.22 0.09 -0.88 
9 379.7 248.9 129.4 43.9 377.6 249.5 130.5 43.8 -0.54 0.21 0.85 -0.31 
10 1814.8 555.2 343.6 62.9 1811.5 554.9 344.9 62.3 -0.18 -0.06 0.39 -0.94 
11 161.3 222.4 96.6 12.6 159.3 223.4 99.8 10.4 -1.26 0.47 3.30 -17.90 
12 828.6 469.3 269.5 23.1 826.9 469.9 270.8 22.4 -0.21 0.13 0.46 -3.00 
13 298.8 261.3 198.3 40.2 296.6 262.2 199.9 36.3 -0.72 0.37 0.80 -9.68 
14 916.6 513.0 478.1 77.0 913.9 513.0 478.6 76.1 -0.29 0.01 0.10 -1.20 
               
Medium farm sample 
1 5045.7 1318.5 846.0 37.3 5044.4 1317.7 847.2 37.0 -0.03 -0.06 0.14 -0.84 
2 11047.1 2273.7 1706.1 160.6 11045.5 2273.9 1705.8 160.0 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.37 
3 2192.2 687.4 1279.7 20.8 2190.6 686.8 1280.6 20.6 -0.08 -0.09 0.07 -1.30 
4 4616.3 1420.7 2428.9 45.2 4614.5 1420.4 2428.9 44.7 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 -1.00 
5 2086.8 1357.5 1405.0 67.6 2085.4 1356.8 1405.2 67.4 -0.07 -0.05 0.02 -0.37 
6 4050.0 1996.5 2085.7 151.9 4048.3 1997.1 2086.7 149.2 -0.04 0.03 0.05 -1.78 
7 3664.5 1351.8 1096.3 152.6 3663.1 1352.0 1095.5 152.9 -0.04 0.01 -0.07 0.16 
8 7979.7 2759.2 2815.5 223.1 7977.6 2759.6 2815.5 222.2 -0.03 0.01 0.00 -0.40 
9 4903.2 1043.3 617.6 97.7 4900.8 1043.3 617.8 97.9 -0.05 0.00 0.04 0.29 
10 6310.8 1730.5 1407.5 152.6 6309.1 1730.2 1407.5 152.6 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 
11 2268.9 1381.4 757.1 44.8 2267.4 1381.5 756.6 44.5 -0.07 0.01 -0.07 -0.56 
12 3643.2 2841.3 1715.4 209.3 3641.6 2841.3 1714.9 208.9 -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.20 
13 2081.6 1242.2 1723.6 195.5 2079.8 1241.4 1724.4 194.9 -0.09 -0.07 0.05 -0.28 
14 5482.5 1357.8 2151.3 144.3 5480.8 1357.2 2152.3 142.6 -0.03 -0.05 0.05 -1.14 
 
Large farm sample 
1 11334.2 3054.0 3413.7 182.4 11332.46 3053.13 3414.34 182.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.22 
2 31037.8 8617.4 4784.5 598.0 31036.72 8617.31 4783.95 597.98 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
3 15479.8 4507.9 8819.8 76.9 15477.95 4507.51 8818.85 76.69 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.26 
4 34883.5 8213.9 14933.3 511.2 34881.02 8213.06 14933.05 511.21 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
5 9591.1 4682.8 4789.3 282.4 9589.36 4680.14 4789.88 282.82 -0.02 -0.06 0.01 0.15 
6 9422.0 8011.3 12835.9 1525.8 9420.69 8010.17 12835.81 1525.75 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
7 16007.3 6958.3 8994.7 669.7 16005.66 6957.98 8994.72 669.22 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 
8 35075.5 12128.5 12375.8 980.5 35073.43 12128.68 12375.64 979.21 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.13 
9 10505.4 3323.8 4980.1 636.7 10503.92 3323.89 4980.06 636.09 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.10 
10 34736.8 9525.2 7747.4 840.1 34735.00 9524.63 7747.28 839.88 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
11 12457.2 7651.7 5019.7 595.4 12455.59 7651.03 5019.71 595.03 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.06 
12 32761.4 11001.7 7429.4 1779.7 32760.23 10999.15 7429.81 1780.12 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
13 8770.9 3809.2 5646.1 762.1 8769.23 3806.43 5646.70 762.50 -0.02 -0.07 0.01 0.05 
14 14309.5 7686.9 13093.9 677.9 14308.08 7685.85 13093.82 677.91 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
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Table A3.14 Estimates of the Q matrices of the cost functions 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
Wheat 
Corn Barley 
               
Sugar 
beet 2.7E-05 1.7E-15 1.7E-15 
5.3E-
16 3.0E-06 1.2E-18 
1.3E-
18 
5.5E-
19 6.9E-07 1.4E-20 
1.6E-
20 
7.5E-
21 
C. wheat 1.7E-15 2.7E-04 1.4E-11 
7.5E-
12 1.2E-18 4.5E-05 
4.9E-
14 
2.4E-
14 1.4E-20 1.0E-05 
5.5E-
16 
2.7E-
16 
Corn 1.7E-15 1.4E-11 3.6E-04 
1.8E-
11 1.3E-18 4.9E-14 
5.1E-
05 
4.0E-
14 1.6E-20 5.5E-16 
6.8E-
06 
6.5E-
17 
Barley 5.3E-16 7.5E-12 1.8E-11 
2.0E-
03 5.5E-19 2.4E-14 
4.0E-
14 
4.8E-
04 7.5E-21 2.7E-16 
6.5E-
17 
6.5E-
05 
Table A3.15 Shadow price of land ( y ), euro 
 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
1 223.66 194.15 18.90 
2 133.17 192.43 19.30 
3 217.48 195.10 18.75 
4 200.15 190.97 18.79 
5 223.02 190.50 18.06 
6 197.76 178.07 18.71 
7 205.53 197.83 19.12 
8 201.46 192.19 18.63 
9 208.10 202.64 19.36 
10 193.46 195.42 19.12 
11 200.87 194.12 18.93 
12 203.73 190.75 17.83 
13 173.02 188.43 17.98 
14 190.50 179.42 18.84 
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Table A3.16 Shadow price of activities ( λ ), euro 
 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
wheat 
Corn Barley 
 
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
wheat 
Corn 
Barle
y  
Sugar 
beet 
C. 
wheat 
Corn 
Barle
y 
1 1.67 6.69 9.87 7.61 2.67 2.73 9.52 4.43 1.93 2.58 8.40 4.28 
2 2.16 8.3 0.05 7.34 2.23 6.04 4.16 3.72 3.19 4.94 2.95 5.50 
3 1.67 6.9 9.08 6.81 2.06 3.20 8.09 4.53 1.87 3.46 2.56 4.88 
4 1.62 6.05 8.86 2.86 1.9 4.07 5.44 4.01 1.25 2.6 4.36 5.49 
5 1.40 8.94 8.13 5.77 2.58 3.07 6.54 4.42 1.99 0.90 8.55 7.42 
6 1.19 5.63 8.8 3.98 2.06 7.08 7.71 0.96 2.59 2.31 5.33 5.59 
7 1.65 6.91 9.99 4.94 2.47 6.18 2.99 7.02 2.16 4.67 5.88 4.48 
8 3.85 8.03 6.75 3.64 1.52 7.51 6.25 3.03 1.58 6.66 5.51 2.25 
9 1.62 7.19 10.25 5.18 1.30 4.94 5.95 7.11 2.46 7.04 5.55 4.12 
10 0.91 3.38 8.94 3.52 1.94 4.51 6.04 6.06 1.98 3.88 5.48 5.49 
11 1.62 8.14 7.47 1.05 2.17 5.13 2.25 4.42 2.15 3.38 5.77 4.74 
12 1.95 7.48 8.78 3.16 2.11 5.30 3.23 4.26 2.82 1.00 6.50 7.27 
13 1.49 7.88 12.21 0.60 1.87 3.11 9.72 3.73 2.00 0.88 8.51 7.40 
14 1.11 4.90 6.26 2.91 1.98 2.99 6.77 1.61 2.55 2.42 5.36 5.68 
Table A3.17 Estimates of farmer’s absolute and relative risk aversion coefficients 
 
Small farm sample 
 
Medium farm sample 
 
Large farm sample 
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α ) 
Relative risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α ) 
Relative risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
 
Absolute risk 
aversion  
coefficient (α
) 
Relative risk  
aversion 
coefficient  
1 0.000300 0.3840 0.000200 3.0610 0.000062 2.5510 
2 0.000037 0.1040 0.000100 3.2680 0.000040 4.7610 
3 0.000300 0.7020 0.000200 2.6610 0.000027 2.0610 
4 0.000300 1.2000 0.000097 2.3800 0.000024 4.1850 
5 0.000300 0.3220 0.000100 1.5660 0.000027 1.4560 
6 0.000300 1.5830 0.000059 1.3350 0.000023 3.7090 
7 0.000300 0.6680 0.000200 3.2800 0.000032 3.6170 
8 0.000200 0.9990 0.000090 3.8120 0.000023 4.3490 
9 0.000300 0.6020 0.000300 3.8280 0.000063 4.0830 
10 0.000200 1.4370 0.000200 3.5740 0.000030 4.0660 
11 0.000300 0.4020 0.000100 1.9740 0.000031 2.8190 
12 0.000300 1.3190 0.000069 2.0730 0.000022 3.1540 
13 0.000200 0.3110 0.000100 1.9000 0.000026 1.4480 
14 0.000200 1.1420 0.000060 1.0940 0.000024 3.7390 
Note: The absolute risk aversion coeeficients are expressed in €
-1  
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Table A3.18 Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the small farm sample 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
1 4.06 81.20 0.92 18.42 -77.32 3.56 71.28 -12.22 4.57 91.30 12.44 4.75 94.92 16.90 
2 14.86 99.03 14.85 98.99 -0.05 14.85 99.03 -0.01 14.86 99.04 0.01 14.86 99.06 0.03 
3 4.39 58.49 0.00 0.00 -100.00 2.54 33.91 -42.03 5.74 76.55 30.86 6.48 86.42 47.73 
4 6.25 48.10 0.00 0.00 -100.00 2.51 19.30 -59.86 9.54 73.42 52.63 10.97 84.35 75.36 
5 4.24 94.18 3.45 76.67 -18.59 4.12 91.44 -2.90 4.36 96.87 2.86 4.42 98.22 4.29 
6 6.24 36.71 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.98 5.77 -84.28 11.66 68.60 86.86 14.18 83.39 127.13 
7 6.35 70.55 0.00 0.00 -100.00 4.83 53.71 -23.86 7.55 83.86 18.88 8.14 90.49 28.27 
8 5.44 45.36 0.00 0.00 -100.00 2.09 17.37 -61.70 8.88 73.98 63.06 10.39 86.59 90.87 
9 6.72 79.08 0.00 0.00 -100.00 5.62 66.14 -16.36 7.59 89.34 12.97 7.97 93.72 18.51 
10 7.75 43.07 0.00 0.00 -100.00 3.02 16.77 -61.06 12.39 68.85 59.85 14.52 80.65 87.24 
11 5.12 85.25 2.61 43.54 -48.93 4.71 78.49 -7.92 5.55 92.41 8.41 5.74 95.73 12.30 
12 6.48 46.26 0.00 0.00 -100.00 2.36 16.87 -63.53 10.30 73.55 59.00 12.00 85.68 85.22 
13 7.16 89.46 6.55 81.84 -8.51 6.97 87.13 -2.61 7.46 93.20 4.18 7.66 95.73 7.01 
14 9.78 51.47 0.00 0.00 -100.00 5.40 28.41 -44.81 14.61 76.87 49.35 16.68 87.79 70.55 
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Table A3.19 Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the medium farm sample 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha 
under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha 
under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 
Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha 
under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 
Ha 
under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
                   
1 20.23 50.58 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
32.63 81.58 61.30 
 
36.44 91.09 80.09 
2 35.16 39.96 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
63.51 72.16 80.60 
 
74.56 84.73 112.05 
3 15.27 46.97 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
1.59 4.90 -89.57 
 
24.71 76.02 61.85 
 
28.43 87.48 86.25 
4 32.27 49.27 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
6.86 10.47 -78.75 
 
50.16 76.57 55.41 
 
57.20 87.32 77.23 
5 21.21 48.21 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
5.43 12.35 -74.39 
 
34.62 78.69 63.22 
 
38.94 88.50 83.57 
6 44.22 60.99 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
24.85 34.28 -43.80 
 
59.14 81.57 33.73 
 
64.99 89.64 46.96 
7 20.09 41.42 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
35.76 73.72 77.99 
 
41.84 86.28 108.30 
8 28.52 31.34 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
65.18 71.63 128.60 
 
77.68 85.36 172.42 
9 16.98 44.67 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
30.45 80.13 79.36 
 
34.39 90.50 102.59 
10 21.59 36.91 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
44.07 75.33 104.11 
 
51.02 87.22 136.32 
11 19.88 48.49 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
5.60 13.66 -71.83 
 
31.75 77.45 59.72 
 
36.35 88.67 82.85 
12 30.50 38.12 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
1.69 2.12 -94.45 
 
56.15 70.18 84.10 
 
67.05 83.81 119.86 
13 22.45 48.29 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
3.44 7.40 -84.68 
 
36.12 77.67 60.86 
 
40.91 87.99 82.22 
14 39.81 64.73 
 
0.00 0.00 -100.00 
 
26.57 43.20 -33.26 
 
49.95 81.22 25.48 
 
55.02 89.46 38.21 
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Table A3.20 Farmland allocated to AES (grassland program) under different scenarios in the large farm sample 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Scenario 2 
 
Scenario 3 
 
Scenario 4 
 
Scenario 5 
 Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
 Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc2/sc1 
 Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc3/sc1 
 Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc4/sc1 
 Ha under 
AES 
Land 
share 
under 
AES 
% 
change 
ha under 
AES 
sc5/sc1 
                   
1 69.99 58.32 0.00 0.00 -100.00 30.16 25.13 -56.91 98.41 82.01 40.60 108.93 90.77 55.63 
2 119.03 38.40 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 238.05 76.79 99.99 272.32 87.84 128.77 
3 105.72 50.22 0.00 0.00 -100.00 24.81 11.79 -76.53 162.91 77.39 54.10 185.62 88.18 75.58 
4 145.61 38.32 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 291.98 76.84 100.53 333.79 87.84 129.24 
5 106.06 56.72 0.00 0.00 -100.00 50.47 26.99 -52.41 150.88 80.69 42.26 168.24 89.97 58.62 
6 102.68 28.48 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 247.26 68.59 140.80 302.27 83.85 194.37 
7 90.06 36.02 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 178.61 71.44 98.33 212.70 85.08 136.19 
8 125.71 31.43 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 285.34 71.33 126.99 338.89 84.72 169.59 
9 77.77 50.01 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.47 0.30 -99.40 122.35 78.68 57.32 138.50 89.07 78.10 
10 106.73 33.15 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 233.06 72.38 118.36 278.10 86.37 160.56 
11 94.83 40.36 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 170.24 72.44 79.51 199.95 85.08 110.84 
12 212.05 51.72 0.00 0.00 -100.00 24.54 5.99 -88.43 322.85 78.74 52.25 365.64 89.18 72.43 
13 106.92 56.28 0.00 0.00 -100.00 46.87 24.67 -56.16 154.05 81.08 44.08 171.38 90.20 60.28 
14 112.77 32.17 0.00 0.00 -100.00 0.00 0.00 -100.00 245.97 70.18 118.13 297.41 84.85 163.74 
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Table A3.21 Land allocation (ha) among crops in scenario 1 and percentage change respect to the baseline 
allocation 
 
Scenario 1 
 
% change scenario 1/baseline 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.00 0.30 0.64 0.00 -100.00 -90.43 -43.30 -100.00 
2 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -94.81 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 3.11 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -11.64 -100.00 
4 0.00 1.25 5.49 0.00 -100.00 -78.08 -7.83 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.25 0.01 0.00 -100.00 -90.35 -99.28 -100.00 
6 0.00 6.10 4.66 0.00 -100.00 -38.46 -11.45 -100.00 
7 0.00 0.00 2.44 0.21 -100.00 -100.00 -2.58 -85.35 
8 0.00 3.06 3.21 0.29 -100.00 -49.63 -13.31 -78.61 
9 0.00 0.32 1.46 0.00 -100.00 -93.83 -0.02 -100.00 
10 1.65 5.15 3.19 0.26 -48.09 -49.81 1.01 -81.58 
11 0.00 0.67 0.22 0.00 -100.00 -83.55 -83.66 -100.00 
12 0.05 4.76 2.71 0.00 -96.55 -45.22 -17.14 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 0.84 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -62.48 -100.00 
14 0.00 3.79 4.80 0.63 -100.00 -62.34 -12.18 -61.37 
Medium farm sample 
1 1.27 7.32 11.18 0.00 -85.38 -67.33 38.74 -100.00 
2 8.99 22.83 21.03 0.00 -57.45 -45.82 -1.69 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 17.24 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 15.46 -100.00 
4 0.00 4.06 29.17 0.00 -100.00 -85.38 5.05 -100.00 
5 0.00 6.92 15.87 0.00 -100.00 -71.18 12.63 -100.00 
6 0.00 5.03 23.25 0.00 -100.00 -87.56 9.88 -100.00 
7 0.00 14.21 14.20 0.00 -100.00 -39.84 -4.39 -100.00 
8 3.63 28.56 29.17 1.13 -73.87 -33.03 -3.79 -72.75 
9 2.48 8.01 10.53 0.00 -69.69 -59.40 35.63 -100.00 
10 2.79 17.21 16.91 0.00 -72.09 -39.70 1.23 -100.00 
11 0.00 9.85 11.27 0.00 -100.00 -63.78 28.35 -100.00 
12 0.00 32.22 17.16 0.12 -100.00 -30.40 -17.31 -97.17 
13 0.00 4.82 19.23 0.00 -100.00 -78.32 20.05 -100.00 
14 0.00 0.00 21.69 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -8.93 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 50.01 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 40.88 -100.00 
2 17.96 120.62 49.51 2.88 -70.86 -23.32 -37.92 -74.60 
3 0.00 0.00 104.78 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 7.59 -100.00 
4 14.63 47.16 172.61 0.00 -74.09 -69.78 9.36 -100.00 
5 0.00 29.26 51.68 0.00 -100.00 -68.02 -26.62 -100.00 
6 0.00 83.35 160.45 14.01 -100.00 -44.55 -2.28 -51.54 
7 0.00 62.45 97.49 0.00 -100.00 -41.26 1.65 -100.00 
8 15.86 128.51 129.92 0.00 -74.05 -31.43 -2.50 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 75.61 2.13 -100.00 -100.00 42.37 -81.65 
10 20.63 103.69 90.95 0.00 -62.44 -34.01 -1.11 -100.00 
11 0.00 72.37 67.80 0.00 -100.00 -48.48 17.67 -100.00 
12 0.00 75.93 105.40 16.62 -100.00 -67.33 27.69 -50.72 
13 0.00 14.91 65.30 2.86 -100.00 -79.97 -21.34 -80.32 
14 0.00 73.13 164.61 0.00 -100.00 -49.30 -1.72 -100.00 
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Table A3.22 Land allocation (ha) among crops in scenario 2 and percentage change respect to the baseline 
allocation 
Scenario 2 % change scenario2/baseline 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.00 2.48 1.60 0.00 -100.00 -21.14 41.74 -100.00 
2 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -94.59 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 2.56 4.94 0.00 -100.00 -24.52 40.30 -100.00 
4 0.00 4.65 8.35 0.00 -100.00 -18.56 40.05 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.77 0.28 0.00 -100.00 -70.40 -81.22 -100.00 
6 0.00 9.41 7.59 0.00 -100.00 -5.05 44.20 -100.00 
7 0.00 3.89 4.42 0.69 -100.00 -15.51 76.51 -52.40 
8 0.00 6.42 5.45 0.13 -100.00 5.81 47.23 -90.52 
9 0.00 4.89 3.10 0.51 -100.00 -6.64 113.02 -54.30 
10 0.01 10.93 6.43 0.63 -99.60 6.48 103.67 -54.93 
11 0.00 2.38 1.00 0.00 -100.00 -41.48 -23.54 -100.00 
12 0.00 8.63 5.37 0.00 -100.00 -0.69 64.08 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.08 1.38 0.00 -100.00 -98.26 -38.77 -100.00 
14 0.00 9.80 8.06 1.15 -100.00 -2.61 47.39 -29.88 
Medium farm sample 
1 0.00 1.55 38.45 0.00 -100.00 -93.07 377.20 -100.00 
2 0.00 39.65 48.35 0.00 -100.00 -5.88 126.05 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 32.50 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 117.72 -100.00 
4 0.00 8.10 57.40 0.00 -100.00 -70.81 106.70 -100.00 
5 0.00 8.89 35.11 0.00 -100.00 -62.99 149.25 -100.00 
6 0.00 26.98 45.52 0.00 -100.00 -33.29 115.14 -100.00 
7 0.00 22.07 26.43 0.00 -100.00 -6.59 77.97 -100.00 
8 0.00 37.34 53.66 0.00 -100.00 -12.43 77.01 -100.00 
9 0.00 3.25 34.75 0.00 -100.00 -83.54 347.46 -100.00 
10 0.00 22.06 36.44 0.00 -100.00 -22.71 118.08 -100.00 
11 0.00 9.38 31.62 0.00 -100.00 -65.49 259.98 -100.00 
12 0.00 47.88 32.12 0.00 -100.00 3.42 54.83 -100.00 
13 0.00 2.55 43.95 0.00 -100.00 -88.54 174.43 -100.00 
14 0.00 21.27 40.23 0.00 -100.00 -12.73 68.90 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 120.00 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 238.02 -100.00 
2 0.00 250.11 57.64 2.25 -100.00 59.01 -27.72 -80.14 
3 0.00 0.00 210.50 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 116.13 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 380.00 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 140.75 -100.00 
5 0.00 62.71 124.29 0.00 -100.00 -31.47 76.50 -100.00 
6 0.00 30.50 330.00 0.00 -100.00 -79.71 100.99 -100.00 
7 0.00 23.63 226.37 0.00 -100.00 -77.78 136.02 -100.00 
8 0.00 110.56 289.44 0.00 -100.00 -41.01 117.21 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 155.50 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 192.82 -100.00 
10 0.00 94.38 227.62 0.00 -100.00 -39.93 147.51 -100.00 
11 0.00 15.33 219.67 0.00 -100.00 -89.09 281.28 -100.00 
12 0.00 41.06 352.56 16.38 -100.00 -82.33 327.09 -51.43 
13 0.00 44.33 141.58 4.09 -100.00 -40.45 70.54 -71.86 
14 0.00 15.69 334.82 0.00 -100.00 -89.13 99.90 -100.00 
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Table A3.23 Land allocation (ha) among crops in scenario 3 and percentage change respect to the baseline 
allocation 
 
Scenario 3 
 
% change scenario 3/baseline 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.00 0.61 0.83 0.00 -100.00 -80.62 -26.63 -100.00 
2 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -94.80 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 1.12 3.84 0.00 -100.00 -67.07 9.03 -100.00 
4 0.00 3.66 6.83 0.00 -100.00 -35.95 14.61 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.32 0.06 0.00 -100.00 -87.55 -95.89 -100.00 
6 0.00 9.27 6.45 0.30 -100.00 -6.47 22.51 -52.72 
7 0.00 0.70 3.03 0.44 -100.00 -84.92 20.99 -69.40 
8 0.00 4.93 4.30 0.69 -100.00 -18.85 16.22 -49.43 
9 0.00 1.02 1.80 0.07 -100.00 -80.60 23.38 -94.08 
10 1.95 7.92 4.33 0.77 -38.57 -22.83 37.40 -44.89 
11 0.00 0.92 0.37 0.00 -100.00 -77.39 -71.87 -100.00 
12 0.34 7.23 4.06 0.00 -77.35 -16.73 24.11 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 1.03 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -54.19 -100.00 
14 0.04 6.43 6.08 1.05 -97.67 -36.09 11.26 -35.90 
Medium farm sample 
1 5.34 16.26 18.40 0.00 -38.71 -27.39 128.40 -100.00 
2 14.03 37.78 33.23 2.97 -33.56 -10.33 55.34 -11.78 
3 0.00 5.06 25.85 0.00 -100.00 -61.36 73.17 -100.00 
4 0.70 17.67 40.09 0.19 -92.26 -36.34 44.35 -79.54 
5 0.00 15.73 22.84 0.00 -100.00 -34.48 62.11 -100.00 
6 0.00 17.32 30.34 0.00 -100.00 -57.19 43.37 -100.00 
7 1.61 21.65 24.14 1.11 -74.92 -8.37 62.54 -69.43 
8 4.75 40.03 43.06 3.15 -65.84 -6.11 42.05 -23.84 
9 5.22 13.76 18.38 0.64 -36.15 -30.30 136.62 -72.19 
10 4.87 25.03 27.46 1.15 -51.23 -12.32 64.32 -64.84 
11 0.00 17.19 18.21 -100.00 -36.76 107.32 -100.00 
12 0.00 46.34 29.04 2.93 -100.00 0.09 39.96 -33.16 
13 0.00 14.48 26.85 1.73 -100.00 -34.88 67.67 -61.45 
14 0.00 6.73 28.21 -100.00 -72.40 18.42 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 1.14 0.00 88.70 0.00 -94.77 -100.00 149.86 -100.00 
2 29.92 150.31 111.47 18.30 -51.45 -4.44 39.79 61.47 
3 0.00 26.92 158.77 0.00 -100.00 -67.35 63.01 -100.00 
4 27.04 77.61 266.96 8.38 -52.10 -50.26 69.14 -13.48 
5 0.00 47.00 88.68 0.86 -100.00 -48.65 25.92 -84.08 
6 0.00 90.86 245.60 24.04 -100.00 -39.56 49.58 -16.86 
7 0.00 79.90 165.05 5.06 -100.00 -24.85 72.08 -58.55 
8 19.22 156.92 216.87 6.99 -68.55 -16.27 62.74 -61.58 
9 6.57 0.00 128.08 20.39 -72.02 -100.00 141.17 75.89 
10 27.82 129.50 164.68 0.00 -49.34 -17.58 79.06 -100.00 
11 0.00 99.50 125.41 10.09 -100.00 -29.16 117.67 -11.23 
12 26.53 144.70 177.54 36.69 -56.73 -37.74 115.07 8.78 
13 0.00 30.19 102.69 10.25 -100.00 -59.45 23.70 -29.57 
14 0.00 88.74 251.43 10.34 -100.00 -38.48 50.12 -19.53 
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Table A3.24 Land allocation (ha) among crops in scenario 4 and percentage change respect to the baseline 
allocation 
Scenario 4 
 
% change scenario 4/baseline 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -61.36 -100.00 
2 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -94.86 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 1.76 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -50.07 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 3.46 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -42.03 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.14 0.00 0.00 -100.00 -94.60 -100.00 -100.00 
6 0.00 2.61 2.73 0.00 -100.00 -73.67 -48.15 -100.00 
7 0.00 0.00 1.45 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -42.00 -100.00 
8 0.00 1.08 2.05 0.00 -100.00 -82.25 -44.73 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -37.76 -100.00 
10 1.39 2.25 1.97 0.00 -56.33 -78.11 -37.52 -100.00 
11 0.00 0.40 0.06 0.00 -100.00 -90.23 -95.61 -100.00 
12 0.00 2.33 1.38 0.00 -100.00 -73.24 -57.89 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -75.80 -100.00 
14 0.00 0.85 3.34 0.20 -100.00 -91.53 -38.90 -87.60 
Medium farm sample 
1 0.00 1.64 5.73 0.00 -100.00 -92.67 -28.94 -100.00 
2 4.97 8.90 10.63 0.00 -76.46 -78.89 -50.30 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 7.79 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -47.79 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 15.34 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -44.74 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.00 9.38 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -33.44 -100.00 
6 0.00 0.00 13.36 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -36.84 -100.00 
7 0.00 7.04 5.70 0.00 -100.00 -70.20 -61.59 -100.00 
8 0.00 10.66 15.16 0.00 -100.00 -75.01 -50.00 -100.00 
9 0.27 2.24 5.05 0.00 -96.74 -88.67 -34.97 -100.00 
10 0.00 6.61 7.83 0.00 -100.00 -76.86 -53.15 -100.00 
11 0.00 3.66 5.59 0.00 -100.00 -86.55 -36.37 -100.00 
12 0.00 17.66 6.20 0.00 -100.00 -61.86 -70.13 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 10.38 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -35.17 -100.00 
14 0.00 0.00 11.55 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -51.51 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 21.59 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -39.17 -100.00 
2 0.75 71.20 0.00 0.00 -98.79 -54.74 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 47.59 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -51.14 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 88.02 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -44.24 -100.00 
5 0.00 13.59 22.52 0.00 -100.00 -85.15 -68.02 -100.00 
6 0.00 35.97 77.28 0.00 -100.00 -76.08 -52.94 -100.00 
7 0.00 31.12 40.28 0.00 -100.00 -70.73 -58.01 -100.00 
8 0.00 64.99 49.67 0.00 -100.00 -65.32 -62.72 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 33.15 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -37.57 -100.00 
10 4.39 54.05 30.50 0.00 -92.01 -65.60 -66.83 -100.00 
11 0.00 41.49 23.28 0.00 -100.00 -70.46 -59.60 -100.00 
12 0.00 32.79 49.71 4.66 -100.00 -85.89 -39.78 -86.19 
13 0.00 1.75 34.20 0.00 -100.00 -97.65 -58.80 -100.00 
14 0.00 24.60 79.93 0.00 -100.00 -82.95 -52.28 -100.00 
Incorporating risk in a PMP framework: the role of AESs as income stabilisers - Appendix 
125 
 
Table A3.25 Land allocation (ha) among crops in scenario 5 and percentage change respect to the baseline 
allocation 
Scenario 5 
 
% chanhe scenario 5/ baseline 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
 
Sugar beet C. Wheat Corn Barley 
Small farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -77.46 -100.00 
2 0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 -94.96 -100.00 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 1.02 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -71.09 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 2.04 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -65.87 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 -100.00 -96.93 -100.00 -100.00 
6 0.00 1.03 1.80 0.00 -100.00 -89.61 -65.89 -100.00 
7 0.00 0.00 0.86 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -65.81 -100.00 
8 0.00 0.16 1.45 0.00 -100.00 -97.31 -60.92 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 0.53 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -63.33 -100.00 
10 1.22 0.91 1.35 0.00 -61.56 -91.15 -57.11 -100.00 
11 0.00 0.26 0.00 0.00 -100.00 -93.71 -100.00 -100.00 
12 0.00 1.23 0.78 0.00 -100.00 -85.84 -76.33 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 0.34 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -84.82 -100.00 
14 0.00 0.00 2.32 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -57.54 -100.00 
Medium farm sample 
1 0.00 0.18 3.39 0.00 -100.00 -99.21 -57.96 -100.00 
2 3.31 3.79 6.34 0.00 -84.33 -91.00 -70.37 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 4.07 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -72.74 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 8.30 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -70.10 -100.00 
5 0.00 0.00 5.06 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -64.09 -100.00 
6 0.00 0.00 7.51 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -64.49 -100.00 
7 0.00 4.03 2.63 0.00 -100.00 -82.97 -82.28 -100.00 
8 0.00 4.22 9.10 0.00 -100.00 -90.10 -69.99 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.80 2.81 0.00 -100.00 -95.94 -63.83 -100.00 
10 0.00 3.28 4.20 0.00 -100.00 -88.52 -74.86 -100.00 
11 0.00 1.40 3.25 0.00 -100.00 -94.85 -63.04 -100.00 
12 0.00 11.04 1.91 0.00 -100.00 -76.15 -90.79 -100.00 
13 0.00 0.00 5.59 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -65.12 -100.00 
14 0.00 0.00 6.48 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -72.78 -100.00 
Large farm sample 
1 0.00 0.00 11.08 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -68.80 -100.00 
2 0.00 37.68 0.00 0.00 -100.00 -76.04 -100.00 -100.00 
3 0.00 0.00 24.88 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -74.45 -100.00 
4 0.00 0.00 46.21 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -70.72 -100.00 
5 0.00 7.29 11.48 0.00 -100.00 -92.04 -83.70 -100.00 
6 0.00 15.72 42.51 0.00 -100.00 -89.54 -74.11 -100.00 
7 0.00 17.89 19.41 0.00 -100.00 -83.18 -79.76 -100.00 
8 0.00 40.42 20.69 0.00 -100.00 -78.44 -84.47 -100.00 
9 0.00 0.00 17.00 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -67.99 -100.00 
10 0.00 33.15 10.75 0.00 -100.00 -78.90 -88.31 -100.00 
11 0.00 26.71 8.35 0.00 -100.00 -80.99 -85.51 -100.00 
12 0.00 16.11 27.49 0.76 -100.00 -93.07 -66.70 -97.75 
13 0.00 0.00 18.62 0.00 -100.00 -100.00 -77.57 -100.00 
14 0.00 7.48 45.61 0.00 -100.00 -94.82 -72.77 -100.00 
CONCLUSIONS 
Over the last decade the increasing connection between agriculture and the environment and 
the rising price volatility on agricultural markets has led to a new emphasis on agri-
environmental policy instruments as well as to a search for new risk management strategies 
for EU farmers. The CAP has reinforced these trends as the EU budget allocated to the AESs 
has grown over the years and the support of farmer’s income has shifted from market 
distorting mechanisms to direct payments to farmers. This focus will be the core of the CAP 
in the future as confirmed by the proposed reform of the CAP after 2013.  
This thesis has dealt with both these issues by analysing the AESs from two viewpoints. First, 
the AESs have been investigated with respect to their traditional role of measures promoting 
environmentally-friendly practices while compensating the farmer for the income foregone; 
later their potential role as farmer’s income stabilisers has also been explored. The evidence 
collected by answering the first research question (Chapter 2) have shown that the effects of 
the AESs on farmer’s performances as well as its environmental effectiveness differ across 
Member States. Moreover, it seems that the amount of the AE payment is worth to be revised 
in some Member States. The answer to the second research question (Chapter 3) have 
outlined that the AESs seem to play an additional role besides the aforementioned one. 
Indeed, we have found that they may act as an income risk management tool available to 
farmers, especially in scenarios of high crop price volatility. Finally, from a methodological 
point of view, the approach adopted in Chapter 3 represents one of the few attempts of 
integrating risk in a farm level PMP model, allowing the use of a calibrated model in 
analysing farm behaviour under uncertainty.  
The first research question addressed in this thesis shows the advantages of combining PSM 
with DID estimator in a non experimental setting as a way to remove the bias due to both 
observed and time-invariant unobserved variables when panel data are available. The results 
of our analysis highlight that the effects of AESs participation on farm’s performances differ 
across Member States likely because of the heterogeneity of agricultural characteristics and 
natural resources as well as the variability in the AESs implementation. Although the FADN 
data does not make any discrimination across the different AESs, our results may have some 
policy implications. First, the level of the AE payment is worthy to be revised in some 
countries, since it does not seem to provide a fair compensation to the farmers for their 
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income foregone arising from program’s participation. This is especially true in Spain, where 
the participation in the AESs has resulted in a large decrease of farmers’ income. The Italian 
and French participant farmers experience a decline in their income per hectare as well; 
however, their drop is not as sharp as the drop experienced in Spain. In Germany the AE 
payment seems to fairly compensate the income foregone of the participant farmers while in 
the UK the income per hectare is not negatively affected by AESs participation even in 
absence of the payment. This may explain why in Germany and UK the share of UAA under 
agri-environmental commitments is larger compared to the other countries considered. One 
may argue that a farmer is willing to participate in AESs only if he expects to increase his 
income by participation. However, the time lag between expectation and realisation may 
explain the actual negative impact on income of AESs adoption in some countries. In 
addition, once the farmer enters an AES is obliged to adopt it for at least five years.  
The second main finding of the first study concerns the ability of the AESs to promote 
sustainable practices in some countries, while in others it does not seem to be successful. The 
promotion of environmentally-friendly practises seems to be effective in France and Italy, 
where the participation in the AESs supports crop diversification, the conversion of a share of 
farmland to grassland and the decline in per hectare fertiliser expenditure. Encouraging 
sustainable farming have been successful also in Germany and in the UK, while in Spain the 
design of the AESs does not seem to generate any environmental benefit. It is worth to remark 
that it would be interesting to conduct the same analysis on each AE measure separately when 
data were available. This may lead to more detailed policy implications.  
The answer to the second research question of this thesis has led to the development of a new 
methodological approach to integrate price risk in a farm level PMP model. The approach 
shows some innovation compared to the few earlier attempts in this modelling area and a 
mathematical demonstration by the KKT conditions has proved its economic foundation. 
After a theoretical description of the model, its empirical application to three farm samples 
under different scenarios of crop price volatility has been implemented. The application aimed 
to check the calibration ability of the model and the ability in estimating farmer’s risk 
aversion coefficient consistent with the literature as well as to perform simulation scenarios to 
investigate the potential role of a specific AES (the option to convert a share of farmland to 
grassland) as a farm strategy to cope with risk. The estimation results have proved the ability 
of the model to calibrate to the observed activity levels in the base year as well as to estimate 
the farm non-linear cost function and the values of the farmers’ absolute risk aversion 
coefficients consistent with the literature. The simulated scenarios support the innovative 
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viewpoint on AESs as a potential farmers’ strategy to cope with income risk on agricultural 
markets characterized by high level of crop price volatility. While the share of farmland 
committed to grassland by risk neutral farmers is independent of the level of price volatility, 
the results of the simulations show an increase in this share for risk averse farmers when they 
face a rise in the price volatility and the extent of this increase depends on the degree of 
farmer’s risk aversion. The adoption of grassland program and the change in crop price 
volatility lead to a reallocation of crops on the farm. When price volatility is constrained at 
zero or it is set at a low level converting a share of farmland to grassland program depends 
mainly on the crop marginal profit. Under these scenarios the production of the less profitable 
crops, sugar beet and barley, decreases while the production of the most profitable crop, corn, 
grows. When crop price volatility is set at high level (e.g. twice baseline volatility) most 
medium and large farms of the samples combine the adoption of the grassland program with 
an increase in the share allocated to the less-risky sugar beet, while small farms rely on the 
conversion of a share of farmland to grassland as the sole risk management strategy.  
The use of AESs as a strategy against income fluctuation has been tested for grassland 
measures only. It would be interesting to check this potential role also for other AESs such as 
the option to converting to organic farming or to adopt crop diversification measures. We 
expect other AESs to contribute to income stabilisation, since they guarantee a share of 
farmers’ income independent of the market fluctuations.  
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